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Abstract 
Chapter one begins with a definition and exposition of the concept 
of theodicy, and a topology for chaDqaterizing comparative theodicies 
is suggested. It is argued that the basis on which theodicies might 
be compared is the foundational ontological principles on which they 
are built. Chapter two is a lengtliy discussion regarding the meaning 
of terms such as omnipotencel ognisciendel omnibenevolence, moral evil 
and natural evil. Chapter three begins with a critical analysis of a 
variety of theodicies found throughout the history of Christian theology* 
The final conclusion drawn in this chapter is that none of the proposed 
answers is acceptable. Acceptability is measured in three important ways: 
First, is the position logically consistent, second, does it conform, 
at least in a broad way9 to the major tenents of the Christian form of 
life, and third, does this position take the individual sufferer seri- 
ously? In chapter four a foundation is laid for a response to the problem c 
of evil which is to follow in chapter five* In this penultimate chapter 
an analysis of the Book of Job is offered which centers on the inter- 
pret'at - ion of Yahweh's speeches out of the whirlwind. It is suggested 
that the crux of Jobts repentance is to be understood in connection 
with Job "seeing God. " In chapter five, aý attempt is made, using 
the help of Karl Barth, D? M, Mackinnon, P. T. Forsyth, Ludwig Wittgen- 
stein and John Wisdom, as well as some insights gained from chapter 
fourgNthat there is a teleological response to the problem-of evil 
that is logically consistent, true to the Christian form of life and 
sehsitive to the needs of the individual snafferere 
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Introduction 
There is something the writers of introductions seldom reveal but 
I 
readers should never forget: though read first, they are written last. 
Introductions usually serve as a kind of conclusion set at the beginning 
of a work. It is for this reason no conclusion can be found at the end 
of this thesis. If one is wanted, it is quite easy to reread the 
introduction. A good introduction acts as a set of promises already 
delivered. It is perhaps best, then, that the introduction be read first, 
before the thesis, and then again upon its completion. It is a way of 
checking to see if promisory notes have been filled. 
This thesis is concerned with why the'world is not such an easy 
place in which to live. We, as its most sentient creatures, live daily in 
a morally ambiguous environment. Most of us experience contentment, 
happiness, and even profound joy, But these experiences are all too often 
interspersed with unwarranted suffering, excruciating pain and irrational 
violence. Although human life at times may seem like heaven on earth, it 
can also be more like scenes from a Kafka novel or a canvas of Edvard 
- Munch. This work is primarily concerned with the problem of reconciling 
these latter kinds of experiences with a God who is thought to be 
Omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. 
Chapter one begins with a definition and exposition of the concept 
of theodicy. As Peter Berger suggests, "Theodicy is the part of a belief 
system that serves to maintain religious meaning in spite of evil and 
suffering. " 
1 
1 
jeter Berger, The Sacred_Canopy (New York: Anchor Books, 1969) pp. 53-54. 
Berger maintains that is is possible to analyze historical types 
of theodicy on a continuum of rationality to irrationality. According to 
Bergerts scheme, theodicies can vary in type from an irrational 
identification of the self with society, as in primitive societies, to 
the most rational kinds of answers found to the problem of evil, those 
suggested in the Indian religious traditions. Somewhere between the most 
rational (karma-samsara) and the least rational (covenantal relationship 
of the ancient Hebrews), Berger lo cates several intermediate forms of 
theodicy which include this worldly compensation (cargo cults), other 
worldly compensation (ancient Egyptian religion), dualism (Platonic 
metaphysics and limited God theories), as well as most of the answers to 
the problem of evil offered in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
In this work, Berger's thesis is criticized on a number of fronts. 
First, he gives an insufficient definition of what it means to be 
"rational". Second, he examines these various theodicies from outside of 
each of the particular forms of life in which they are placed. It is 
argued that Berger makes many of the same kinds of intellectual mistakes 
found among members of what is sometimes. called the "Primitive Materials" 
tradition. E. B. Tylor, Max Muller and Sir James Frazer, for example, 
all too often seem to misunderstand or misinterpret the "primitive mind" 
because they frequently failed to understand the depth grammar of the 
cultures in which these religions were placed. 
Peter Winch's article, "Understanding a Primitive Society", and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer's 'The Golden Bough' are used in 
criticizing Berger's approach to comparative theodicy. 
3. 
In the remainder of the first chapter an alternative 
topology for 
characterizing comparative theodicies is suggested. It iS agVA %at 
. -the 
basis on which theodicies might be compared is the foundational 
ontological principles on which the various religious forms of life are 
built. Thus, monistic faiths like 'Brahmanic Hinduism a-ad Hinayana 
Buddýism might properly be called "religions of dissolution" with respect 
tp the problem of evil, for the adherents to these traditions maintain 
that at bottom level the phenomenal world, as well as the souls who 
inhabit that world, are illusory. The problem of evil, for these faiths, 
is not resolved, it is dissolved. 
A second cluster of theodicies might be labeled "religions of 
solution". This approach to the problem of evil is most dramatically 
displayed in the ancient Persian religion, Zoroastrianism. The religions 
of solution are fundamentally dualistic - the foundational ontological 
principle on which they are based is the notion that ultimate reality is 
essentially bifurcated. For these faiths, the. problem of evil is not 
dissolved, as it is for the monistic religions, it is solved. In addition 
to Zoroastrianism, the dualism of Plato and the limited God theorists can 
also be seen as offering Versions of the "religions of-solution" with 
respect to the problem of evil. 
A discussion of a third group of theodicies, the "religions of 
paradox"t follows. These traditions, chiefly Judaism and Christianity, 
are called religions- of paradox because they seem committed to a distinctive 
combination of monism and dualism, or an ethical dualism set within the 
framework of an ultimate ontological monism. The religions of paradox seem 
4. 
committed on the one hand to belief in a God whose attributes include 
omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence, while at the same time 
adhering to the notion that there is real evil in the world. 
In the end of this first chapter, J. L. Mackie's formulation of the 
]problem of evil is used to introduce the dilemma for the religions of* 
par . adox. 
In chapter two a lengthy discussion is developed regarding the 
meanings of terms like lomnipotencel, 'omniscience's tomnibenevolencel, 
'moral evil' and 'natural evilt. A variety of possible formulation for 
each of these terms is explored.. In each case an attempt is made to 
discern the most logically coherent definition of each term. Chapter two 
concludes with a discussion of whether the problem of evil, as formulated 
by the religions of paradox, -really 
involves one in a formal logical 
contra-diction. The notions of 'prima facie evil', 'apparent evil' and 
lactual evil' are also introduced toward the end of the second chapter. 
These concepts will be very important in understanding our final view of 
the problem of evil. 
Chapter three begins with a critical analysis of a variety of 
theodicies found in the Christian theological tradition. Twelve theodicies 
in all are discussed. These are divided into four basic groups: 
(1) Punishment and Warning theodicies; (2) Unreality of Evil theodicies; 
(3) Evil is Logically Necessary theodicies; and (4) Teleological 
Theodicies. The final conclusion drawn in this chapter is that none of 
the proposed'answers to the problem of evil is acceptable. Acceptability 
is measured in three important ways. First, is the position logically 
consistent. Second, does it conform, at least in a broad way, to the 
5. 
major tenets of the Christian form of life. And thirdt does this position 
take the individual sufferer seriously? 
I 
In Chapter four a foundation is laid for a response to the problem 
of evil which is to follow in chapter five. - In this penultimate chapter 
an analysis of the Book of Job is offered that centers on the interpretation 
of'the Yahweh speeches out of the whirlwind. Using the work of MacKenzie, - 
Rudolph Otto, George OtBrien, and others, it is suggested that the crux 
of the Yahweh speeches is to be understood in connection with Job "seeing 
God" in 42: 6. O'Brien suggests that the problem for Job switches from a 
formal one to an existential one, a common shift which'takes place when 
an overriding concern for an existential relation displaces the need for 
formal explanation. The chapter ends with O'Brien's insights being 
applied specifically to the problem of evil as it is formulated by the 
religions of paradox. 
Chapter five begins by reminding the reader of a distinction made 
clear in chapter three. There is was suggested that there are some 
0 
theodicies in the Christian tradition which seem to be prohibited by 
rea son. Because of one or more logical flaws, these responses fail as 
a 
consistent answers to the problem of evil. We have also seen that there 
are other theodicies which might be said to be allowed by reason. Hick's 
teleological response is numbered among these. Most of the theodicies 
that are allowed by reason, however, still fail as acceptable answers to 
the problem of evil, for-they fail the second and/or third criteria of 
an acceptable Christian theodicy. In Hickts case, his position fails, 
not on logical grounds, but because he gives insufficient weight to the 
person of Christ in his theodical scheme. Hick is correct to point out, 
--6-. 
I 
nevertheless, that any rationally coherent answer to the problem of evil 
must be teleological in nature. 
In the remainder of this thesis an attempt is made to argue, using 
the help of Karl Barth, D. M. MacKinnon, P. T. Forsyth, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
John Wisdom, and some insights gained from chapter four, that there is 
a teleological response to the problem of evil that is at the same time 
logically consistent, true to the Christian form of life, and sensitive 
to the needs of the individual Christian victim of suffering. 
17. 
Chapter One: The Varieties of Theodicy 
I stand near Soberanes Creek, on the knoll over the 
sea, west of the road. I remember 
This is the place where Arthur Barclay, a priest 
in revolt, proposed three questions to himself: 
First, is there a God, and of what nature? Second, 
whether there is anything after we die but worm's meat? 
Third, how should men live? Large -time-worn questions no doubt; yet he touched his answers, they are not 
unattainable; 
But presently lost them again to the glimmer of insanity. 
Robinscn Jeffers 
I want to be there when everyone suddenly Imows what it 
has all been for. All the religions of the world are 
built on this longing. 
Fyodor Dostoyevski 
In Escape from Evil Ernest Becker observes that "what man really 
fears is not so much extinction, but extinction with insignificance 
This holds true, I think, not only for the fear of death, but also for 
human responses to suffering. Death, disease and natural calamity are 
brutal reminders of how little control human beings have over the world. 
Although we often imagine ourselves immortal and impregnable, the cruel 
facts suggest that our physical existence is limited more or less to the 
Biblical seventy years. The presence of evil in the world is a terrible 
burden which demands a response* Thus, when we are confronted with it, 
"our lives become meditations on evil and a planned venture for controlling 
and forestalling it". 
2 And when that is not possible, for making meaninu 0 
out of it. 
Ernest Becker, EscaPe From Evil (New York: 'Free Press, 1975) p.. 2. 
2 
Ibid., P. 
. 
People in all cultures face problems that cannot be resolved either 
with the use of common sense or scientific expertise. To be human is to 
suffer and die, and to have one's aspirations and desires subject to 
failure and frustration. The transitoriness of life and the uncertainty 
that plagues human ventures confront all people with situations in which, 
as'soci6logist Thomas O'Dea has remarked, "Human knowledge and social 
forms display a total insufficiency for providing either means of 
solution or mechanisms for adjustment and acceptance.,, 
3 
It is clear that religious* systems provide, or attempt to provide, 
the contexts in which the existence of evil,. both moral and natural, is 
integrated into the larger picture of reality. Religious systems, if 
I 
they 
are to be lasting, must have something to say in what Paul Tillich has 
called "the boundary situations", when our capacity to say yes to life is 
most threatened. And that "something to say", I think, must consist of 
at least two important elements. First, religious responses to suffering 
must have an existential element. Indeed, the experience of suffering 
is first an existential one, an experience to be lived through. It is 
usually only later that it becomes an intellectual one to be explained. 
Clifford Geertz has come yery close to making this same point when he 
writes: "The problem of sýffering ist-paradoxically, not how to avoid 
suffering, but-how to make physical pain, personal loss, worldly defeat, 
or the helpless contemplation of others' agony something bearable, 
supportable, 'something, as we say, sufferable. ,4 
3 
Thomas O'Dea, Introduction to the-Sociology of Religion (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1966) p. 63. 
4 
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 
1973) p. 171. 
9. 
Religious responses to suffering must also exhibit another important 
dimension: they must deal with evil in a coherent and intellectually 
honest way. Religious forms of life must not only help the sufferer live 
through the experience of pain, disappointment and suffering, they must 
alsQ help the sufferer give meaning to the experience. 
The various ways in which the religions of the world have attempted 
to give meaning to suffering might be called the study of comparative 
5 theodicy, fr. om the Greek theos, and dike . Peter Berger, in his book, The 
Sacred Canopy, has suggested a typology that may be helpful in differentiating 
among various styles of theodicy making-6 The general vocabulary and 
system of categorization employed by Berger provide a rather neat 
-he problem hermeneutical. tool for interpreting the various responses to t 
of suffering. 
5 
Leibniz appears to have been the first to use the word Itheodicyl in its 
distinctive modern sense. In a letter written in 1697 he spoke of 
employing the term as the title of-an impending work, and in 1710 the 
work duly appeared. The complete title was Essais de Theodicees sur la 
Bonte de Dieu, la liberte de 11homme et 11origine du Mal. Since that 
time, the word Itheodicy' has been in common'use in French, German and 
English. The writing of Leibniz's essay actually came about because the 
Queen of Prussia had become distressed by the writings of the French 
iconoclast, Pierre Bayle. Bayle, who was a confirmed fideist, had 
suggested that faith was not only unsupported by reason, it actually ran 
contrary to it. Leibniz attempted to ease the Queents mind in light of 
Baylets work. Later in the century Leibniz's position would also be 
used to explain the Lisbon earthquake which killed 40POOO people in. 1747. 
In modern times, the usage and scope of the term Itheodicyl is often 
quite vague and ill-defined. Sometimes it is a synonym for philosophy of 
religion or philosophical theology. At other times, the term has a more 
specific meaning in keeping with its etymological origin. When we use 
the term it will be in connection with any. systematic religious response 
to the problem of evil. 
6 
Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York: Anchor Books, 1069) 
10. 
Berger begins by defining a theodicy as "the part of a, belief system 
that serves to maintain religious meaning in spite of evil and suffering 
7 
He very carefully points out that theodicies are by no means employed to 
make people happy, or even. necessarily to show them that they may be 
redeqmed. "Indeed"t he suggests, "some theodicies carry no promise of 
8 
rede'mption at all - except for the redeeming assurance of meaning itself". 
Nevertheless, Berger maintains 
It is possible to anaiyze historical types of theodicy on a 
continuum of rationality-irrationality. Each type represents 
a particular posture, in theory and practice, vis a vis the 
anomic phenomena to be legitimized or nomized. 9 
According to Berger's scheme, theodicies can vary in type from an 
irrational identification of the self with society, as in primitive societies 
or the covenantal relationship of the ancient Hebrews, to the most rational 
type of theodicy found in Indian religious forms of life - the "karma-samsara 
complex". Berger suggests that Vedantic Hinduism and Hinayana Buddhism 
should be considered the most rational form of. religious responses to 
suffering because these traditions are governed by a series of rewards and 
punishments in successive incarnations according to the degree to which one 
has been faithful to the tasks imposed by former lives. 
71bid., 
pp. 53-54. 
8 
Ibid., p. 60. 
91bid., Berger's analysis. of theodicy seems to lean very heavily on the 
earlier model offered by Max Weber in "Das Problem der Theodizee". in 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tubingen, 1947). In that work, Weber 
distinguishes between what he calls "four rational types of theodicy": 
the promise of compensation in this world; the promise of compensation 
in a world beyond; dualistic solutions; 
, 
and karmic theories. Weber, 
like Berger, finds the last of these to be the most "rational". It is 
also clear that Berger is deeply indebted to Emile Durkheim, especially 
the Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Collier Books, 1961), 
for the notion of the self-transcending character of religious 
institutions. 
LL 0 
Somewhere between these poles of the rational and the irrational 
Berger finds several intermediate forms which include "this worldlyty 
messianic-millinarianism (Jewish Sabbatianism and cargo cults), "other 
worldly". compensations (exemplified by the elaborate mortuary customs 
of the ancient Egyptians and Chinese), and dualism, in which all evil is 
ascribed to some ultimate reality. other than God. Berger cites 
Manicheanism, Mithraism, and Zoroastrianism as examples of this third 
type, though the view taken by John Stuart Mill in his Three Essays on 
Religion, as well. as Plato in the Timaeus, and E. S. Brightman in his 
Philosophy of Religion can also be seen to fall quite naturally in this 
category. 
10 
In this intermediary cluster of theodicies Berger also places more 
t 
I common types, especially in the West, such as those found in the Book pf 
Job, as well as those stressing the redemptive power of the suffering of 
an incarnate deity, as in most forms of Christianity. 
There is much to recommend Berger's work. Though he has clearly 
based his study on the pioneering work of Max Weber, Berger considerably 
- broadens the discussion by including an analysis of a number of traditions 
to which Weber has paid little or no attention. 
The Sacred Canopy is an ingenious and comprehensive piece of 
scholarship, 
11 but it is not without its conceptual problems. The major 
flaw in Berger's method of categorization seems to rest on his rather 
10 
The important distinctions among these various thinkers will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
11 
Other classifications of types of theodicies can be found in Brian 
Hebblethwaite's Evil, Suffering and Religion (London: Shelton Press, 
1979) pp. 14-39; Charles Barrett's Understanding the Christian Faith 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980) pp. -230-260; and 
John Hick's Evil and the God of Love (London: Macmillan and Co., 
1977) parts II and III. 
L2. - 
dubious assumption that one can clearly assess the comparative degree of 
rationality in each of the various theodicies. One would be hard pressed, 
I think, to come up with clear suffic*ent or even necessary conditions 
for calling something "rational". Alvin Plantinga points to this very 
sticlW problem: 
Now an apparently straightforward and promising way to 
approach this question would be to take a definition of 
rationality and see whether belief in God conforms to it. 
The chief difficulty with this appealing approach, however, 
is that no such definition of rationality seems to be 
available. If there were such a definition, it would set 
out some conditions for a beliefts being rationally 
acceptable, conditions that are severally necessary and 
jointly sufficient. That is each of the conditions would 
have to be met by a belief that is rationally acceptable; 
and if a belief met all these conditions, then it would 
follow that it is rationally acceptable. But it is 
monumentally difficult to find any non-trivial necessary 
conditions at all. 12 
Nowhere in Berger's chapter on theodicy. does he entertain the 
question of what the proper definition of the "rational" might be. Indeed, 
it may well be the case that by examining various religious forms of life 
from the outside, and measuring them by use of a rather murky and implicit 
notion of rationality, Berger has missed the particular coherence of each, 
in the same way that Americans sit bored and confused at a cricket match 
until suddenly they understand the rules of the game. 
In some ways Berger succumbs to the same intellectual elitism that 
was present among anthropologists and sociologists of religion at the end 
of the last century and the beginning of this one. Individuals like 
E. B. Tylor, Max Muller and Sir James Frazer, all began with certain 
assumptions about the level of "rationality" among "primitive" peoples, 
12 
Alvin Plantinga, "Rationality and Religious Belief", Nous., V01- 15 (1981) pp. 41-42. 
and then developed elaborate theories about the origin of religion based 
on the study of the "pre-logical" frames of mind of these people. 
13 
In some of the literature from this period "primitives" were not 
labelled "irrational" or "pre-logical" but rather . "unscientific". Perhaps 
one of the clearest examples is to be found in E. E. Evans-Pritchardts 
WitAraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azandes. 
14 Evans-Pritchard suggests 
that the African Azandes believe that some of the members of their tribe 
are witches capable of varioils occult influences on the tribe and its 
individual members. Given'this belief about witches, the sorts of activities 
the Azandes engage in with reference to these particular members of society 
are quite understandable; indeed, quite logical. But Evans-Pritchard 
indicates that although the Azandes are logical, they reason unscientifically, 
for they don't check their truth claims in a scientific way. 
Peter Winch in an influential article, "Understanding a Primitive 
Society". ' objects to Evans-Pritchard's point of view. Winch suggests 
that hidden in Evans-Pritchard's perspective is the assumption that the 
Azandes view of witches must be seen as a possible scientific claim. 
Winch also objects to the notion that "being in accord with objective 
reality" can only be understood within the context of scientific 
reasoning. Indeed, he suggests that Evans-Pritchard's notion of "reality" 
and "being in accord with reality" are really shorthand ways of saying 
"that which is verified by science", and it is only w ithin this context 
13 
Cf.: E. B. Tylorls Primitive Culture, two volumes (London: Longmans 3rd 
edition, 1891); Max Muller's Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion 
(London: Longmans, 1878); and Sir James Frazer's The Golden BouRh (London: 
Longmans, 1914), particularly parts ii and x and Belief in Immortality and 
Worship of the Dead, Gifford Lectures, St Andrew! ý, 1913. 
14 
E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azandes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3rd edition, 1976) 
15 
Peter Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society", American 
guarterly., Vol. 1 (1964) pp. 307-324. 
--14. - 
that Evans-Pritchard's comments are intelligible. Winch remarks: 
Evans-Pritchard is trying to work with a conception of 
reality which is not determined by its actual use in 
language. He wants something against which that use 
itself can be appraised. But this is not possible; and 
no more possible in the case of scientific discourse 
than It is in any other. We may ask whether a particular 
scientific hypothesis agrees with reality and test this 
observation and experiment. Given the experimental 
methods, and the established use of the theoretical 
terms entering into the hypothesis, then the question 
whether it holds or not is settled by reference to something 
independent of what I, or anybody else, care to think. But 
the general nature of the data revealed by the experiment 
can only be specified in terms of criteria built into the 
methods of the experiment employed and these, in turn, make 
sense only to someone who is conversant with the kind of 
scientific activity within which they are employed. 16 
Winch continues by arguing that there are other contexts where 
"reality" and "being in accordance with reality" are also meaningful, and 
these may have little. or nothing to do with scientific views of the world. 
Winch is not proposing a new kind of relativism here. 
17 What he is doing, 
I think, is sketching. cut in a more definitive way some remarks made by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein regarding the realization that we cannot determine the 
meaning of a concept disconnected from the use that particular concept is 
- given in a certain language game* 
18 Whether and how language is 
meaningful can only be determined from inside that particular language 
game. Berger attempts to stand outside the traditions he has analyzed, 
as if he could be an ideal observer in these matters, and has tried to 
discern which theodicies are the most rational and which the least. But 
16 
Rld., P. 309. 
17 
A more detailed discussion of why I think that Winch and Wittgenstein 
are not epistemological relativists is carried on in chapter five of 
this thesiv. 
18 
There is an extensive collection of Wittgenstein's notes on this issue 
of understanding radically different "forms of life", which he made in 
connection with reading James Frazet's The Golden Bough. Remarks on 
Frazer's 'The Golden Bough', edited by Rush Rhees (London: Brynmill 
Press, 1979). 
in taking this kind of approach he fails to take into account the contexts 
in which each of these particular answers to the problem of evil is placed. 
Winch sums all this up quite well: 
The check of the independently real is not peculiar to science. 
The trouble is that the fascination science has had on us makes 
it easy for us to adopt its scientific for. m as a paradigm 
against which to measure the intellectual respectability of 
other modes of discourse. Consider what God says to Job out of 
the whirlwind: "Who is it that darkens counsel by words 
without knowledge? ... Where wast thou. when I laid the foundations of the earth? Declare if thou hast understanding. 
Who hath laid the measures thereof, Tell-me, if thou knowest? 
Or who. hath stretched the line upon it? .... Shall he that 
contendeth with the Almighty instruct him? He that reproveth 
God, let him answer it. " Job is taken to task for having gone 
astray by having lost sight of the reality of God; this does 
-not, of course, mean that Job has made any sort of theoretical 
mistake, which couid be put right, perhaps by means of 
experiment. God's reality is certainly independent of what any 
man may care to think, but what reality amounts to can be seen 
from the religious tradition in which the concept of God is 
used, and this use is very unlike the use of scientific concepts, 
say of theoretical entities. The point is that it is within the 
religious use of language that the conception of God's reality 
has its place, though, I repeat, this does not mean that it is 
at the mercy of what anyone cares to say; if this were so, God 
would have no reality. lV 
Wittgenstein makes several remarks about Sir James Frazer's The Golden 
Dough which amount to the same thing. One of Wittgenstein's major objections 
to Frazerls work is that the latter makes the beliefs of the peoples he 
studied look like mistakes or false hypotheses. Wittgenstein puts the matter 
this way: 
Frazer says it is very difficult to d 
magic and this is why it persists for 
example, a ceremony which is supposed 
to appear effective sooner or later. 
that people do not notice sooner that 
or later. 20 
iscover the error in 
so long - because, f or 
to bring rain is sure 
But then it is, queer 
it does not rain sooner 
19. Ibid., pp. 308-309. 
2 OWittgenstein, Remarks on'Frazer's "The Golden Bough', p. 2. 
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Berger, in judging-these various theodicies according to their 
degree of rationality, seems to commit the same kind of error. He has some 
notion of what it would mean to think or act rationally, and he applies 
this notion quite unreflectively to the traditions in question. 
Another important problem with Berger's typology is that it ignores 
seve'ral of the most important responses to the problem of evil to be found 
the Western tradition. Little or no mention is made, for example, of 
retributive justice, the idea that evil is God's tool for punishing the 
guilty or warning those who are tempted to sin. He also makes little 
reference to the contrast theodicy, the notion of evil as privation, the 
free will defense, or various teleological theodicies that have been 
21 
offered in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
A third and perhaps most important flaw in the method of categorization 
found in The Sacred Canopy is that Berger gives very little attention to 
the various presupposed ontological underpinnings of each of the traditions' 
answers. If more time had been spent in looking for what Wittgenstein 
called. 11the hidden grammar" of each of these faiths, a very different 
typology might have resulted. 
22 
I would suggest that we might place in one group Brahmanic Hinduism 
and Theravadan Buddhism. Although Berger is correct to point out that 
these two religions share the important notions of karmic rebirth and 
transmigration, he says nothing about an even more crucial metaphysical 
presupposition which they have in common: that the individual personality 
21 
This same point might be made regarding the other traditions Berger has 
mentioned as well. In the Hebraic tradition, for example, one can 
-identify at least the following: the yetzer ha ra, the richly 
mythologi: cal response of the Kabbalists, the Fall story in Genesis 3, 
the resurrection response in Daniel 12, etc. I suspect that the same 
kind of variety could also be found in the other traditions as well. 
22 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell and Mott, 1953) section 373. 
-- If, -- - 
or soul is obliterated at nirvana or moksha. For both the Vedantic Hindus, 
as well as the small raft Buddhists, it is that instant when it will become 
clear that the phenomenal world, as well as the individual personalities 
in that world, were fundamentally illusory. Reality for both of these 
religious traditions collapses into a kind of ultimate monism. As John 
Bowker suggests: 
The individual who has an adequate grasp of Brahman will find 
that suffering falls away in insignificance. Since everything 
that happens is a manifestation of Brahman, it follows that 
true understanding only arises when the accidents of time and 
space are penetrated and seen to reveal Brahman. Brahman pervades 
all things without being exhausted in any-one of them; which 
means that suffering and sorrow cannot be the final truth of 
existence. 23 
The Katha Upanisad makes the same point about the fundamental monistic 
character of ultimate reality: 
As fire, which is one, entering-this world becomes varied in 
shape according to the object it burns, so also the one Self 
within all beings becomes varied according to whatever it 
enters and also-exists outside them all. As air which is one, 
entering this world becomes varied in shape according to 
whatever it enters and also exists outside them all. Just 
as the sun, the eye of the whole world, is not defiled by the 
external faults seen by the eye, even so the one within ' 
all 
beings is not tainted by the sorrow of the world, as he is 
outside the world. 24 - 
Bowker expresses the relationship between this ultimate monism and 
the problem of evil quite well: 
Suffering occurs as a problem for Hinduism only when duality 
in the universe, the contrast between pain and pleasure, is 
seen as an abiding truth about existence. Then, inevitably* 
the individual self spends itself in trying to find a solid 
23 
John Bowker, Problems of Sufferi 
Cambridge University Press, 1970 
in the ReliRions of the World (London: 
p. 212. 
24 
Katha Upanisad 
' ., 
ii, 2,9-11 in The Principal Upanisads., translated by 
Sri Purchit Swami and W. B. Yeats (London: Faber and Faber, 1937). 
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and secure home in objects that prove ephemeral and transitory. 
Suffering ceases to be a problem when it is realised that the 
individual self can transcend occurrences of suffering by 
finding its identity in Brahmin. 25 
26 
If the phenomenal world and all that it contains is an illusiont 
then there can be no Individual personalities. Of course, where there are 
no individual personalities, there can be no individual suffering. Where 
-*there is no individual suffering, there can be no problem of evil. The 
27 
problem of evil is not solved in these monistic faiths, it is dissolved. 
Thus we might call this first type. of response to the problem of evil the 
"religions of dissolution". 
A second cluster of. theodical responses might be labelled, "religions 
of solution", for rather than dissolving the problem of evil, they attempt 
to solve it. Religions of solution are most dramatically exemplified in 
the ancient Persian faith, Zoroastrianism. Religions of solution can be 
easily identified by two necessary conditions which taken together become 
sufficient. First, they are committed to an ethical dualism. In these 
25 
Bowker, Problems of Suffering., p. 215. It should also be pointed out 
here that both Hinduism and Buddhism have a number of other alternative 
explanations for suffering. Theravadan Buddhism, for example, postulates 
the four noble truths as the sine qua_non of the problem of evil. The 
various sects of Mahayana Buddhism and sectarian Hinduism have also 
developed highly mythologized responses to the problem of suffering,. 
sometimes quite different from the traditional monistic answer offered by 
the religions of dissolution. 
26 
A rather beautiful poetic Hindu account of the illusory character of the 
world of the senses can be seen in the Indian tale of Vishnu and Narda. 
Lord Vishnu grants the wish of Narda that he be shown the secret of maya (the illusory nature of the phenomenal world). But before revealing the 
secret Vishnu requests Narda bring him a drink of water. The disciple 
goes to a nearby village seeking to fulfill the Lord's request.. While 
in the village, however, he quickly falls in love, marries, has children. 
Several years pass. Finally, one day a severe flood carries away his 
wife and children. Grief stricken, Narda collapses into darkness. But 
upon awakening he-hears the comforting voice of Lord Vishnu. "Where 
is the water you have gone to fetch me? I have been waiting here for 
more than a half an hour. " Heinrich Zimmer, Myths and Symbols in Indian 
Art and Civilization (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 19ý1')--p-p. 32-34- 
27 
A curious echoing of this monistic position toward the problem of evil 
can be found in Mary Baker Eddy's Christian Science, where the reality 
19. 
faiths human beings are thought to'be endowed with freedom of choice and 
thus have the power'to choose between two real alternatives, good and evil. 
The other necessary condition is that adherents to the religions of 
solution are committed to a metaphysical presupposition that there is at 
least one other eternal principle in the universe besides God. 
28 
Geddes MacGregor points quite clearly to the gist of these two 
necessary conditions when he writes: 
God, tbough indeed as benevolent as the devout say, eternally 
faces conditions-not of his own making. As in the Timaeus, 
God is the divine artist ever working on a recalcitrant and 
eternal stuff. Upon this inchoate stuff, he isýimposing 
order. The stuff is ? evil' in the sense that it can be an 
obstacle that the divine goodness has to overcome and 
subdue. All the chance and arbitrariness commonly associated 
with the naturalist view of the universe are in it. ' It is 
physic (nature). To say that nature is cruel is to read into 
it human interpretation. Nature is simply indifferent; but 
-that seems as cruel as when sailors talk of the 'cruel seas', 
which of course are cruel only in the sense in which a brick 
of the phenomenal world is upheld, while the reality of evil is not. 
More sophisticated versions of Western monism can be found in the 
writings of Spinoza(Ethics trans. by W. Hale White, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1930) and in Nicholas Bedyaev's The Destiny of Man 
(Glasgow: The University Press, 1954). In that work, Bedyaev makes the 
following rather cryptic remark: "The feud between the creator and the 
creature which overshadows our whole existence concerns evil and its 
origins. And the struggle against the Creator is waged not only by those 
who distort with evil the image of the created world, but also by those 
who suffer from the evil in it ... The good as well as the wicked rebel 
against God, for they cannot reconcile themselves to the existence of evil. 
The wicked hate God because He prevents them from doing evil, and the good 
are ready to hate Him for not preventing the wicked from doing evil, and 
for allowing the existence of evil. " (p. 23). With all this said, 
however, Bedyaev then proceeds to offer a dissolution of the-problem of 
evil along the lines of German mystical theology. 
28 
I have used the phrase "at lpast one other eternal principle" here for it 
is logically possible that there could be more than two gods, for example, 
who were exactly equal in power and intelligence and ruled the universe. 
An unstated dimension of this second necessary condition is that at least 
one of these eternal principles cannot be overcome by the other. If that 
were not an implied feature of the second necessary condition then both 
Judaism and Christianity would have to be considered as members of the 
religions of solution. I will argue later that because of the traditional 
attributes of God, neither Judaism nor Christianity can correctly be 
viewed as religions of solution. 
20. 
wall seems cruel to me when I run into it. In this view even 
God finds nature like that, and in our struggle with nature we 
find ourselveb co-workers with God. The scope of this struggle 
is presumably far greater than ours and his power and skill far 
beyond ours in coping with nature, but the task is essentially 
the same. 29 
An example of the religions of solution where this competing force 
takes on the character of a personified deity can be seen in Zoroastrianism. 
-In this ancient Persian tradition there is a belief in two eternally 
opposed deities. One, Ahura Mazda, is totally good, while his counterpart, 
Angra Mainyaý is thought to be absolutely evil. The radical conflict 
between these two gods is evident throughout the nature of the universe 
and human life. In the Zoroastrian view the conflict between good and evil 
on earth is an indication of the fundamental cleavage at the very root of 
being. The daily conflicts between good and evil in our characters and 
lives is only a manifestation of the universal war between these two eternal 
powers. 
Zoraster, the prophet, puts it this way: 
I will speak out concerning the two spirits of whom, at the 
beginning of existence, the holier spoke to him who is evil: 
"Neither our thoughts, nor our teachings, nor our wills, nor 
our choices, nor our words, nor our deeds, nor our convictions, 
nor yet our souls agree. 30 
And again, Zoroaster points to this fundamental split in reality: 
In the beginning the two spirits who are well endowed twins 
were known as the one good and the other evil in thought, 
word and deed. Between them, the wise chose the good, not so 
the fools. And when these spirits met they established in the 
beginning life and death that in the end the evil should meet 
with the worst existence, but the just with the best mind. Of 
these two spirits, he who was of the lie chose to do the worst 
things; but the most*holy spirit, clothed in heaven chose 
29 
Geddes MacGregor, Philosophical Issues in Religious Thought (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973) P. 149. 
30 
A compeidium of R. C. Zaehner, editor, The Teachin-gs of the Magi: 
Zoroastrian Beliefs (London, 1956) Yasna xlv. 2. 
A. L. 
righteousness (or truth) ... as did all those who sought with 
zeal to do the pleasure of the wise lord by doing good works. 
31 
In these two passages Zoroaster implies the metaphysical dualism that 
underlies his faith by suggesting that Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainya are 
twins, identical, eternal, and presumably equal in p9wer and strength. 
This ontological dualism is the key to understanding the duality of human 
lif e, and thus brings us to the Zoroastrian answer to the problem of evil. 
Rýil has its source in the bad god, Angra Mainya. Human beings, through 
their volitions, can choose to ally themselves with "he who was the lie", 
or with the good god, Ahura Mazda. The problem of evil is solved, not 
dissolved, by turning toward the good god. This position is logically 
sound, indeed, perhaps-irrefutable, because the Zoroastrian ethical dualism 
corresponds rather neatly to their basic metaphysical presuppositions about 
ultimate reality. 
A somewhat milder form of the religions of solution, and one that is 
much closer to the quotation by MacGregor, can be found in sections 30a to 
48 of Plato's Timaeust as well as Book x of the Laws and Book II of 
The RepjLblic, where Plato devises the following dialogue: 
Goodness, then, is not responsible for everything, but only 
for what is as it should be. It is-not responsible for evil. 
I agree. 
It follows, then, that the divine being, being good, is not, 
as most people say, responsible for everything that happens 
to mankind, but only for a small part; for the good things 
in human life are far fewer than the evil, and, whereas the 
good must be ascribed t 32 heaven only, we must look elsewhere 
for the causes of evil. 
31 
Lbid., Yasna xxx 3-6. 
32 
Plato, The ReDublic, F. MacD. Conford, 
Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 71. 
translator, Book 11,379 (London: 
In Book x of the Laws and section 29 of the Timaeus, Plato makes 
similar references to the notion that god is not the cause of evil. 
33 If 
we look carefully at these texts, it becomes clear that Plato has made this 
assertion for two reasons: First, the souls, although created by the 
demiurge, once made, have autonomy and thus the power to initiate evil. 
34 
And-decond, unlike the god of the Old Testament,, Platols god does not 
create ex nihilo. Instead, he brings order to. a pre-existent chaos. 
35 And 
some of that chaotic stuff remains eternally resistant to change. 
Plato answers the question of the origin of evil by suggesting that 
it ostensibly could have two sources: the souls or the unordered chaos. 
His position can be seen as a religion of solution, for it meets our two 
necessary conditions cited above. First, like Zoroastrianism, Plato's 
position includes a commitment to ethical dualism. And second, his position 
presupposes a metaphysical notion that there are two eternal substances, 
the demiurge and at least some elements of the pre-existent chaos which 
predate the existence of the souls. 
Various forms of the finite deity doctrine popular among modern 
. Western thinkers might also serve as good illustrations of 
the religions of 
solution. The first appearance of the finite deity doctrine in modern 
philosophy can probably be attributed to David Hume. 
36 Since the late 18th 
century, this position has not suffered from a lack of supporters. John 
Stuart Mill, E. S. Brightman, H. G. Wells, John MeTaggert, Albert Einstein, 
33 
Plato's Timaeus and Critias, A. E. Taylor, translator, (London: Methuen 
and Company, 1929) pp. 26-27; Platols Laws, Trevor J. Saunders, translator, 
(London: Penguin Books, 1970) pp. 437ff. 
34 
Plato's Timaeus, 39e to 42, pp. 36-40. 
35 
Ibid., 47-48, pp. 45-47. 
36 
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (New York: Hafner 
Publishing Co., 1959), particularly sections xi and xii. 
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F. H. Ross and Peter Bertocci, have all at one time or another identified 
themselves as believers in a finite god doctrine. 
37 
John. Hick rightly points out, however, that there are really two 
different but related finite deity doctrines; 
38 he refers to the first 
as "external dualism", and suggests that this position is best characterized 
by John Stuart Mill. The other position he calls "internal dualism". It 
cýLn most clearly be seen in the work of E. S. Brightman. The difference 
between the two would seem to reside in the fact that in the external 
variety the limitations on God's power come from the outside (as in Plato), 
while in the internal version the limitations can be seen as coming from 
a given to be found in the nature of the deity itself. 
Brightman refers to this limitation in God's nature when he says: 
The Given consists of the eternal uncreated laws of reason 
and also equally eternal and uncreated processes of non- 
rational consciousness which exhibits all the ultimate 
qualities of sense objects (qualia), disorderly impulses 
and desires, and experiences of pain and suffering, the 
forms of space and time, and whatever izI God is the source 
of surd evil. 39 
Although this passage suffers from a crusty opaquenessy the point to 
- be made, I think, is that evil, whatever it may be, is not something willed 
by God, but rather an eternal part of his nature. Hick seems to take the 
same view of the passage in question when he comments: 
37 
J. S .. Mill, Three Essays on Religion (London: Longmans Green, 1885); 
E S; 
)Brightman, 
A Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1ý4 H. G. Wells, God the Invisible King (London: 1936); John McTaggert, 
Some Dogmas of ReliRion (London: Edward Arnold, 1906); Albert Einstein, 
Out of My Later Years (New York: 1950); F. H. Rossp Personalism and the 
Problem of Evil (Re-w Haven: Yale University Press, -19-40-y; Peter Bertocci, 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice Hall, 1951). 
38 
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, pp. 31-39. 
39 
Brightman, Philosophy of Religi6n, P. 337. 
I 
He (Brightman) unites under one label of deity two diametrically 
opposed realities, namely the perfect and holy will of God and 
the evil natuýe that'opposes that will. 40 
If Hick is correct about Brightman, and I believe that he isq it 
should be clear that Brightman's internal dualism meets our conditions for 
a religion of solution. Whether it possesses the same internal consistency 
as Zoroastrianism or the metaphysics of Plato, is, of course, another 
qýiestion. 
41 
John Stuart Mill's external dualism, on the other hand, seems quite 
logically consistent. In discussing the source of natural evil Mill 
suggests the following possibilities: 
There is no ground in Natural Theology for attributing 
intelligence or personality to the obstacles which partially 
thwart what seems the purpose of the Creator. The limitations 
of His power more probably result either from the quality of 
the material - the substance and forcer, of which the universe 
is composed not admitting of any arrangements by which His 
purposes could be more completely fulfilled; or else the purpose 
might have been more fully attained, but the Creator did not 
know how to do it; creative skill, wondrous as it is, was not 42 
sufficiently perfect to accomplish his purpose more thoroughly. 
Either scenario painted by Mill in the passage above would be sufficient 
to produce a solution to the problem of evil. If God is not all powerful, 
there is nothing he can do about certain aspects of the make-up of the 
universe. If he is not all knowing, he might be quite capable. of doing 
40 - Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 39. 
41 
Mr Peter Coxon, Lecturer in Hebrew and Old Testament at the University of 
St Andrews has suggested to me that this view of God may be quite like 
that expressed in some of the earliest portions of the Old Testament. 
There, he suggests, God is seen as good, but also as possessing a darker 
more malevolent side 
* 
as well. Carl Jung also expresses a similar point 
of view in his Answer to Job, translated by R. F. C. Hull, (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
42 1 Mill, Th ee Essays on Religion, pp. 176-177. 
something about natural evil, but not at all sure about how to go about 
43 it. Another possibility'that Mill does not entertain is that God is 
omniscient in all matters except with respect to the existence of evil. 
Mill does not explicitly state his position on the origin of moral 
evil, but Hick suggests the following reading of Mill: 
Presumably, he (Mill) would have to hold that matter and 
energy together with the laws of their operation, as to the 
circumstances-that God had not created and with which he had 
to contend, somehow necessitates mants moral frailty and 
failure. He would presumably argue that such a psycho- 
physical creature as man, organic to his material environment 
and subjected by it to a multitude of strains and stresses, 
must inevitably become self-centred, and that from this 
circumstance have developed the moral ills of human life. 
44 
Hick makes an additional observation about Mill's position: 
Nor does this seem to be an unreasonable speculation. This 
form of dualism is capable of-being expanded into a 
comprehensive and consistent position, and one that has the 
great merit that it solves the problem of evil. 45 
McTaggert seems to follow the same basic line of thought on this 
issue: 
It seems to me that when believers in God save his goodness by 
saying that he is really not omnipotent, they are taking the 
best course open to them, since both the personality and 
goodness of God present much fewer difficulties if he is not 
conceived as omnipotent. 46 
43 
Some of the lesser known versions of external dualism include: Christian 
Ehrenfels's Cosmology, translated by Mildred Focht (New York: Comet Press, 
1948) and Edwin Lewi . s"s The Creation and the Adversary (New York: Abingdon 
and Cokesbury Press, 1948). Also, a new version of the external limited 
God theory has recently appeared in a very popular book in both Great 
Britain and the United States entitled, When Bad Things Happen to Good 
People by Harold Kushner (London: Pan Books, 1982). Kushner's position 
very much resembles that of Millts, which is why it is odd to find Gerald 
Priestland's comment on the back of the book: "Rabbi Kushner writes with 
a wealth of Jewish wisdom and pastoral devotion, but his theology is, I 
find, wholly in keeping with contemporary Christian thought". 
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Hick, Evil and the God of Love, pp. 34-35. 
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Ibid., P. 34. 
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McTaggert, Some Dogmas of Religion, p. 243. 
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A little further on, McTaggert concludes: 
It is not a v*ery cheerful creed, unless it can be supplemented 
by some other dogmas which can assure us of God's eventual 
victory. But it is less depressing and less revolting than 
the belief that the destinies of the universe are at the mercy 
of a being who, with the resource of omnipotence at his 
disposal, decided to make a universe no better than this. 47 
Another modeiýn version of the limited God theory, and therefore, a 
religion of solution as well, can be found in the doctrine known as 
panentheism, or what is more often called the., process view of God. This 
position ha6 its historical roots in. Platols Timaeus, and they extend up 
through Socinus in the 16th century, to modern thinkers such as Alfred 
48 North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, 
Although Whitehead's contributions to process thought are immense, 
in many ways his thought is much more difficult and inaccessible than 
Hartshorne. 49 Like the rest of Whitehead's philosophy, his thoughts on 
God are frequently expressed in highly technical language. Often, it is 
not fully worked out. For these reasons, it seems best to comment on 
Hartshorne's version of process theology rather than that of Whitehead. 
47 
Ibid., p. 244. 
48 
Geddes MacGregor on p. 
. 
149 of his PhilosoPhical Issues in'Religious Thouzpht 
suggests some affinities between Whitehead and Brightman. Hick makes a 
similar judgement in Evil and the God of Love, p. 36. 
49 
There are some important differences between Whitehead afid Hartshorne that 
should not go unmentioned. Whitehead employs an empirical method. His 
metaphysical understanding is reached through seeking to identify by 
empirical analysis those elements which are necessary to all experience as 
human bodies. Hartshorne seems much more committed to using spriori 
reasoning to reach his conclusions. He suggests that since metaphysical 
truths are apriori truths, they apply to any state of affairs. Still, for 
all their differences, Whitehead and Hartshorne share a common view of 
reality. What is real for both is what is in process. To be unchanging in all respects is to be inert, abstract or dead. To be actual, in their 
view, is not to be static, but rather a momentary event in a series of 
events in which each successive actual occasion creatively determines itself. 
ArV 
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For Charles Hartshorne, God is as good as it is now possible for him 
to be., God is, in effect, developing, improving, and has not yet managed 
to eliminate evil, if such an elimination can ever occur. As human beings 
struggle against both natural and moral evils, we can assist God in his 
50 
own_development. In Hartshorne's version of the finite deity;, -theory 
God cannot know the future, hence he can never be absolutely certain about 
how the details of history will work out. According to Hartshorne, this 
fact is due both to the randomness of nature and because he has endowed 
human beings with freedom of choicd. Because God is situated in time, 
and was not the creator of the uniVerse, he suffers and rejoices with 
human beings, but he cannot control them. God. and humans may enter into a 
partnership, aligned in a project to reduce or eradicate evil, but God 
cannot force them to assist him.. Any conforming to God's will comes about 
through persuasion, not coercion. 
Hartshorne believes that his model will solve the problem of evil for 
0 the theist. If God is subject to the limitations of the'basic structure 
of a universe he did not. create, then the laws of that universe are eternal 
necessities, not matters that could be altered by divine decision. Thus, 
Hartshorne has a ready-made answer to the problem of evil. The process 
answer to the problem of moral evil can best be under. stood by looking at 
the following quotation from David Ray Griffen, a member of the youngest 
generation of process thinkers: 
God does not refrain from controlling creatures simply because 
it is better for God to use persuasion, but because it is ' necessaril the case that God cannot completely control his 
creature. s. 
h 
50 
Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity (New Haven': Yale University 
Press, 1948) pp. 134ff. 
51 
David Ray Griffen, God, Power and Evil (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1976) p. 276. 
1011, 
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Since omnipotence, forthe process-thinkers, does not involve 
omicausality, there is no'logical commitment to God being the active cause 
of all moral evil existing in the world. When moral evil is introduced 
into the world it is through human initiative, not divine. In the process 
view, mankind is responsible for the ubiquitous moral evil in the world, 
not God. And since God suffers as. the world suffers, the pain we inflict 
on our fellow humans is ultimately inflicted on God as well. 
But the problem of theodicy, is not completely solved by making room 
for human freedom and-responsibility. God suffers with us not only in 
our sinfulness, but also in our finitude. Much of the pain and suffering 
in the world is not the result of human volitions. It comes as the result 
of the structure of the universe being the way it is. Nothing immoral is 
; involved when man A and man B are both interested in the same beautiful, 
intelligent woman. But at least one of those suitors is doomed to failure 
and its accompanying pain. In process thought, God did not make the 
universe the way it is, a universe which appears to be necessary,, 
52 
and in 
which the fulfillment of competing interests is incompossible, that is, 
- possible separately, but not possible at the same time. 
Thus, we see that Hartshorne's position on the problem of evil is 
52 
This is another important place where Whitehead and Hartshorne disagree. 
Whitehead argýes that the ultimate metaphysical principles on which the 
universe operates were initially established by divine, primordial fiat. 
Hartshorne, and Griffen as well, suggest that these laws of the universe 
are necessities. For a discussion of Hartshorne's differences from 
Whitehead see Hartshorne's "On some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy", 
The Philosophical Review vol. 44, no. 4 (1935). 
quite'similar to the external forms of the-limited God theory. 
53 There 
is something about the universe which will not, or could not, conform to 
the deity's wishes. The God of process thought is not. omnipotent, either 
with respect to human beings or the universe as a whole, nor is he 
omniscient with respect to the future. Jim Garrison, much influenced by 
the process perspectives of Hartshorne and. J. A. T. Robinson, shows clearly 
t. hat the degree of human freedom suggested in the process point of view 
makes the tr aditional conception of Goýls omniscience inappropriate. He 
makes. a similar remark about God's omnipotence: 
Thirdly, while God does 
' 
commit'what we define as intrinsic 
evil as well as what we define as intrinsic good, God as 
infinitely free and powerful (though not omnipotent), can 
use those intrinsically evil and good acts committed by 54 
God and humanity alike-instrumentally for a higher purpose. 
The process perspective qualifies as a religion of solution in regard 
to thq problem of evil because, first, human beings possess freedom of 
choice, and the universe is such that they have both the. possibility of 
good and evil moral choices, and second, the ýrocess thinkers of the Griffen- 
Hartshorne persuasion are committed to an ontological presupposition about 
the pre-existence of the I un . iverse which-makes God less than omnipotent with 
respect to the given structure of the uniVerse. 
53 
In the preface to God, Power and Evil Griffen writes, "In John Hickts 
Evil and the' God of Love the Whiteheadean position is not even mentioned 
except for the false suggestion that it is essentially the same as E. S. 
Brightmants". Ironically, in the rest of the book Griffen never returns 
to the task of showing-why we should not view it that way, nor does he 
show why Hartshorne's position should not be counted as an external form 
of dualism much like that of Plato's Timaeus. Indeed, Hartshorne on 
p. 62 of A Natural Theology for our Time writes "in a sense, however, the 
objection points to a truth, the old platonic one that evil*and partial 
disorder in the world do mean more than one agent influencing reality. 
However, there is no clear sense in which this can amount to a plurality 
of 'Gods'. " 
54 
Jim Garrisonts The Darkness of God: Theology after Hiroshima (London: 
SCM, 1982) p. 52. 
- 
Once again, as we have seen in the other forms. of the religions of 
solution, the process answer to the problem of evil can be said to be both 
logically sound and providing a clear and cogent way but of the dilemma. 
55 
If we now return to Berger's The Sacred Canopy, and even grant him 
the use of his rather fuzzy notion of what "ratlonalityll amounts to, it -is 
clear that his claim that Plato's view, and we might add the other limited 
G. od theories as well, belong somewhere in the middle of his continuum of 
theodicies, is mistaken. These dualistic answers to the problem of evil 
are quite logically sound by any ordinary usage of that term. Moreover, 
Hinduism and Buddhism, the religions of dissolution, are also highly 
rational responses to the'problem of evil, but not for the reasons Berger 
would have us believe. Berger believes the Indian traditions should be 
counted as the most rational by virtue of their rather neat balance of 
56 debita and credits with respect to the law of karmic rebirth. But. if 
that were the real reason for making this judgement then"certainly the 
4 
55 . For more on process thought, as well as process theodicies, see the 
following: Delwin Brown and Ralph James' Process Philosophy and Christian 
Thought (New York, 1971); John Cobb's A Christian Natural Theology 
TPhiladelphia: Westminster, 1965); Charles Hartshorne's The Divine 
RelativitýL(New Haven: Yale University, 1948); and A Natural Theology for 
Our Time asalle: Open Court, 1973); and Alfred North Whitehead's 
Religion in the Making (London: World Publishing Co., 1926) 
56 
In a real way Berger confuses two separate theodicies for a single one. 
Monism and karmic rebirth are logically distinct notions which need not 
be found together. Although we have already said a great deal about the 
former, little has been said about the latter. The chief tenet of the 
karmic-reincarnation answer to the problem of evil 'is'that evil is the 
result of the sins of past lives. The doctrine is suggested by Plato, 
defended by Pythagoras and Plotinus, and assumed to be true by many 
Greco-Roman mystery religions. Remnants of this position may also be 
found in the Talmud, and Kaballah, in Origen, and in contemporary 
Rosacrucians and Scientologists. This model is logically possible and 
probably incapable of empirical refutation. There is a growing body of 
literature about individual Vho claim to recall details of past lives. 
The best of these stories has been gathered by Ian Stevenson in Twenty 
Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation 2nd edition (Charlotte: University of 
31. 
retributive Justice of the Deuteronomic code should be counted as just as 
reasonable. The same notion of "reeping what one sows" is at the heart of 
the biblical idea of lex talionis. 
57 
It seems to me that a better reason for considering the religions of 
dissolution to be rationally cogent responses to the problem of evil is 
that*by suggesting that individual life58 ultimately ends in a reabsorption 
back into the One, they have developed a metaphysical monism that matches 
quite well with their ultimate ethical monism. (If we have no individual 
personalities, we can have no individual evil, either moral or natural. ) 
But although both the religions of dissolution and the religions of 
solution are logically consistent, they are still not without their 
difficulties. The monistic religions of dissolution are unsatisfactory 
for at least three important reasons. First, there seems to be no real 
Virginia Press, 1974); Cases of the Reincarnation Type, volume I; Ten 
-Cases in India, volume II: Twelve Cases in Lebanon, and volume III: Ten ýases in Sri Lanka (Charlotte: University of Virginia Press, 1975-1979). 
There are at least two major difficulties with this reincarnation approach 
to the problem of evil. The first has to do with forming a sufficiently 
cI lear-definition of the "self" so that we may understand what it is that 
purportedly moves from one body to the next. Even if this problem were 
surmountable, we would still be left with the second problem of 
demonstrating from whence the evil committed by the soul in its very 
first body has come. In a real way, the incarnation answers merely 
redefine the problem by pushing it back a few steps. 
57 
For good examples of the notion of retributive justice among the ancient 
Hebrews, cf.: Deuternomy 11: 13-21; Deuternomy 28; Leviticus 26 and 28 
and Numbers 12: 1-15. 
58 
1 have used the expression "individual life" here rather than "soul" or 
"spirit" because there is a fundamental difference, in the Indian traditions 
on this point. Classical or Brahmanic Hinduism subscribes to the notion 
that it is a "soul" that becomes reincarnated. The Theravadan or small 
raft Buddhists, however, believe that it is a bundle of sense impressions 
and character traits, which they call skandas, that is reborn. The former 
approach bears many resemblances to the notion of the soul found in 
traditional Christianity, while the latter is more similar to David Humets 
notion of the self as a "bundle of perceptions". of course, Hinduism 
and Buddhism agree that individual personality is obliterated at nirvana, 
when atman becomes brahman. 
32. 
connection between the karmic law and their ultimate end point, nirvana. 
If it is the case that at bottom level all of reality is of the same 
substance, why is so much emphasis placed on this series of rebirths that 
seems to "pretend" that individual personalities and the phenomenal world 
are real? Second, this position quite simply seems to offend common sense. 
The phenomenal world may ultimately be an. illusion, but it certainly 
appears to be real. 
59 
One might raise an important objection at this point and suggest 
that I have failed to understand the particular religious forms of life of 
the. Brahmanic Hindus and Tlieravadan Buddhists. But I could reply by 
pointing out that the adherents of these traditions also seem to take the 
phenomenal world, as we 11 as the individual personalities in it, a good 
deal more seriously than they might if they were really to hold fast to the 
basic. metaphysical assumption on which. these faiths are based. 
Another way of looking at this second objection is to see that in a 
real way ultimate monism tends to offend whaý Wittgenstein would call the 
"certainties" of life, the foundational principles we hold to be true, 
without evidence, but on which all our other judgements about the world 
are based. Many of the c. omments Wittgenstein makes in On Certainly in 
regard to scepticism could also be made with reference to any view that the 
phenomenal world is an illusion. 
6o - 
A third problem with regard to the monistic responses to the problem 
59 
This discussion is quite like the Buddhist story where the young student 
asks his teacher what the latter would do, given the fact that the world 
is an illusion, if he were about to be attacked by an illusory tiger. 
The monk responded, "I would climb an illusory tree". 
60 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Basil Blackwood, 1977). 
33. 
of evil is that they seem to leave a very important question unanswered. 
We may at once admit that the phenomenal world, and thus evil, is an 
illusion, but we still seem to be left with the inexplicable problem of 
viewing it as if it were real, and that seems to present the monistic 
faiths with another kind of problem of evil to replace the old one. 
The religions of solution, it seems to me, also suffer from some 
iptractable flaws, though I have no real quarrel with the logical cogency 
of these views. The real problem I have with dualistic answers to the 
problem of evil is that they seem to know so much more about what God is 
like and what he is doing than I do. Although they each represent a 
logically possible state of affairs, I see no clear reason for picking 
any one over the. view, for example, that God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, 
but terribly absent-minded. 
61 
. Another more fundamental problem I have with the religions of solution 
is that none of the limited God theories seems to be describing a God that 
is even remotely similar to the God of Abrahaý, Isaac and Jacobt or even 
the God of the philosophers for that matter. 
62 
The process theodicy is 
- tempting, but their God har dly seems like the one to whom I might be 
interested in praying. Indeed, what does prayer amount to for Hartshorne's 
Godý It strikes me as more like a committee meeting where God takes 
suggestions for how the universe might be straightened out. 
I am also not at all sure what precisely it means in the process view 
to say that God is "in time". At the very least it can be said that 
Hartshorne's view of time suffers from a lack of development. I am reminded 
61 
This view, or something quite like it, is suggested in James Branch 
Cabell's novel Jurgen (London: 1919), particularly chapter 49. 
62 
losophical Issues in Religious Thought Geddes MacGregor suggests in Phi. 
that because "Brightman and other exponents of the view have wished to 
exhibit it as compatible with traditional Christian theismt they have 
tried to minimalize its dualistic aspects". p. 149. 
.e 
t 
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of Unamuno's remark, "Time is the most terrible of mysteries, the father 
of them all". 
63 
It should be kept in mind, however, that the criticisms of both the 
religions of solution and the religions of dissolution which I have 
outlined do n6t lie on purely rational grounds. In the case of the latter, 
they lodge more in the realization that absolute monism seems counter- 
intuitive, even, it seems to me, to those engaged in that particular form 
of life. I have criticised the religions of solution not so much for 
logical shortcomings, as a failure to present a picture of God that is 
sufficiently enough like'the orthodox Christian conception that he is 
worthy of worship. 
John Hick seems to raise a similar point about John Stuart Mill in 
particular, and the religions of solution in general, when he writes: 
-From the point of view of Christian theology, however, a 
dualism of this kind is unacceptable for the simple but 
sufficient reason that it contradicts the Christian 
conception of God. Mill's type of duaLism does not face, 
and therefore does not solve, the problem of evil as it 
arises for a religion that understands and worships God 
as that than wlich nothing more perfect can bn conceived. 
Dualism avoids the problem - but only at the cost of 
rejecting one of the most fundamental items of the 
Christian faith, belief in the reality of 10he infinite 
and eternal God, who is the sole creator of heaven and 
earth and of all things visible and invisible. The belief 
is so deeply rooted in the Bible, in Christian worships 
and in Christian theology of all schools that it cannot be 
abandoned without'vitally affecting the nature of 
Christianity itself. The absolute monotheism of the 
, 
Judeo- 
Christian faith is not, so to say, negotiable; it can be 
accepted or rejected, but it cannot be amended into 
63 
St Augustine (Book XI, chapters 14-28 of the Confessions) seems to have 
had a similar difficulty in getting a handle on time. 11"WIlat is time? " 
When no one asks him, he knows. When someone does ask, however, he does 
not know. He knows. how to use the word 'time, and cognate temporal words 
such as 'before'# lafterit 'past', and 'future', but he can give no clear 
account of them. (My translation. ) Wittgenstein's puzzlement about time 
seems much like that of Augustine. (Blue and Brown Books Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1958). Ronald Suter's "Augustine on Time, with Some Criticisms 
From Wittgenstein", Revue Internationale de Philosophi vol. 16 (1962) 
Pp. 319-322, is the source of my musings about Hartshorne's insufficient 
discussion of time. 
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something radically different. This then is the basic and 
insuperable Christian objection to dualism; not that it is 
intrinsicallY*impossilble or unattractive, but simply that 
it is excluded by the Christian understanding of God and 
can have no place in Christian th. eodicy. 64 
The rejection of the religions of solution as orthodox responses 
leads us to the realization of a third cluster of religious perspectives on 
the' problem of evil. This group might most aptly be labelied the "religions 
of paradox" and includes Judaism, Christianity and Islam, though, as will 
soon become apparent, I will confine my comments almost exclusively to the 
first two of these traditions. This third type is called religions of 
paradox for they each embody a distinctive combination of monism and 
dualism, or of an ethical dualism set within the framework of an ultimate 
ontological monism. 
65 
These faiths seem committed on the one hand to the metaphysical 
presuppositions that God is all good, all knowing and all powerful, as 
well as being creator of the universe in some ex nihilo way, while at the 
same time holding that both moral and natural evils exist. Another way 
then to state the necessary conditions of the religions of paradox is to 
say that they are simultaneously committed to the truth of two propositions: 
first, belief in a God who possesses the omni-attributes, 
66 
and second, 
belief in an ethical dualism which-sharply distinguishes good from evil. 
64 
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 35. 
65 
John Hick, in his article, "The Problem of Evil", The. , neyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Paul Edwardso editor, vol. III, p. 136, suggests that this 0 
combination of monism and dualism exemplified in Judaism and Christianity 
represents "the main contribution of western thought to the subject". 
66 
It must be admitted that it is not at all clear just how long these 
omni-attributes have been considered as descriptive of the nature of God. 
Consider, for example, chapter 10 of Leviticus where Moses' nephews, 
Nadib and Abihu fail to mix the incense properly for a burnt offering. 
Yahweh is so angry that he sends down a fire to devour them. There is 
it) I 
Unlike the limited God theories of the religions of solution, here 
in this third type we have a conception of God that most closely resembles 
the classical conception of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In 
being faithful to that conception of God, however,. we seem to leave no 
room for the existence of evil. At first blush this seems to be an 
ins6luble problem, and thus we see the appropriateness of the name, the 
religions of paradox. 
Brand Blanshard seems to put the conundrum quite succinctly: 
The question at issue is a straightforward one: how are the 
actual amount and distribution of evil to be reconciled with 
the gQvernment of the world by a God. who is in our sense 
good? 67 
After raising this question, Blanshard goes on to answer it: 
So straightforward a question deserves a straightforward 
answer, and it seems to me that only one such anpwer makes 
sense, nanely that the two cannot be reconciled. 68 
But before we too quickly concede victory to Blanshard, let us first 
attend carefully to what he has had to say. Notice Blanshard makes no 
mention of God's power and intelligence. This immediately allows us an 
escape hatch through which the problem raised by Blanshard might be solved 
- the limited God theories of the religions of solution. One could readily 
no indication in the text that the nephews had made a deliberate mistake. 
In Leviticus 249 when the son of an Israelite mother and Egyptian father 
blasphemes the name of God, Yahweh commands Moses to have them stoned to 
death and decrees ex post facto that henceforth anyone guilty of a 
similar crime must meet the same fate. In Numbers 16 a group of 250 
influential men rebelled against Moses and Aaron. Yahweh causes an 
earthquake to swallow the leaders of the opposition, followed by a 
consuming fire that destroyed the rest. After the Israelites complain 
that Moses has killed "the people of the Lord", Yahweh sends a plague 
that kills 14,700 more of the chosen people. It is-unlikely that a 
notion that God is all good, all knowing and all powerful engendered 
stories such as these. The view of God depicted here seems more like 
the "cold mad feary father" of the last page of Finn: ýganls Wake, or the 
deity depicted in Thomas Hardy's "Nature Questing". 
67 
Brand Blanshard, Reason and Belief (New Haven: Yale University Presso 
1975) p. 546. 
68 
Lbid. p p. 538. 
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end the argument with Blanshard, by simply suggesting, with John Stuart 
Mill or David Hume, that God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, 
or perhaps. both, 
David Hume puts the dilemma. for the religions of paradox in perhaps 
sharper detail: 
Is He (God) willing to, prevent evil,. but' not able? Then He 
is impotent. Is He able but not willing? Then He is 
malevglent. Is He both able and willing? Whence then is 
evil? 9 
Augustine raises therproblem in almost identical terms: 
Whence, then, is evil, since God who is good made all things 
good? It was the greater and supreme good who made these 
lesser goods, but Creator and created are alike good. Whence 
then comes evil? Could he who was omnipotent be unable to 
change matter wholly so that no evil might remain in it? 
Indeed, why did he choose to make anything of it and not by 
the same omnipotence cause it wholly not to be? 70 
The problem seems. no less acute for Thomas Aquinas: 
It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two 
contraries be infinite,. the other would be altogether 
destroyed. But the name God means that. He is infinite 
goodness. If therefore, God existed, there would be no evil 
discoverable; but there is evil in the world, therefore, God 
does not exist. 71 
Among contemporary philosophers, the problem of evil for the religions 
of paradox is given almost identical formulation; consider this comment from 
J. L. Mackie: 
The problem of evil ... is a logical problem, the problem 
of clarifying and reconciling a number of beliefs ... In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent, 
God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. 72 
69 
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 178. 
70 
Augustine, The Confessions and Enchiridion, translated and edited by A. C. Autler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955) chapter 5. A very similar 
phrasing of the problem can also be found in Book XI of the City of God 
chapter 16. 
71 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I question, 2 answer, 3,1. in A. C. 
Pegist The Basic Writings of St Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1945). 
72 
J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotencelt, Mind (April, 1955) p. 209. 
38. 
These words of H. J. McCloskey seem quite familiar: 
The problem of evil is a very simple problem to state. There 
is evil in the world; yet the world is said to be the creation 
of a good and omnipotent God. How is this possible? Surely 
a good omnipotent God would have made a world which is free 
of evil of any kind. 73 
All of these comments seem to agree on three points that produce the 
horns of the dilemma for, the religions of paradox. All five thinkers, in 
their own particular language, express the belief that evil exists, while 
at the same-time ascribing to a cluster of metaphysical presuppositions 
that include Godts omnipotence and omnibenevolence. 
But if we look carefully, we can see that in each of the five examples 
-something crucial is missing. In order to see more clearly what has been 
left out consider the example of Crundh, the greatest rugby player in the 
world. In fact, he plays with such power and grace that Crunch is seen by 
most experts to be invincible. In addition to, Crunch's skill and love for 
the game, he is also known as the most sportsmanlike and gentlemanly 
character on the pitch. The only problem with poor Crunch is that no one 
has sent him a copy of this seasonts venue, and since he lives far outside 
of town, he has no idea of when the games are being played. 
The purpose of this-example is to show that it is logically possible 
for a god to exist who has essentially the same problem as poor Crunch. 
This deity could be all good and all powerful, but completely unaware that 
evil exists. Evil could be a peculiar blindspot or lacuna in this god's 
knowledge. He would be perfectly happy to do something about evil, indeed, 
because of his goodness he would be compelled to do something about ito 
but he just doesn't know that it is there. This position calls for no 
limitation in Gcdts power. He would not only be quite willing, he would 
73 
H. J. McCloskey, "God and Evil", The Philosonhinal gRarter volume 10, 
number 39 (April, 1960) p. 97. * 
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also be quite able to fix the evil, if only he knew about it. 
What we have in this answer, of course, is another version of the 
limited God theories. And, indAed, if this is a logically possible state 
of affairs, and I think it is, it is a quite simple solution to the problem 
as stated by the five representatives above. It might be added that this 
solution suffers from the same flaw Hick has pointed out in regard to the 
other limited God theories. But it does, nevertheless, meet the formulations 
of all five inquisitors head on. As the problem is stated by all five, 
however, it does not involve the religions of paradox. 
It should be clear that what is needed to create the dilemma as it 
exists for the religions of paradox is-the notion that God is also 
74 
omniscient. Thus, the proper formulation of the problem of evil for the 
religions of paradox would look something like the following: God is by 
definition omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, yet evil exists in 
the world in both moral and natural forms. 
75 
0 
74 
In J. L. Mackie's recent book, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), it appears that he came to realise the importance 
of including the attribute "omniscience" in any discussion of the_problem 
of evil in the Judeo-Christian tradition. He amends his version of the 
problem to read: "According to traditional theism, there is a God who 
is both omnipotent (and omniscient) and wholly good, and yet there is evil' 
in the world. How can this be? " p. 150. 
75 
It is of some historical interest to note that one of the very first 
thinkers in the Christian tradition to phrase the problem in just these 
terms was Tertullian in his tract Adversus Marcionem, (ii. 5-6). There 
Tertullian writes the following: "And now for those questions of yours 
you dogs, whom the apostles turn out of doors, you will bark at the God 
of Truth. These are the bones of the argument that you chew over. 'If 
God is good ancl has foreknowledge and power to avert evil, why has he 
allowed men to be beguiled by the devil and to fall away from obedience 
to His law into death; seeing that man is in God1s own image and 
likeness, yes, in His own substance too, because of the status of the 
soul? For if He is good, He would not wish such a thing to happen; if 
presciont he would not be ignorant that it was to happen; if powerful He 
could prevent its happening: every event must be consistent with those 
three attributes of the divine majesty. 'l (My translation. ) 
4U. 
In the next chapter we will examine these terms very carefully. A 
careful analysis will be made of omnipotencet omniscience, omnibenevolence, 
moral evil. and natural evil in an attempt, at getting clear on what these 
terms mean and how they are related. Additionally, we will discuss whether 
the. problem of theodicy, as formulated by the religions of paradox, really 
involves one in a formal, logical contradiction. 
0 
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Chapter Two: A Clarification of Terms 
I know that one has no right to say things like that. I 
know. Man is too small, too humble and inconsiderable to 
. sterious ways of 
God. But what seek to understand the my 
can I do? I'm not a sage, one of the elect, nor a saint. 
I'm just an ordinary creature of flesh and blood. I've 
got eyes too, and I can see what they are doing here (in 
a concentration camp). Where is the divine mercy? Where 
is God? How can I believe, how can anyone believe, in this 
merciful God? 
Elie Wiesel 
Apparently with no surprise 
To any happy flower 
The frost beheads it at its play 
In accidental power - 
The blonde assasin passes on - 
The sun proceeds unmoved 
To measure off another day 
For an approving God. 
Emily Dickinson 
In the first chapter it was suggested that the dilemma of the problem 
of evil. for the adherents to the religions of paradox can be expressed 
in the following group of propositions, all of which are held to be true: 
God is-omnipotent 
omniscient 
omnibenevolent 
and evil exists (in both moral and natural forms). 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. are called religion$ of paradox with 
respect to the problem of evil because they seem to involve one in an 
apparent contradiction or paradox about the origin and existence of evil. 
Another way to put this idea of apparent paradox, we have suggested in the 
first chapter, is to say that Judaism, Christianity and Islam seem committed 
to an ethical dualism set within the framework of an ultimate metaphysical 
monism. 
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In this present chapter, we have two distinct but related aims: 
first, to get clear, as best we can, on the meaning of various terms used 
in formulating the apparent paradox (omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence. 
moral evil and natural evil). And second, to discuss briefly whether the 
use-of these terms in formulating the problem of evil as framed by the 
religions of paradox involves one in a logical contradiction. The first 
of these tasks shall take some time, so we must keep the second task in the 
backs of our minds. 
In the religions of paradox, God is endowed with characteristics that 
radically distinguish him from all other 
be wholly limitless throughout the whole 
the God of Hegel, or that of the process 
theism does not need the world as a sphe: 
essence is identical with His existence, 
suggested that the most appropriate name 
forms of being. He is thought to 
range of His existence. Unlike 
theologians, the God of traditional 
re for His self-development. Godts 
as Thomas Aquinas held when he 
for God is that disclosed to Moses, 
according to the Vulgate text of Exodus: qui est, He who is. 
1 
If the God of classical theism is thus infinite, he must possess all 
properties in a mode that is free of limitation. The properties we shall 
now be concerned with are'omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence. 
In this discussion we will make no attempt to prove the existence of the 
God of classical theism. Rather, we shall show that given the existence 
I 
of God as He is traditionally conceived, the following definitions of His 
attributes would seem to be the most logically compelling and consistent. 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, translated by Anton Pegis, (New 
York: Doubleday, 1955) Book I, chapter 22, p. 121. 
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Omnipotence 4 
Let us begin this discussion by considering for a moment this note 
from Frederick Ferre's Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion: 
Different theistic traditions interpret this term differently, 
Some insist that "omnipotence" must involve the possibility 
of God's doing literally anything - whether it be "making 
a stone so heavy that He cannot move itIt, or "killing 
Himself", or other standard conundrums and dilemmas - while 
others interpret "omnipotence" as the possibility of doing 
anything logically possible or anything worthwhile. 2 
Ferre. rightly suggests that when we say that God is omnipotent, 
philosophers, as well as the common man, may mean by that term one of 
two things. 3 Either (a) An omnipotent being is one who can4 do absolutely 
anything. Or (b) An omnipotent being is one who can do anything that is 
logically possible. For reasons that will become apparent later, we must 
also offer a third formulation of God's omnipotence: (c) An omnipotent 
being is one who can do anything that is logically possible and is consistent 
with his other attributes. 
5 Let us proceed by first examining formulation(a). 
The notion that an omnipotent being is one who can do absolutely 
anything is at least as old as the philosophy of Rene Descartes. His 
- belief in this interpretation of omnipotence is actually connected to and 
2 
Frederick, Ferre, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 179-6T7 -)p . 12 3 
Later in chapter five it will be argued that the Christian form of life 
actually provides a fourth alternative to these three traditional notions 
of omnipotence. 
4 
tCan' is used here as the can of ability. 
5 
There are some less convincing definitions of omnipotence which, for the 
sake of brevity, I havp not entertained here. One other possibility is 
that an omnipotent being can do "anything he wants". This view is 
sometimes attributed to Augustine. Anthony Kenny in The God of the 
Philosophers (London: Clarendon, 1977), chapter 7, suggests that this 
formulation of God's omnipotence is defectivefor any person on earth who 
realizes his or her limitations could be said. to do whatever he or she 
wants and thus a possessor of omnipotence. 
dependent upon another Cartesian notion that the truths of logic and 
mathematics are made true by virtue of the will of God. In a letter to 
his friend, Father Mersenne, on 15th April, 1630, Descartes makes this 
point very clearly: 
The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been 
laid down by God and depend on Him entirely no less than 
the rest of His creatures. Indeed, to say that these 
truths are independent of God is to talk of Him as if He 
were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject Him to the Styx 
and the Fates. Please do not hesitate and to assert and 
proclaim everywhere that God who has laid down these laws 
in nature just as a king lays down laws in his kingdom . 
oe* If God established these truths He could change them 
as a king changes his laws. 6 
A short time later, Descartes sent Mersenne a second letter on this 
same point: 
As for the eternal truths, I say once more that they are 
true or possible only because He knows them as true or 
possible. They are not known as true by God in any way 
which would imply that they are true independently of Him 
... In God willing and knowing are the same thing, in 
such a way that, by the very fact of willing something He 
knows it, and it is only for this reason that such a thing 
is true. 7 
It should be clear that Descartes thought the laws of logic and 
- simple mathematics were necessary truths, and so he counted them among his 
small bag of simple and distinct ideas. But although he thought they were 
necessary truths, he did not think that they were what Geach has suggested 
6 
Rene Descartes, Descartes' Letters, edited by 0. Adam and P. Tannery 
(Paris, 1964) 1,35. A modern formulation of this same notion of 
omnipotence can be found in H. G. Frankfurt's "The Logic of Omnipotence", 
in Philosophical Review, volume 73 (1964). There he argues that God 
"invents" the laws of logic just as he "invents" the laws of nature. 
7 
Ibid., 1,147. 
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Descartes would call "necessarily necessary truths". 
8' 
Descartes malýes a reýerence which amounts to this same point in a 
third correspondence with Mersenne: 
It would seem rightly so if the question was about something 
which exists or if I was setting up something immutable 
whose immutability did not depend on God ... I do not think that the essence of things and the mathematical truths which 
can be known of them are independent of God, but I think they 
are immutable and eternal because God so willed and so 
disposed. 9 
And again in a fourth letter: 
It. was free and indifferent for God to make it not be true 
that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right 
angles, or in general that contradictories could not be true 
together. Even if God had willed that some truths should be 
necessary, this does*not mean that He willed them necessarily 
or to be necessitated to will them. 10 
In DescarteO point of view, God freely establishes the laws of logic 
i 
in much the same way He has established the laws of nature. Although once 
he establishes the laws of logic, they are then necessary, it does not 
mean that he willed them necessarily. 
Still, Geach has his problems with Descartes's interpretation of the 
concept of omnipotence. 
Descartes's motive for believing in absolute omnipotence was 
not contemptible; it seems to him that otherwise God would 
be subject to the inexorable laws of logic as Jove was to 
8 
P. T. Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977) pp. 9-10. Modal logicians these days seem to be quite enthralled 
with expressions like "possible possibly p" and "it is not necessary that 
necessarily p", which can produce all sorts of possible expressions about 
possible worlds. But clearly this is a good deal farther than Descartes 
would, I think, have wanted to go. He would not, 'for example, have been 
willing to say "it is possible that God does not exist" nor even in the 
modal spirit "it is possibly possible that God does not exist"- 
9 
Descartes' Letters, VII, 380. 
10 
Ibid., IV, 110. 
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the decrees of the fates. The nature of logical truth is a 
very difficult problem, which I cannot discuss here. The 
easy conventionalist line, that our arbitrary way of using 
words is what makes logical truths, seems to me untenable, 
for reasons that Quine among others has clearly spelled out. 
If I could follow Quine further in regarding logical laws 
as natural laws of very great generality; laws revisable in 
principle, though most unlikely to be revised in a major 
theoretical reconstruction, then perhaps after all some 
rehabilitation of Descartes on this topic might be possible. 
But in the end I have to say that as-we cannot say how a 
supralogical God would act or how He could communicate 
anything to us by way of revelation, so I end as I began: 
a Christian need not and cannot believe in absolute 
omnipotence. 11 
The problems with absolutd omnipotence to which Geach gives hints 
are difficulties noticed by Thomas Aquinas as well. This is precisely 
what led him to conclude in the Summa Theologica, "Nothing which implies 
contradiction falls under the omnipotence of God". 
12 In a following 
passage he gives a more detailed account of his reasons for holding this 
point-of view: 
Whatever implies being and nonbeing simultaneously is 
incompatible with the absolute possibility which falls 
under divine omnipotence. Such a contradictiori is not 
subject to it, not from any impotence in God, but because 
it simply does not have the nature of being feasible or 
possible. Whatever, then, does not involve a contradiction 
is Di the realm of'the possible with respect to which God 
is omnipotent. Whatever involves a contradiction is not 
within the scope of omnipotence because it cannot qualify 
for possibility. Better, however, to say Lhat it cannot be 
done, rather than God cannot do it. 13 
The central flaw with the notion of absolute omnipotence, as Thomas 
and others have pointed out, is that it inevitably commits one to a host 
of rather bizarre contradictions. For example, if God can' do absolutely 
anything could He make His left hand so heavy that His right hand could 
11 
Geach, Providence and Evil, 
12 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, (latin text) 
. 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 
1963) 1. Q25 A4, p. 164. 
13 
Ibid., I. Q25 A3, p. 163-164. 
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not pick it up? Notice that if we give an affirmative answer then after 
God made His hand sufficiently heavy there would be something He could 
not do, namely, pick it up. Hence, He would not be omnipotent. On the 
other hand (no pun intended) if we answer no, God could not make His left 
hand so heavy that His right hand could not pick it up, then immediately 
the re would be something that He could not do, and consequently He would 
riot be omnipotent. We could ask similar questions about whether God 
could create a thing that was simultaneously itself and not itself, but 
I think the point about the inherent weakness in the concept of absolute 
omnipotence has already been made. 
14 
14 
For an interesting early Medieval discussion of omnipotence paradoxes 
cf. the dinner conversation between Desiderio of Cassino and Saint 
Peter Damiani, recorded in the latter's De Divina Omnir)otentia which is 
reprinted in J. Mignets Patrologia Latina (Paris: no date) vol. 145. J. L. Mackie develops a number of interesting examples of these omnipotence 
paradoxes. Both Alvin Plantinga in God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1967) pp. 168ff., and Richard Swinburne in The Coherence 
of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
* 
1977) pp. 156ff-, deal with the 
Mackie examples. Swinburne seems tO-think that the answer to puzzles 
such as these is to say, "Yes, He could create beings who were not in His 
control". But He would not do it for in doing so Ile would actually be forfeiting His omnipotence. Plantinga argues that a coherent formulation 
of omnipotence cannot be developed. In a related round of arguments: George Mavrodes argues that the paradox of the stone can be resolved since 
even if God could not create a stone so heavy He could not lift it, this 
would be no challenge to His omnipotence, since cre 
, ating 
a stone so heavy 
that God could not lift it is a logically impossible task. Mavrodes uses- 
a similar argument for suggesting that God cannot sin but that is also no 
challenge to His omnipotence, since God committing a sin is not a. logically possible task. ("Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence"t The 
Philosophical Review vol. 72 (1963). C. W. Savage, in his article, "The 
Paradox of the Stonell, Philosophical Review vol. 76 (1967) agrees with Thomas Aquinas that God cannot create a stone so'heavy that He Cannot lift 
it, and also suggests that this is no real limitation on God's power. But Savagets reasons for making this claim are very different from Thomas'. 
Savage argues that to say that God could not make such a'stone is 
equivalent to saying that God can lift any stone he makes, and to say this is surely to place no limitations on God's power. Perhaps the best 
solution to these omnipotence paradoxes is to say that God can do anything that is logically possible and which does not contradict his other attributes. 
This view will be the one endorsed later in this chapter. 
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Let us now examine the second formulation, (b) An omnipotent being 
is one who can do anything that is logically possible. 
15 Our first task 
is to get clear on what we mean by the "logically possible" and the 
"logically impossible". Aristotle suggests a very simple and cogent pair 
of definitions: the logically possible is found when it is not necessary 
that its contrary is false. The logically impossible, he suggests, is to 
16 be found when its contrary is necessarily true. 
To cite an example from the realm of simple mathematics, it is 
impossible that 2 plus 214, because its contrary 2 plus 2=4 is 
necessarily true. If I define a triangle as "a 3-sided figure whose 
angles are equal to 180 degrees", it makes no sense to say that God could 
create a 4-sidod triangle. This is no limit on God's power. It is a 
limit in our ability to find meaning in a meaningless sentence. This, of 
course, applies to the physical world, as well as the world of mathematics 
and geometry. To ask if God could blide two beads up the rod of an abacus, 
then two more beads up the same rod, and, without creating another bead, 
produce five beads at the top of the rod, is to ask God to do something 
that is logically impossible. This is not a limitation on God's power. 
It is a limitation on our ability to make sense of what it means to say 
that two beads and two beads equals five beads. To expect God to do the 
logically impossible is to expect God to do what cannot be done by any 
being. Indeed, as Thomas Aquinas suggests, if the sentence is logically 
contradictory, there is nothing there to be done. 
15 
As was suggested in footnote 14, 'logically possible' includes only 
those actions which are not contrary to His nature, when predicated of God. 
16 
Aristotle, The Prior and Posterior Analytics, edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1949) 12,32a 6-14. 
52. 
The importance of the above examples should be clear. If the 
elements of a concept are contradictory (for example, a round-square), then 
the concept can never be instantiated. It is, in effect, a psuedo- 
concept that refers-to nothing at all. When we become critical of God 
because He cannot make a round square or a married bachelor, we are chiding 
Him for not doing something when there is nothing there to. be done. When 
there are things to be done, an omnipotent being can do them, provided 
they are not contrary to His nature. Thus, the proper definition of an 
omnipotent being is one who can do anything that is logically possible. 
C. S. Lewis points unambiguously to this same notion of omnipotence 
and suggests that the first alternative, formulation (a), involves 
meaningless combinations of words that do not suddenly acquire meaning 
simply by virtue of the fact that we preface them with the words "God can". 
17 
Thus Lewis concludes: 
His omnipotence means the power to do all that is 
intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically 
imposssible. You may attribute miracle to Him, but not 
nonsense. There is no limit to His power. If you choose 
to say "God can give a creature free will and at the same 
time withhold free will from it", you have not succeeded 
in saying anything about God ... It remains true that all things are possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities 
are not things but nonentities. It is no more possible for 
God than for His weakest creatures to carry out both of two 
mutually exclusive alternatives; not because His power meets 
the obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even 
when we talk it about God. 18 
Still, with all this said in its favours (b) is, nevertheless, an 
17 
Anthony Flew quotes this section of Lewis with approval in his "Divine 
Omnipotence and Human Freedom", New Essays in Philosophical Theolo 
(London: SCM Press, 1955). This may be one of the few times Flew and 
Lewis agreed on anything having to do with the philosophy of religion. 
18 
C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: Macmillan Co. t 1978) p. 28. 
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inadequate definition of the concept of God's omnipotence, though it 
might now do quite satisfactorily as a formulation for any being x who 
is said to be omnipotent. In order to see why this is the case consider 
whether an omnipotent being could commit suicide or sin. Surely, there 
is nothing amiss in saying that both of these actions are logically 
possible. There is nothing logically incoherent or contradictory in 
saying that an omnipotent being could, for example, tell lies or take 
his own life. 
But if we also make the stipulations that this omnipotent being 
is also eternal and omnibenevolent, then it follows that it would be 
logically impossible for him to tell lies or think himself out of 
existence. God cannot sin because it contradicts his omnibenevolence. 
He cannot commit suicide because he is eternal. Thus, the proper 
formulation of GodIs omnipotence is (c) An omnipotent being is one who 
can do anything that is logically possible and is consistent with his 
other attributes. 
Omniscience 
Once again, perhaps it is best to begin with a helpful note from 
Ferre's Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion: 
As in the case of omnipotence, different theistic traditions 
interpret omniscience differently. Some allege that the term 
involves God's knowledge of even future events, in which case 
the traditional problem arises in explaining how future human 
actions can be considered genuinely free and undetermined (if 
they are so considered) and at the same time known with perfect 
assurance by God. Others maintain that Ilomnisciencell will be 
satisfied as long as God knows all there is to know; and if 
future indeterminate actions are not yet, it is no imperfection 
of knowledge not to know what is not yet knowable. omniscience 
on this view would be complete knowledge on all actualities and 
all possibilities and the distinction between them. 19 
19 
Frederick Ferre, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion, p. 24. 
4 
54. 
In this passaget Ferre makes an important distinction between two 
different views of omniscience: (c) For every proposition p, if p is true, 
an omniscient being knows that p, but only in so far as p is determined 
now by what is already the case. And (d) For every p, if p is true, an 
omniscient being knows that p. We will also examine the less convincing 
formulations of God's omniscience: (a) for every p, an omniscient being 
knows that p. and (b) For every p, if p, an omniscient being timelessly 
knows that p. 
Version (a) can be seen to be an inadequate definition of omniscience 
for if we were to take a proposition like I'Vicchio is a member of the Royal 
family" and substitute it for p, we would have the following: I'Viechio is 
a member of the Royal family, and an omniscient being knows that Vicchio 
is a member of the Royal family". But clearly this will not do. Any 
satisfactory formulation of omniscience must take into account the 
distinction between knowing something false and knowing that something is 
false. An omniscient being does not know false propositions but he should 
know when propositions are false. We must therefore amend our definition 
to take this into account. Formulation (b) corrects the simple error of (a). 
Formulation (b) of omniscience can be easily understood by looking 
at the following remark from Boethius: 
Since God lives in the eternal present, His knowledge transcends 
all movement of time and abides in the simplicity of its 
immediate present. It encompasses the infinite sweep-of past 
and future, and regards all things in its simple comprehension 
as if they were now taking place. Thus, if you think of the 
foreknowledge by which God distinguishes all things, you will 
rightly consider it to be not a foreknowled e of future events, 
but knowledge of a never changing present. 2S 
20 
Boethius, The Consolation of PhilosolDhv Richard Green, (trans. ) (New 
York: Random House, 1962) Book V, prose 6, p. 116. 
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Thomas Aquinas was also a staunch proponent of this view. In the 
Summa Theologica, he writes: 
Things reduced to acts in time, are known to us, successively 21 
in time but by God are known in eternity, which is above time. 
St Anselm, addressing God in the Proslogion, develops a similar 
perspective: 
You were not, then, yesterday, nor will you be tomorrow, but 
yesterday and today and tomorrow you are, or rather, neither 
yesterday nor today nor tomorrow you are, but simply, you are, 
outside of time. 22 
What these three figures have in common is that they all view the 
concept of omniscience as the ability to know the past, the present and the 
future, simultaneously, as if happening all at once. From this it follows, 
all three would argue, that it is terribly misleading to talk about God 
knowing the future. for in reality, his knowledge of the future is a 
knowledge of an eternal present, for He is outside or above time. 
The major difficulty with this view of omniscience can be found in 
the last sentence of the above paragraph. It is very difficult# if not 
impossible, to figure out what it means. It is not at all obvious what 
it means to say that any being is "above" or "outside" time. But whatever 
those expressions may mean, if they mean anything at all, they are surely 
not intended to suggest that God does not know every action which is 
performed by all His creatures. But it is also clear that His creatures 
perform actions which by their very nature could not be performed 
simultaneously. For example, I may open the window in my study in the 
21 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I. Q14 A13. 
22 
Anselm, The Proslogion in St Anselm Sidney Norton Dean, (trans. ) (Lasalle: 
Open Court Publishing, 1962) p. 25e 
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morning to allow some air in the room, and later, after the sun has set, 
I may close it because I then have a chill. But I cannot perform both of 
these actions at the same time. I must perform the first action before I 
can perform the second. It makes no sense to talk about closing an 
already closed window. In order for God to be omniscient, he must know 
the sequence. It makes no sense to say that God "sees" me opening and 
closing the window simultaneously. 
A similar kind of difficulty with formulation (b) of God's 
omniscience is pointed to by Anthony Kenny: 
The whole concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of 
which is simultaneous with every part of time, seems to 
be radically incoherent. For simultaneity as ordinarily 
understood is a transitive relation. If A happens at the 
same time as B, and B happens at the same time as C, then 
A happens at the same time as C. If the BBC programme 
and the ITV programme both start when Big Ben Strikes ten, 
then they both start at the same time. But on St Thomast 
view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the 
whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these few 
words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on. 23 . 
Elsewhere, Kenny suggests that this same kind of difficulty with 
formulation (b) has been expressed by Suarez in De Scientia Dei Futurorum 
Contingentium. Suarez analyzes the passages mentioned above from Anselm, 
Thomas Aquinas, and Boethius, and adds a fourth by Augustine. He goes on 
to suggest that although all four thinkers believe that presence or 
coexistence is both a necessary and sufficient condition for explaining 
God's knowledge of future events, they are mistaken. Kenny explains: 
Suarez insists that though temporal things coexist with the 
whole of eternity, because eternity coexists with all timest 
past, present and future, yet these different times do not 
coexist with each other. God coexists now with one thing 
23 
Anthony Kenny A uinas: A Collection of Critical- EsEV-s (London: 
Macmillan, N9M 264. 
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and now with another thing, without changing in Himself: 
like a tree standing motionless in a river which is 
, successively present or adjacent 
to different masses of 
flowing water. The only sense in which things are 
eternally present to God is as objects of His knowledge. 
The statement of their presence, therefore, is a 
restatement of God's knowledge'of the future, and not an 
explanation of it. 24 
In contemporary philosophical circles, two other major objections 
to formulation (b) of God's omniscience have been raised. The first of 
these might be called the argument from indexicals. It can be found in 
the work of A. N. Prior, and is also followed by Norman Kretzmann. and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff. 25 In short, Prior suggests that if one is 
committed to the view that God's knowledge is timelesso then an undesired 
by-product of this position is that God's knowledge would be restricted 
to those truths which don't change over time. Prior puts the problem this 
way: 
I want to argue against this view [formulation (b)] on the 
ground that its' final effect is to restrict what God knows 
to those truths, if any, which are themselves timeless. 
For example, God could not, on the view I am considering, 
know that the 1960 final examinations at Manchester are now 
over. For this is not something that he or anyone else 
could know timelessly. It's true now but it wasn't true 
a year ago (I write this on 29 August 1960) and so far as I 
can see all that can be said on this subject timelessly is 
that the finishing date of the 1960 final examination is 
an earlier one than the 29th August, and this is not the 
thing we know when we know that those examinations are over. 
I cannot think of any better way of showing this than one 
I've used before, namely the argument that what we know 
when we know that the 1960 final examinations are over can't 
24 
Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers p. 39. 
25 
A. N. Prior, "The Formalities of Omniscience", Philosophy (1962); Norman 
Kretzmann, "Omniscience and Immutabilityll, The Journal of, Philosophy 
vol. 63 (1966); Nicholas Wolterstorff, "God Everlasting" in God and . the 
God: Essays in Honor of Henry Stob C. J. Orlebeke and L. B. Shedes, eds. IGrand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975). 
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be just a timeless relation between dates, because this 
isn't the thing we are pleased about when welre pleased 
, 
the examinations are over. 26 
Nelson Pike successfully challenges Prior's position by arguing 
that he has not identified a range of facts a timeless being could not 
know. Rather, he has merely pointed out certain linguistic forms a 
27 timeless being could not use when talking about his knowledge. Indeed, 
Pike points out that the fact reported in an expression like "It is 
raining in St Andrews on 17th April, 1984" could be exprpssed by God in 
sentences that do not employ temporal indexicals. H. N. Castenada and 
Richard Swinburne 28 employ similar strategies in answering Kretzmannts 
version of the indexical argument against formulation (b) of God's 
omniscience. Swinburne writes: 
A knows on 2 October the proposition 'It is now 2 October'. 
Surely B on 3 October can know that A knew what he did on 
2 October. How can B report his knowledge? By words such 
as 'I know thaý A knew yesterday that it was then 2 Octobert. 
How can we report B's knowledge? As follows: B knew on 
3 October that on the previous day A knew that it was then 
2 October. Hence ... B knows on 3 October what A knew on 2 October, although B will use different words to express 
the same knowledge. -7 
Caste7iada points to a similar resolution: 
If a sentence of the form Ix knows that y knows that 
formulates a true statement, the person x knows the 
26 
1 A. N. Prior, "The Formalities of Omniscience", p. 116. 
27 
Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (New York: Macmillan, 1970). 
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H. N. Caste-nada, 110miscience and Indexical Reference", Journal of 
Philosophy vol. 64 (1967); Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism 
(Oxf ord: Clarendon, 1977) . 
29 
Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism p. 165. 
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statement formulated by the clause filling in the blank. 30 
, 
What Pike, Swinburne and Castaneda all point to is the realization 
that if you know that Washington D. C. is in the United States, and I know 
that you know that Washington D. C. is in the United States, then it is 
clear that I know the same fact that you know. Castalieda and Swinburne 
suggest that Kretzmannts dilemma is really a pseudo-problem, the result 
of Kretzmann not noticing how words like "now" and "current" function in 
certain type. s of discourse. Once one gets clear about the logic of these 
quasi-indicators, the problem suggested by Kretzmann and prior disappears. 
A more telling criticism of formulation (b) of God's omniscience 
has been suggested by William Kneale in his "Time and Eternity in Theology ". 
31 
In that article Kneale attacks the notion of God's knowledge being timeless 
because he (Kneale) 
can attach no meaning to the word Ilifel unless I am 
allowed to suppose that what has life acts ... life must 
at least involve some incidents in time and if, like 
Boethius, we suppose the life in question to be intelligent ý2 
then it must involve also awareness of the passage of time. 
This same argument is ratified and embellished by J. R. Lucas in his 
A Treatise on Time and Space and by Richard Swinburne in The Coherence of 
Theism. 33 
30 
H. N. Castan-eda, "Omniscience and Indexical Reference", p. 116. 
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The thrust of this final criticism of God's timeless omniscience 
is that if one believes that God is outside time, as Boethius and Thomas 
Aquinas have suggested, then one must deny, in effect, that God is a 
person. Lucas' suggestion for resolving this dilemma is to argue that 
since minds are necessarily in time but only contingently in space it 
is reasonable to suppose that everything that exists is present to God 
34 
spacelessly, but not timelessly. I think that Lucas' suggestion is a 
sound one, but enough has been said already, I think, to cast serious 
doubts on formulation (b) of God's omniscience. We shall now turn to 
formulation (c). For every p, if p is true, an omniscient being knows 
that p, but only in so far as p is determined now by what is already the 
case . 
Friedrich Schleiermacher is a good example of this third account 
of omniscience. In his book, The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher describes 
God's foreknowledge in the following way: 
In the same way we estimate the intimacy of relationships 
between two persons by the foreknowledge one has of the 
actions of the other, without supposing that in either case 
the one or the other's freedom has thereby been endangered, 
so even divine knowledge cannot endanger freedom. 35 
What Schleiermacher-seems to be suggesting is that God's foreknowledge, 
34 
Ibid., One of the first modern versions of the theory that God is 
everlasting, existing within time, can be found in Oscar Cullmann's 
Christ and Time (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950) 
35 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith H. R. MacKintosh and J. S. 
Stewart, eds. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clarke)-p. 57. James Ward in his 
Naturalism and Agnosticism (London: A. and C. Block, 1915) and F. R. 
Tennant in Philoso ical Theology vol. II, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1930) also hold similar points of view. Both would 
hold that it is contradictory to say that free choices can be known in 
any sense until they are made. Both suggest that God is ignorant of 
future free human choices and that this ignorance is the result of 
self-limitation. God must do this, they argue, in order to guarantee 
human freedom. 
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and therefore His omniscience with respect to the future, is based on 
God knowing His creatures so well that He has a very good idea of what 
each of them is to do in the future. The analogy often used in 
connection with this view of omniscience is that God sits in a high 
tower and, because of his knowledge of the predelictions and characters 
of each of His creatures, He can establish what they will do next. 
In order to better understand formulation (c) of Godts omniscience, 
consider' the following example. Two brothers exit from two different 
pubs at closing time on a particular evening. Both are quite intoxicated. 
Both have had drinking problems for a number of years. Both stumble out 
of their respective pubs and enter their automobiles, one headed north, 
the other south. Proponents of formulation (c) of divine omniscience 
suggest that God1s knowledge of future contingent events would be 
analogous to a third brother who sits high in a flat in the middle of the 
same street on-which the two brothers travel. Because he knows his 
brothers so well, the third can glance in both directions, spot both cars, 
and "know" that the brothers will come to an abrupt crash in the middle 
of the street. He does not cause the crash to occur, but he knows his 
siblings so well he realizes that the accident is inevitable. The 
believers in formulation (c) of God's omniscience might then go on to 
add that God not only knows about the future actions of the two brothers, 
but he also possesses this kind of knowledge about all the creatures he 
has made. 
The problem with this view of omniscience is that the analogy does 
not quite work. For one thing, in traditional theism God not only knows 
that there will be a crash,. he also knows the name of the ambulance driver, 
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the hospital to which they will be taken, how much blood each brother 
will lose, and the number of cobblestones that will be covered by both 
vehicles before the collision. Indeed, the God of classical theism 
knows all these things bef ore either of the dead brothers was born. 
. Formulation 
(c) of God's omniscience will not do as a proper 
interpretation. The reason is quite simple. If it were the proper 
definition we would be beset with the major difficulty that most human 
beings of normal intelligence would be logically possible possessors of 
the kind of knowledge attributed to (c). All (c) implies is that if one 
were able to make the proper kinds of inferences he could tell future 
events by virtue of the availability of those inferences now. But surely 
when we refer to the omniscience of God we mean to say a good deal more 
than that I should think. 
This leads us quite naturally to an analysis of (d) For every pt 
if p, is true, an omniscient being knows that p. If it is true that it 
rained on this date last year in St Andrews, then an omniscient being 
knows that it rained on this date in St Andrews last year. If it is true 
that it is presently raining in St Andrews, then an omniscient being 
knows that it is presently raining in St Andrews. And if it is true that 
on this date next year it will be raining in St Andrews$ then an 
omniscient being knows that it will be raining in St Andrews on this 
date next year. 
The principal objection raised in connection with this formulation is 
that in using this approach Godts omniscience seems to be incompatible 
with human freedom. There are various ways in which this problem might 
be phrased. For our purposes, we will take the following argument as 
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being fairly representative: 
If God is omniscient, he knows the future. 
ii. If someone knows that p, it follows that p. 
If God knows some future event will occur, it could 
not be otherwise. 
iv. If some future event could not be otherwise, then the 
event is necessary. 
v. Human actions can either be free or necessary. 
vi. If God knows future human actions, then they could 
not be otherwise. 
i 
vii. Therefore, if God is omniscient, there can be no free 
human actions. 
This formulation of God's omniscience does not deny God's 
omniscience, but it does suggest that the absence of free human actions 
is the price paid for its truth. 
The question this argument against omniscience addresses is one 
that is as old as the history of Christian theology. In a curious way 
the argument continuýs to reemerge in the history of the tradition. 
36 
But what is not seen by the proponents of the deterministic objection, 
of which our sample argument is an example, is that there is a fatal 
. ambiguity 
concerning what is meant by the term "necessary" in premises 
iv. and v. When speaking of the concept of necessity it is important to 
distinguish between necessity de dicto and necessity de re. Necessity 
de dicto is used to describe a class of propositions that are necessarily 
true, e. g., 'If Socrates is sitting, then Socrates is sittingf. Necessity 
de re is used in connection with statements that take the form 1x is Y 
necessarily', eaget 'Socrates is sitting necessarilyt. The latter use is a 
36 
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kind of short hand for saying that nothing could prevent Socrates from 
sitting, while the former is related to tautological expressions. 
Thomas Aquinas seems to make this same distinction between these 
two different uses of "necessity" when he speaks of omniscience: 
'All that God knows must necessarily be' is usually 
distinguished: it can either apply to the thing or 
the statement. Understood of the thing, the 
proposition is taken independently of the fact of God's 
knowing, and false, giving the sense 'everything that 
God knows is a necessary thing'. Or it can be 
understood of the statement, and thus it is taken in 
conjunction with the fact of God's knowing and true, 
giving the sense, 'the statement, a thing known by 
God is, is necessary'. 37 
What Thomas is suggesting here is that someone who believes that 
'God is omniscient' and 'There are some future free actions' are 
incompatible would be led to the conclusion 'Future free actions are 
necessary'. But two different interpretations of 'Future free actions 
are necessaryt can be given, for we have two distinct uses for the word 
"necessity". Thus 'Future free actions are necessary' could mean: 
If God knows that 'Socrates will sit tomorrow', then 
tSocrates will sit tomorrow' is necessarily true. 
or 
(2) 'God knows that Socrates will sit tomorrow' entails 
that Socrates will necessarily sit tomorrow. 
Although (1) is certainly true, (2) is not. There is nothing 
contradictory in saying that Socrates will not always be sitting as a 
matter of necessity. If Socrates is sitting, his sitting is necessary. 
But this does not show that Socrates always sits necessarily. 
If we use this distinction between necessity de dicto and necessity 
de re to examine premises iii. and iv. of our sample argument against 
37 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia Q14 A13. 
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formulation (d) of Godts omniscience, it should be plain that there is 
nothing contradictory in saying that God could know free human actions 
in advance. If premise iii. and iv. become suspect, the conclusion in 
vii. does not f ollow. 
Thus, our analysis of the concept of omniscience is complete. We 
have examined four competing notions of what it means to say that a 
being is omniscient, eventually settling on the most logically satisfactory 
formulation:. (d) For every p, if p is true, an omniscient being knows 
that p. 
Omnibenevolence 
Omnibenevolence is a synonymn for perfect goodness. But moral 
goodness is not the same as perfect goodness. We can and often do 
attribute moral goodness to people who are morally imperfect. Most if 
not all people fail morally at some time or other (they are dishonest, 
. unkind, selfish, etc. 
), but if generally they attempt to avoid these 
Pitfalls, and are most often successfijl in these attempts, we call them 
morally good. A morally perfect being, however, acts well always, though 
failure to act in an evil way is not sufficient for calling a being 
morally perfect or omnibenevolent. On the other hand, one single act of 
evil is sufficient for saying a particular being is not morally perfect 
or omnibenevolent. An omnibenevolent being must not only avoid evil, 
he must also do the good. These two necessary conditions taken together 
become sufficient for calling a being morally perfect or bmnibenevolent. 
Of course, one initial problem with this definition of moral 
perfection or omnibenevolence is that we have said nothing about what it 
means to say an action is morally good. We often contrast morally good 
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acts with good acts of other kinds. George might be a very bad 0 
harmonica player, for example, but his playing may be morally good 
because he does it for the enjoyment of people in an old age home. 
What is it, then, to judge that some actions are morally good? 
.I 
would suggest that to say an action is morally good is to say 
that that particular action is a better action, on balance, than any 
other actions that might be done in its stead. A morally good action 
is one we have an overriding obligation to perform. It is an action 
where the overriding reasons for doing it outweigh any reasons for not 
doing it. Conversely, a morally bad or evil action is one a moral 
agent should refrain from doing. When we say that God never does 
actions that are morally wrong we mean that in choosing between 
alternatives God never selects an action which is on balance worse than 
any alternative action He might have chosen instead. When we say that 
God is morally perfect we mean that God always chooses that action 
which on balance is better than any other acýion He could have performed. 
But an important problem arises for our view of moral perfection. 
The problem is sometimes referred to as the Euthyphro dilemma, for it is 
first found in the Platonic dialogues. Briefly stated, the, problem is 
this: does belief that God is morally perfect imply a moral standard 
external to God by which we measure God to see if He is, in fact, 
morally good. Or is it the case that when we say that God is 
omnibenevolent it. means that God is, by definition, morally perfect. 
In this second view God's nature, whatever it might be, is the standard 
by which we decide goodness. Both of these positions, as Plato has 
. shown, involve their proponents in difficulties. If God is good 
in 
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relation to some external source, then God could be said to not be 
the only ultimate reality. If this position is correct, the universe 
is one where its moral character was not ordained by God. 
On the other hand, if God is good by definition, then whatever 
God. commands is morally permissible, indeed, morally obligatory. Thus, 
if'God were to decide that the ten commandments should be rearranged 
such that those which contain a "not" should have it removed, while 
those which contain no "not" should have one inserted, that would be 
morally acceptable since what is ethically "good" is solely determined 
by the will of God. 
But as Mackie has skillfully pointed out, the horns of this 
dilemma need not impale us. They only do so if we make the mistaken 
assumption that moral qualities are atomistict that is, they only come 
in unanalyzable atomic units which either are wholly dependent or 
independent of the will of God. Mackie suggests that we can, in fact, 
take them apart: 
It might be that there is one kind of life which is, in a 
purely descriptive sense, most appropriate for human beings 
as they are - that is, that it alone will fully develop 
rather than stunt their natural capacities and that in it, 
and only in it, can they find the fullest and deepest 
satisfaction. It might then follow that certain rules of 
conduct and certain dispositions were appropriate (still 
purely descriptive) in that they were needed to maintain 
this way of life. All these would then be facts as hard as 
any in arithmetic or chemistry, and so logically 
independent of any command or prescriptive will of God, 
though they might be products of the creative will of God 
which, in making men as they are, will have made them such 
that this life, these rules, and these dispositions are 
appropriate f or them. 38 
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Mackie continues his analysis by suggesting that God might require 
human beings to conf orm to this appropriate life by enjoining them to obey 
certain rules. This would add a certain objective and prescriptive 
element to these descriptive truths. Mackie then adds that it might also 
be the case that this appropriate life as well as these connected rules 
are what human beings ought to strive to c6nform to, though they may not 
be completely accessible to people in a direct way, through some kind of 
experimental. or empirical method. Still, God knows what this appropriate 
life amounts to and desires that people should live it. So, Mackie 
concludes, it is perfectly coherent to hold that God somehow reveals the 
sense of these corresponding rules. 
39 
The importance of Mackie's response to the Euthyphro problem lies 
in the fact that it allows us to say that the descriptive component of 
moral*distinctions is'. logically independent of what God may wish, while 
at the same time suggesting a prescriptive component which is intimately 
related to God's will. The picture of God as a divine ogre is replaced 
by the belief that He demands of His creatures that they should live in 
. the best way possible. 
40 
Natural and Moral Evil 
We have already spent some time in discussing what constitutes a 
moral evil. It is clear, however, that the willful causing of human 
39 
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suffering is different in kind from hurricanes which may take human 
lives,,. or cancers which may cause suffering and death. The latter should 
be considered evil because anyone who desired them for their own sake 
would clearly be acting irrationally. 
41 Another reason for viewing certain 
kinds of natural occurrences as evil*is that an omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnibenevolent being who caused these things to happen, when he 
alternatively could have created a world without them, with no loss of 
overall balance of good over evil, would be thought to be an evil or 
malevolent being. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to 
figure out just what the problem of evil is about. 
But this distinction between natural evil and moral evil is not 
always so clear cut. In order to understand this point, consider the 
following example: 
Fred comes from a family with a long history of lung cancer and 
various respiratory ailments. Fred persists, nevertheless, despite 
warnings like shortness of"breath and tightness in the chest, to smoke 
four packs of cigarettes a day. Before he opens each pack, he carefully 
notes the warning on the side. Eventually, after many years of chain 
smoking he contracts lung cancer. But when his friends inquire as to 
when he might think about giving his fags up, he tells thems "Whatever 
happens, will happen anyway. When your number is up that's when you go, 
and not a day before or after that". 
Now it should be clear that the disease Fred has contracted is a 
natural evil. At the very least, one could say that Fred has done nothing 
to prevent or forestall its occurrence. But because of thiss it might 
41 
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also be said that if Fred is a competent moral agent, he is indeed 
experiencing a moral evil done to himself as well. Through his gross 
neglect Fred is a victim of his own moral evil. 
The above example shows that the distinction between moral evil 
and. natural evil appears to be more a heuristic device than a neat 
logical distinction. Much of what we. consider to be natural evil 
appears to have indirect human causes. We could eliminate much of 
the starvati_on in the world, for example, if the world's resources were 
allocated differently_. Many-people still suffer from diseases for which 
there are now known cures. Sometimes steps can be taken to avoid or 
forestall natural disasters, but they are not taken. In these instances 
it is quite difficult to say if it is only a natural evil that has 
occurred. 
This rather fuzzy distinction between moral and natural evil has 
led thinkers on the problem of evil to concentrate mainly on the problem 
of moral evil, since it seems to constitute the. 'larger part of the problem. 
But we must keep in mind that if God possesses both omnipotence and 
omniscience, in addition to His omnibenevolence, then He is in some way 
connected to the existence of natural evils, and may, therefore, be 
morally culpable. 
J. S. Mill seems to be pointing to God's moral culpability for 
natural evils when he says the following: 
In sober truth, nearly all the things men have been hanged 
or imprisoned for doing to one another are nature's 
everyday performances. Killing, the most criminal act 
recognized by human laws, nature does once to every being 
that lives, and in a large proportion of cases after 
protracted tortures such as only the greatest monsters 
whom we read of ever purposively inflicted on their follow 
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living creatures. If by an arbitrary reservation we refuse 
to account anything murder but what abridges a certain term 
supposed to be allotted to human life, nature does this to 
all but a small percentage of lives, and does it in all 
modes, violent or insidious, in which the worst human 
beings take the lives of one another. Nature impales men, 
breaks them as if on a wheel, casts them to be devoured by 
wild beasts, burns them to death, 
-. crushes 
them with stones 
like the first Christian martyrs, starves them with hunger, 
freezes them with cold, poisons them by quick or slow venom 
of her exhalations, and has hundreds of hideous deaths in 
reserve such as the ingenius cruelty of a Nabis or a 
Domitian never surpassed. All of this nature does with the 42 
most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice ... 
We must keep in mind in. our discussion of the problem of evil from 
the perspective of the religions of paradox that if Mill is correct then 
it seems that all examples of natural evil are also substantiations of 
moral evil as well. If God is a moral agent and He is responsible for 
the existence of natural evils, then in a real sense they may be seen as 
moral evils as well. 
43 
One consistent way out of this dilemma is to make a distinction 
among what David Griffin calls "genuine evilst', "apparent evils", and 
"prima facie evils". 
44 
By genuine evils we mean pain, death, disability, 
loss of freedom, loss of opportunity, etc., which, all things considered, 
the universe would have been better without. Another way to statethe 
definition of a genuine evil is to say that it is an evil for which we 
42 
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cannot give a sufficient reason for its existence.. An event or state 
of affairs is a genuine evil if its occurrence prevents the existence 
of some other event or state of affairs which would make the universe 
better than it is. 
Prima facie evils are anything that may be labelled evil at first 
gla nce. Some prima facie evils, upon closer reflection, might turn out 
to be genuine evils. Other prima facie evils, however, may ultimately 
be seen as only apparently evil. 
Apparent evils are those which, when considered from a larger context,. 
are seen as merely apparent since their "evilness" may be viewed as 
comPensated for by the goodness to which they contribute. In the final 
chapter of this thesis'w#. t will once again take up the challenge posed by 
Mill. It is enough now, however, to simply mention the distinction among 
genuine evil, apparent evil and prima facie evil. 
I must confess that despite the important distinctions we have made 
in the last several pages in regard to the definitional problems involved 
in the problem of evil, much of what I have said here, nevertheless, 
seems too antiseptic, too clean. These distinctions seem not to capture 
the sense of the wanton cruelty and destruction that are the everyday fare 
of radio, television and newspaper reports. 
Examples of extraordinary cruelty are no less ubiquitous in the 
history of human culture. Almost three millenia ago, Ashurnasirpal II, 
King of Assyria, ordered that the hands and feet of the inhabitants of 
captured villages should be severed. The bleeding bodies were piled up 
in the town squares so that those who were still alive might suffocate or 
73. 
bleed to death. 45 As I write this, Syrian soldiers three thousand years 
later sit across from American marines inýLebanon. The weapons both sides 
carry make-the cutting off of hands and feet seem like a more merciful 
practice. 
Me perception of evil is a direct and immediate experience of 
something which befalls individuals. We e#eriences each of us, evil 
done to us, and by empathy, evil to those we love, our friends and neighbours, 
and even to people we will never meet. It is not difficult to understand 
the pain suffered by the victims of Lt. Calley's massacres in Mai Lai or 
the mental anguish depicted so skillfully in William Styron's Sophie's 
Choice. 46 Voices like these cry over immense distances. That one person, 
anyone, should suffer unjustly is intolerable. If there were but one 
example of innocent suffering in the entire world, we would still have the 
obligdtion of asking why. 
But Solzhenitsyn raises an interesting point about hidden suffering, 
d 
about the impossibility of ever having just one example of innocent 
suffering. He tells the story of the eight year old daughter of one of the 
victims of Stalin's purges. After the father's death the girl lived only 
another year. During that time, Solzhenitsyn remarks, "She did not once 
smile". He adds, "When we count up t he millions of those who died in the 
47 
camps, we forget to multiply them by two or three" 0 
45 
L. E. Doob, Panorama of Evil (London: Greenwood Press, 1978) 
46 
William Styron, Sophiels Choice (New York: Random Housep 1979) Sophie 
Zawistowska is a Polish survivor of Auschwitz. Her story becomes a 
commentary on the powerfulness of individual freedom as it faces 
overwhelming evil. At one point in the novel she is given the "choice" 
by an SS officer of deciding which of her two small children she can save 
from the gas chamber. Sophie screams, "Ich kann nicht w&hlen". (Icannot 
choose. ) Then, so as not to lobe them both, she gives up her little girl. 
47 
Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1974) P. 431. 
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One is reminded of Edward Wallant's stirring and disconcerting 
novel, The Pawnbroker, in which the central character, Sol Nazerman, has 
lost his 'wife and two children in the Nazi death camps. Before the war, 
he was a University Professors specializing in Western intellectual history. 
After the war, he operates a pawnshop in East Harlem. His religious 
world view, which includes his definition'of the meaning of suffering, 
has been totally shattered. Yet, when we count up the dead of the 
Holocaust, Sol Nazermants name does not appear. -. The practical reality of 
suffering seems to be hidden no less in philosophically sophisticated 
discussions of the definition of evil, as they are in the statistics 
concerning dead in Nazi Germany or the Soviet death camps. 
The realization of the practical reality of suffering was brought 
home to me in a painful way when the... memorial for the Vietnam veterans 
was r6cently erected in Washington, D. C. The monument is a series of 
interlocking pieces of black marble on which are placed the names of the 
56,000 men and women who died in Vietnam. But rather than placing the 
names in alphabetical order, the designer of the stones chose to put the 
names in the order in which they died. This makes it extremely difficult 
to find any particular person in the dozens of panels. 
One summer day I travelled to Washington to find on the stones the 
name of a high school friend who had been killed early in the war. After 
several hours of looking for the name, I finally found it. After paying 
my respects, I began to look about me at the family members and friends 
of those who had f allen in southeast Asia. Of ten groups of three and f our 
could be seen stroking the indentation in the stone that signified a 
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particular lost friend or father, husband or son. ItAs in moments such 
as this that one realizes the truth of Solzhenitsynts remark. Each of 
these names tells us the story of one tragedy, but there are also the 
three or four hidden stories we do not learn. 
- Let us now examine carefully what we have garnered from this second 
chapter. First, after a lengthy discussion we were led to the notion 
that Godts omnipotence involves the ability to do anything that is 
logically possible and is also consistent with His other attributes. 
Second, in our analysis of omniscience we ascertained that the best 
definition of that term is to say if some proposition is true, God knows 
- that proposition is true. Additionally, we have suggested that the proper 
formulation of God's omnibenevolence is to say that God always avoids evil 
and does the good. We also demonstrated that the distinction between 
natural and moral evils, though not a strict logical. distinction, is a 
good heiwistic, device for understanding the concept of evil. Finallyr we 
made some very brief commentst which will be taken up again in chapters 
three and five, about the untheoretical character of suffering experienced 
first hand. 
One remaining problem we are faced with in this chapter is whether 
belief in God's omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence, as well as 
belief in the existence of real evil in the world, commits one to a 
formal logical contradiction. Another way to phrase this question is to 
ask if one may consistently ascribed to the truth of the following four 
propositions simultaneously: 
i. God is omnipotent. 
ii. God is omniscient. 
iii. God is omnibenevolent. 
iv. There is evil in the world in both moral and natural forms. 
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There can be no doubt that the religions of paradox are committed 
to the truth of all four propositions. If a formal contradiction can be 
derived from i through iv, then we would be forced to conclude that the 
paradox is not just apparent, it is genuine. And if this were to turn 
out-to be the case, the best we could hope for would be a god who 
resembles that proposed by J. S. Mill or found in Plato's Timaeus. 
But it should be clear to any student of elementary logic that 
belief in the truth of propositions i through iv does not involve one in 
a formal contradiction. This would still be the case even if we were to 
add 
v. God created the world ex nihilo. 
J. L. Mackie seems to come to the same conclusion about the logical 
compatibility of these propositions when he writes: 
However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; 
to show it we need some additional premises, or 
perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the terms 
'good', 'evil' and tomnipotent'. 48 0 
Mackie then goes on to offer these additional premises or quasi- 
logical rules: 
vi. Good is opposed to evil in such a way that a good thing 
always eliminates evil as far as it can. 
vii. There are no limits (other than logical ones) to what 
an omnipotent, omniscient being can do. 
From these two additional premises, as well as i through v, he 
derives something like the following: 
viii. A good, omnipotent, omniscient being would eliminate 
evil completely. 
48 
J. L. Mackie, The miracle of Theism, p. 150. 
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and 
ix. 1A good, omnipotent, omniscient being exists' and 
'evil exists' are logically incompatible. 49 
Thus, if Mackie's analysis is correct, we may see the aptness of 
the name "religions of paradox". In response to the logical problem 
Mackie has outlined above, theologians and philosophers of religion have 
attempted to construct various theodicies. Some attempt to relax the 
paradox by suggesting alternative definitions of 'good', 'evil', 
'omnipotence', etc. But from a logical standpoint, most of these 
attempts end up as religions of solution or dissolution, depending on 
whether they attempt to change any of the first three propositions 
(solution), or they concentrate their attention on the fourth (dissolution). 
Any theodicy which attempts to resolve the problem by denying any, of the 
four propositions, however, inevitably strays from either the orthodox 
ýdoctrine of God or the classical view of evil. 
50 
In the remainder of this work we shall not be concerned with 
theodicies which attempt to abandon or modify the theistic attributes 
so as to avoid the logical problem outlined above. Instead, I shall 
assume the existence of what Hick has called the traditional belief in 
God as unique, infinite, uncreated, eternal, personal spirit of absolute 
goodness and power. 
51 1 
49 
Ibid., pp. 150-151. Mackie actually uses the formal wording I have 
employed here in his "Evil and Omnipotence". 
50 
By the "classical view of evil" I mean here a biblical view as opposed 
to Augustine's notion of privation. This will become much clearer in 
-the following chapter. ' 
51 
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, P. 35. 
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In the next chapter, I shall discuss those theodicies in the 
Christian tradition which, in various ways, attempt to restate the 
alleged evil pole of the logical contradiction. Rather than modifying 
the theistic attributes these theodicies attempt to restate the concept 
of evil without turning their position into a religion of dissolution. 
In these reformulations of evil the attempt is made to show that evil, 
as reformulated, is compatible with the existence of a God who is 
conceived as possessing the relevant attributes of omnipotence, 
omniscience and omnibenevolence. 
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Chapter Three: An Analysis of Traditional Theodicies 
A bird sings now; 
Merrily sings he 
Of his mate on the bough, 
of his eggs in the tree: 
But yonder a hawk 
swings out of the blue, 
And the sweet song is finished 
- Is this story true? 
And now have mercy, 
on me and on you. 
James Stephens 
I have been ill and keep ill. I am president of the 
Diabetic Socly and diabetes keeps me in and out, in and 
out of bed every two hours or so. This exhausts, and this 
vast return to chaos which is callod peace, the infinite 
meanness of great masses of my fellow creatures, the 
wickedness of organized religion give me a longing for 
sleep that will have no awakening. There is a long history 
of heart failure on my parental side but modern palliatives 
are very effective holding back that moment of release. 
Sodium bicarbonate keeps me in a grunting state of 
protesting endurance. But while I live I have to live and 
I owe a lot to a decaying civilization which has anyhow 
kept me alive enough in the spirit of scientific devotion 
to stimulate my curiosity and make me its debtor. 
Forgive this desolation. 
H. G. Wells, shortly before his death, 
in a letter to Bertrand Russell. 
In this chapter I shall offer a critical analysis of traditional 
Western theodicies which, in various ways, attempt a restatement of the 
alleged 'evil' pole of the logical contradiction sketched out in chapter 
two. Rather than modifying the theistic attributes in order to resolve 
the problem of evil, these theodicies attempt to restate the concept of 
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evil. In taking this approach, the proponents of these views can thereby 
argue that the existence of evil, as reformulated, is compatible with the 
existence of a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. A 
fair sampling of these responses can be arranged conveniently into four 
groups: (1) punishment and warning theodicies; (2) the unreality of 
evil theodicies; (3) evil is logically necessary theodicies; and (4) 
teleological theodicies. 
In each of these four categories we shall explore a number of 
variations. It will be the burden of this chapter to show, however, that 
all of the restatements mentioned are inadequate Christian responses for 
one reason or another. Many of the theodicies about to be mentioned fail 
on logical grounds, but I will also suggest that some of these attempts at 
theodicy fail either because they fall outside the general bounds of the 
Christian traditiop or because they largely ignore the perspective of the 
victim of suffering. We shall see that most, if not all of the answers 
0 
about to be mentioned, fail to take the sufferer very seriously. We will 
recall from our discussion in the first chapter that this is one of the 
chief conditions necessary for a theologically viable response to suffering. 
Without this existential element, we have argued, answers to the problem of 
evil ring hollow or seem arbitrary and forced. 
It is, of course, quite difficult to approach the problem with. a true 
understanding of the practical reality of suffering. But without that 
understanding the task of theodicy cannot properly be undertaken. 
Perhaps the best way to begin an analysis of traditional theodicies 
is to approach the concept of evil through a sympathetic observation of 
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human suffering. In a real way, this is the only direct link with evil 
we have. Although we have been clear about what evil is in the previous 
chapter, it is, nevertheless, best understood, at least for the individual 
doing the suffering, in an ostensive way. Surely, it is easier for a 
person to communicate the existential pain and reality of his suffering 
by having you suffer as well, than it is to have him verbally relate his 
fbelings to you. Perhaps there is a bias in what I am suggesting: the 
practical reality of suffering can only truly be seen from the perspective 
of the victims, or at the very least from the perspective of those who are 
totally and profoundly sympathetic with those victims. 
In an often quoted text, Gabriel Marcel has stated the importance 
of assuming this kind of perspective: 
In reflecting upon evil, I tend, almost inevitably, to regard 
it as a disorder which I view from the outside and of which 
I seek to discover the causes or secret aims. Why is it that 
the mechanism functions so defectively? Or is the defect 
merely apparent and due to a real defect in my vision? In 
this case the defect is in myself, yet it remains objective 
in relation to my thought, which discovers it and observes it. 
But evil which is stated or observed is no longer evil which 
is suffered: in fact it ceases to be evil. In reality, I 
can only grasp it as evil in the measure in which it touches 
me - that is to say, in the measure in which I am involved, as 
one is involved in a law suit. Being "involved" is the 
fundamental fact; I cannot leave it out of account except by 
an unjustifiable fiction for in doing so, I proceed as though 
I were God, and a God who is an onlooker at that. 1 
I think Marcel is suggesting something central to the study of 
theodicies. When the theodicist objectifies the evil he views or reflects 
upon it in a dispassionate way, he deprives the evil of its 'evil-ness' in 
relation to the very real suffering of the victim, for whom the evil is 
1 
Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of 
--Existence 
(London: Harvill Press, 1948, 
pp. 260-261. 
85. 
experienced as intrinsic and ultimate in the present moment. 
In viewing evil from a distance one is bound to form a distorted 
conception-of it. Indeed, if Marcel is correct, one no longer observes 
evil but an objectification of it. In removing oneself from the evil 
the theodicist becomes something akin to the pilot of a small plane who 
wants to understand a certain African tribe by flying over them at 
10,000 ft. 
In order to make this personal perspective of Marcel's a bit 
clearer', consider the two following statements: 
(a) On October 5,1942 at Dulmo (in the Ukraine) eight 
German Jews were e9terminated along with 1500 local Jews. 
They were led to an open air shooting range, where burial 
pits had been dug. The condemned handed in their clothing 
and other possessions, were directed to stand in the pits, 
and were shot. 
(b)- The people undressed. The mothers undressed the 
-little children without screaming or weeping ... They had 
reached the point of human suffering-where tears no longer 
flow and all hope has been abandoned ... I heard no 
complaints, no appeal for mercy. I watehed a family of 
eight persons, a man and a woman both about fifty ... looking at each other with tears in their eyes. The father 
was holding the hand of a boy about ten years old and 
speaking to him; the boy was fighting his tears ... The 
pit was already nearly full; it contained about a 
thousand bodies. The SS man who did the shooting was 
sitting on the edge of the pit, smoking a cigarette, with 
a tommy gun on his knee.. The new batch of twenty people, 
the family of eight, and the baby carried in the arms of 
the woman with the snow white hair, all completely naked, 
were directed down steps cut in the clay wall of the pito 
and clambered over the heads of the dead and dying. They 
lay down among them. Some caressed those who were still 
alive and spoke to them in a low voice. Then came the 2 
shots from the SS man who had thrown away his cigarette. 
It is clear that in the first statement above we have a concise, 
2. 
M. Hay, "Europe and the Jews", Religion From Tolstoy to Camus, ed. Walter 
Kaufman (New York: Harper Brothers, 196-it-)pp. 339ff. The first passage 
is my own rough objectification of Hay's account. 
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rather objective account of the fac- 
over forty years ago. This account 
but in so doing it contains nothing 
experience. One can read statement 
sympathy is required. 
In contrast, statement (b) is 
it is not just this fact that makes 
account. More facts could be added 
bs of a given incident which occurred 
describes the particulars of the case, 
of the practical reality of the 
(a) with little or no emotion, no real 
much more lengthy and detailed. But 
us more sympathetic to the second 
to the first account but it is 
doubtful that this alone would make that description more sympathetic. 
In the second account we are asked not only to recognise the particulars 
of the case, but we are also asked to attempt to understand what these 
human beings are going through in the final moments of their tragic 
lives. We are asked to enter the scene not as mere spectators but as 
participants in their suffering. 
It is rare in present times to hear sympathetic accounts of 
suffering. In contemporary Western culture we are beset with news 
accounts often wedged between situation comedies and advertisements for 
mouthwash and underarm deodorant. It is little wonder contemporary 
theodicists have fallen into the trap of objectifying evil. 
John Hick, along with a number of other contemporary philosophers 
of religion and theologians, would surely object to my line of argument. 
In fact, Hick explicitly asserts that theodicy is the task of the detached 
observer rather than the victim: 
As has often been observed, in the case of human suffering 
the intellectual problem of evil usually arises'in the mind 
of the spectator rather than that of the sufferer. The 
sufferer's immediate and absorbing task is to face and cope 
with evil that is pressing upon him and to maintain his 
-î 
spiritual existence against the threat 
, 
of final despair. He 
does not want. or need a theoretical theodicy, but practical 
grace and courage and hope. We can therefore say, in 
Marcel's terminology that for him evil is not a problem to 
be solved, but a mystery to be encountered and lived through. 
Hick does not totally exclude the victim's perspective from 
consideration, but surely he underestimates the ability of the sufferer 
to formulate crucial questions in the midst of his encounter with evil. 
"Practical grace and courage and hope" are never completely divorced from 
some theoretical context. In fact, it is often in the very context of 
the agony and suffering that', despite the disorientation and chaos that 
often occurs in these situations, the problem of evil is most forcefully 
raised and seriously considered. Indeed, this is precisely one of the 
reasons why the Book of Job remains so poignant. Job not only has a 
practical concern about suffering, he also has a theoretical concern. The 
comforters, on the other hand, see it as a theological conundrum to debate. 
Here I would probably part company with Marcel in so far as Hick's 
interpretation of Marcel is correct. I think it is clearly wrong that 
the mystery of evil cannot be reflected upon at all within the experience 
of that evil. This is an anti-intellectual claim which seems to dismiss 
a priori any possibility of theodicy. If this a priori view were the 
correct one, we certainly would not need Job's friends coming along on 
three different occasions to discuss the intellectual alternatives. 
On the contrary, I'd like to suggest that the search for a Christian 
3 
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 10. Austin Farrer is even more bold 
in excluding the perspective of the victim: "We are concerned with the 0 theoretical problem only. nor If what we say is neither co=, '- rtino 
tactful, we need not mind. Our business is to say, if ,., & c-cn, what is true. So far from beginning with the sufferer and his personal distresses, 
we will attempt to got the issue in perspective, and sketch the widest 
possible view. " Love-Almighty and Ills Unlimited (Garden City: Doubleday, 
1961) p. 11. 
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theodicy is not, by definition, impossible, but that theodicists must be 
careful to first, be logically cogeA, and second, be consistent, at least 
in a broad way, wiih the major tenets of Christianity, and finally, they 
must develop a method which captures the reality of evil as it is 
experienced by the sufferer. Theodicy, I think, cannot be done by using 
dim objectifications as one's focus of study. Evil remains a part of the 
sufferer, and this often keeps their theodicies honest. We should expect 
at least that much from the sympathetic theologian or philosopher of 
religion. 
Perhaps one of the best examples in Western literature of a sufferer 
reflecting on the problem of evil in the midst of his encounter with that 
evil can be found in Leo Tolstoy's "The Death of Ivan Illych". It is a 
harrowing tale which describes, with compelling and grim realism, the 
decline and death of a legal official, Ivan Illych, who had reached the 
top of his profession as a public prosecutor. But at a deeper level, 
Tolstoy gives us the picture of Ivan as an ordinary, mediocre man -a 
typical member of a professional bourgeoisie. Before his illness, Ivan 
had spent his legal career objectively viewing other peoples' problems. 
He had always approached evil and suffering in the lives of others in a 
cold and legalistic fashion. But now it was his turn. He, Ivan Illych, 
was the victim. During his slow and painful dying, he saw, to hisgrea-11. 
horror, that his family, friends and physicians had objectified his 
suffering. 
Ivan Illych went out slowly, seated himself dejectedly in 
his sledge and drove home. All the way home he kept going 
over what the doctor had said, trying to translate all 
those involved, obscure scientific phrases into plain 
language and find in them an answer to the question, 'Am 
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I in a bad way -a very bad way - or is it nothing at all'? 
And it seemed to him that the upshot of all that the doctor 
ihad said was that he was in a very bad way ... 
4 
Those around him did not truly sympathize with his situation. In 
the midst of his suffering Ivan realizes the absurdity of viewing 
disease, loss of opportunity and death from the point of view of an 
ou tsider., 
In the depths of his heart he knew he was dying but, so far 
from getting used to the idea, he simply did not or could 
not grasp it. 
The example is a syllogism which he had learned in Kiezewetter's 
Logic: 'Casius is a man, men are mortal, therefore Casius is 
mortal', had seemed to him all his life to be true as applied 
to Casius but certainly not as regards himself . That Casius - 
man in the abstract - was mortal, was perfectly correct; but he 
was not Casius, nor man in the abstract: he had always been a 
creature quitel quite different from all others. He had been 
little Vanya with a mamma and papa, and Mitya and V'Olodya, with 
playthings and the coachman and nurse; and afterwards with 
Katya and with all the joys and griefs and ecstacies of 
childhood, boyhood and youth. What did Casius know of the smell 
of that striped leather ball Vanya had been so fond of? Was 
it Casius who had kissed his mother Is hand like that, and had 
Casius heard the rustle of her silken skirts? Was it Casius 
who had rioted like that over the cakes and pastries at the Law 
School? Had Casius been in love like that? Could Casius 
preside at sessions like he did? 5 
Finally, from out of the depths of his own suffering he formulates 
the crucial question of theodicy: 
... he no longer controlled himself, but wept like a child. 
Ile wept over his helplessness, over his terrible loneliness, 
over the cruelty of men, over the cruelty of God, over the 
absence of God. 
Why has thou done this? Why didst thqu place me here? Why, 
why dost thou torture me so horribly? O 
4 
Leo Tolstoy, "The Death of Ivan Illychl', in The Cossackst Haýpy Ever and 
The Death of Ivan Illych (Haxmonsworth: Penguin Books, 1982) pp. 127-128. 
Ibid., P. 137. 
6 
Ibid., p. 152. 
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It is this spirit of Ivan Illych that is so often lacking in 
contemporary discussion of theodicy. Barth once said of Leibniz that 
"at bottom-level he hardly had any serious interest (and from a practical 
standpoint none at all) in the problem of evil". It could be argued, I 
think, that Albert Camus is essentially making the same claim against 
his character, Father Paneloux, in The Plaýue. Dr Rieux, the atheist 
physician who is revealed as the narrator in the final chapter of the 
book, and the young priest, are used as paired opposites in the novel. 
Rieux sees the problem of the plague as a purely medical one. Paneloux 
in the beginning of the book sees the existence of the disease as an 
intellectualized theological conundrum. Each of their views becomes 
tempered by the other's when they are thrown together in witnessing the 
death of an innocent child. Rieux'is, for the first time, confronted by 
the 1ýrger questions, questions that require answers that go beyond his 
simple technical skill. Paneloux is forced to respond in an existential 
way to the reality of undeserved suffering. 
It is this dual concern for existential understanding and intellectual 
rigor that is difficult to find in so many contemporary and historical 
theodicies. In reading much of the literature on the problem of evil one 
gets the distinct impression that intellectual defences are carried out 
with little or no reference to the real world, that solutions proffered 
would be quite useless in any practical situation where a sufferer was 
asking IWhy'9 Would anyone dare, for example, to suggest to a mother 
whose child had been recently killed in a senseless accident that evil 
was merely an illusion, a deprivation of good, or some prelude to a future 
eschatological harmony? Talk which is distantly plausible in the lecture 
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hall often becomes strangely absurd when brought to the bar of concrete 
experience. Even from the pulpit we all too often forget that not only 
must we be-intellectually honest, but we must also keep in mind that me 
of the other important test5of the worth of a theodicy is that it help 
the. sufferer in his encounter with evil. If a theodicy fails this test, 
it is useless; it has ignored the practical reality of suffering. 
Having made these comments about the central importance of the 
victim in discussions of theodicy, we might do well to look carefully 
and critically at a variety of restatements of the evil pole of the 
apparent logical paradox presented in chapter two. In our discussion 
we will attempt to show that the first three types (punishment and 
warning, the unreality of evil theodicies, and the evil is necessary 
theodicies) all suffer from some incurable logical ills, but the fourth 
type, 'teleological theodiciest will require a more extensive analysis in 
Like t4dr 
terms of how well it conforms to our second and third criterion: 
6 it fits in 
0 
a broad way in**to the Christian form of life, as well as how seriously 
%I. 
it takes the individual sufferer. 
. I. Punishment and Warning Theodicies 
Under this heading we can discuss two distinct but related points 
of view which find their origins, at least in the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
in the Torah. These positions might properly be labelled "retributive 
justice" and the "warning theodicyll. In the earliest portions of the Old 
Testament, where the Hebraic understanding of man's relationship to God 
is both communal and covenantal, the existence of pain and suffering is 
most often seen as retribution for sins. 
7 This view is most clearly 
7 
Cf.: Judges 2: 11-15; Deut. 11: 13-21; chapter 28; Lev. 23; Num. 12: 1-5, 
for example. 
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expressed in the Pentateuch, but can also be seen in early prophetic 
literature as well: 
Tell-them, 'Happy is the virtuous man, 
for he will feed on the fruit of his deeds; 
woe to the wicked, evil is on him, 8 he will bc treated as his actions deserve'. 
This simple cause and effect explanation of suffering is written 
very deeply into scripture. It is explicit in the idea of the covenantal 
relationship in which the contract is inevitably followed by blessings 
and curses. It reached its height of formulation and theological 
importance in the Deuteronomic history which e: výen gave a retributive 
explanation for the fall*of the city of Jerusalem to the Babylonians a 
century later. 
He built altars to the whole array of heaven in the two 
courts of the Temple of Yahweh. He caused his son to 
pass through the fire. He practiced soothsaying and 
'magic and introduced necromancers and wizards. He did 
very much more things displeasing to Yahweh, thus 
provoking his anger ... Then Yahweh spoke through his 
servants, the prophets, "Since Manessa King of Judah 
has done these shameful deeds ..., and has led Judah 
itself into sin with its idols, Yahweh, the God of 
Israel says this, 'Look, I will bring such disaster as 
to make the ears of all who hear it tingle ... I will 
scour Jerusalem as a man scours a dish and, having 
scoured it, turns it upside down. 9 
This quotation contains both elements of retributive justice and, 
quite clearly, an element of warning to be heeded by any reader who might 
have apostasy planned in the near future. 
But even as early as the 8th and 7th century prophets there had been 
questions raised about the distribution of this supposed deserved 
8 
Is. 3: 10f. 
9 
II Kings 21: 5,10-13. 
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punishment. Indeed, it would seem that Jeremiah raises this question 
about the distribution of suffering in an anguished way rather than as an 
intellectual exercise. 
You have right on your side, Yahweh, 
When I complain to you. 
But I would like to debate a point of justice with you. 
Why is it that the wicked live so prosperously? 
Why do scoundrels enjoy peace? 10 
By the time of the writing of the Book of Job, we find a sustained 
attack on this theodicy of deserved punishment. This attack, of course, 
is placed in the mouth of the victim of suffering, Job. 
In his article, "Will You Lie for God? ", F. M. Cross describes the 
developed orthodox theodicy which Job and his comforters debate: 
In the national development of Israel's religion, the 
confessions of this historical faith were elaborated. The 
Lord of Israel, it was said, will deliver an obedient nation; 
he will also bring down by plague or defeat a rebellious and 
proud people. In the circles of Israel's pious and wise, the 
older doctrines were further simplified and refined. The 
ancient Lord of'Israells community became rather the God of 
the pious individual, who prospered the godly in his lifetime 
and struck down the unrighteous in the midst of his folly, 
This weal and woe were the unambiguous signs of God's 
pleasure or wrath, direct evidence of man's integrity or sin. 
The orthodox line, Cross continues, is elaborated by Eliphaz, one 
of Job's friends: 
Think now, who that was innocent ever perished, or where 
were the righteous destroyed? 
As I have observed, those who plow falsehood and sow trouble 
reap the same, 
By the breath of God thel perish, and by the blast of his 
wrath they are consumed. 2 
10 
Jer. 12: 1. 
11 
F. M. Cross, "Will You Lie for God? " Convocation address delivered at 
the Memorial Church, Harvard University, September 24,1958, p. 3. 
12 
Job 4: 7-9. 
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God sets on high the lowly, and the despondent are lifted 
in victory. . He frustrates the designs of the crafty, so that their hands 
achieve no success ... 
He delivers the orphan from violence; the poor from the 
hands of the strong. 13 So the pauper has hope, and injustice shuts her mouth. 
Job, however, counters this punishment and warning theodicy with 
the perspective of the sufferer: 
Look at me and be appalled, and put your hand on (your) mouth. 
When I call it to mind, I shudder, and chills seize my flesh. 
Why do the wicked live, reach old age, yea, and wax great 
in power? 
Their children are established before them, and their progeny 
bef ore their eyes. 
Their houses are free from anxiety, and God's rod (falls) 
not on them ... 
They spend their days in prosperity, and in peace go down to 
Sheol 000 When you say tWhere is the house of the prince? ' tWhere is 
the camp of the wicked? ' 
Have you not asked those who travel the roads, and do you not 
accept their evidence: 
That the wicked man is spared in the day of calamity, that he 
is rescued in the day of wrath? 14 
The glib answer set forth by Jobts friends does not budge the 
protagonist. We have been told in 1: 1 that Job is "blameless and upright", 
and nothing the comforters have said will change that. 
Professor Cross strongly argues against the popular conception that 
Job is a patient, orthodox and long suffering individual (an interpretation 
that is fostered by the fact that the author of the dialogues has 
utilized the setting of the folk tale before and after the main debates). 
To see Job in his true light, Cross argues, we must recognize him as a 
heretic in his own time and place. Job confronts his orthodox comforters, 
having endured restlessly their pastoral tones, their pious pomposity, 
13 
, Ibid., 5: 11,12,15,16. 
14 
Ibid., 21: 5-9,13,28-30. 
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their offense at his doubts and their refusal to admit questions, their 
endless stock of brilliant aphorisms, and observes that they are liars: 
Will you tell lies on God's behalf, and speak falsely for him? 
Will you show him partiality; will you prejudge the case in 
his favor? 
Will it go well when he examines you? Can you delude him as 
you delude a man? 
Nay, he will surely punish you if you secretly show him 
partiality. 15 
Albert Camus is also very highly critical of the punishment and 
warning theodicy in his novel, The Plague. A few weeks after the plague 
had deeply established itself in the town of Oran, the Jesuit priest, 
15 
Ibid., 13: 7-10. Brian Hebblethwaite in his recent book, Evil, Suffering 
andReligion (London: Sheldon Press, 1970) points out that in the Kistory of religions when the idea of suffering as punishment is felt 
to be inadequate, another explanation often replaces it, the idea of 
suffering as a divine test or a trial of faith. Certainly this is the 
case. in the Book of Job, for the Elihu speeches follow that of the 
other comforters. The idea that the good are somehow purged by 
suffering can also be seen in the case of Jewish martyrs under Syrian 
rule, and in the early Christian martyrs sucý as Polycarp in the 2nd 
century, although in the Christian case the idea of sharing in the 
suffering of Christ also plays an important role when this theodicy is 
employed. In the Islamic tradition the idea of suffering as a test 
acquires a particular importance. The Qurlan makes this explicit: "We 
shall test your steadfastness with fear and famine, with loss of life 
and property and crops. Give good news to those who endure with f-ortitude, 
who in adversity say: 'We belong to Allah, and to Him shall we re'turnt. 
On such men will be Allah's blessing and mercy. " (ii. 150ff. ) In the 
Orthodox Muslim theodicy trials and tests are expected. Considering the 
emphasis placed on the omnipotence and inscrutability of God, this is no'. 
surprising. For the muslim, some kind of theodicy like this is inevitable. 
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the idea that extreme suffering is 
intended by God as a test of faith casts grave doubts about the goodness 
of God. Sometimes it is suggested that if evil is seen as a test, why 
is it that so many people seem to fail the test. More will be said about 
this point and its relationship to the theodicy suggested by John Hick 
later in this chapter. For more on 'evil as a test' in the Islamic 
tradition Cf. J. A. William's Islam (New York: University Press, 1961) 
pp. 15ff.; John Bowkerls Problems of Suffering in the Religions of the 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) pp. 99-136; also, 
Bowker's ItIntercession in the Quran and Jewish Tradition"o Journal of 
Semitic Studies XI (1966) pp. 69-82. 
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Father Paneloux, preaches a sermon which emphasizes the punishment and 
warning theodicy as the proper answer to why the town had been inundated 
by the dreaded disease. Paneloux traces the history of the plague in 
the Old Testament, noting that it served as an instrument used by God 
to-strike down his enemies: 
In strict logic what came next did not seem to follow 
from the dramatic opening. Only as the sermon 
proceded did it become apparent to the congregation 
that, by a skillful oratorical device, Father Paneloux 
had launched at them, like a giant fisticuff, the gist of 
the whole discourse. After launching it he went on at 
once to quote a text from Exodus relating to the plague of 
Egypt, and said: "The first time this scourge appears in 
history, it was wielded to strike down the enemies of God. 
Pharoah set himself up against the divine will, and the 
plague beat him to his knees. Thus from the dawn of 
recorded history the scourge of God has humbled the proud 
of heart and laid low those who hardened themselves 
against him. Ponder this well, my friends, and fall on 
your knees. 16 
The plague eliminates the chaff, while at the same time it winnows 
out the chosen: 
If today the plague is in your midst, that is because 
the hour has struck for taking thought. The just man 
heed have no fear, but the evil doer has good cause to 
tremble. For plague is the flail of God and the world 
his threshing floor, and implacably he will thresh out 17 his harvest until the wheat is separated from the chaff 
Paneloux concedes that to verify deserved punishment is the cause 
of the plague demands that the wicked only be afflicted. This would 
affirm, as Job's comforters attempted to do, that the fact of suffering 
is prima facie evidence of the sufferer's wrong doing. But Paneloux 
also seems to want to affirm that the judgement and punishment of the 
16 
Albert Camus, The Plague trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Modern 
Library, 1948) PO 87. 
17 
Ibid. 
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wicked aids the salvation of those unaffected by the plague, for it 
works as a constant warning to them. The plague motivates the righteous 
to continue to conform to God's will. It illuminates and underscores 
mants impotence and exposes his arrogance and specious self-sufficiency. 
Consequently, one may be humbly prepared for the necessity and 
18 
acceptance of God's saving grace. 
But shortly after this first sermon an event occurs which 
radically changes Father Panelouxts view of the appropriateness of the 
punishment and warning theodicy. He and the physician, Dr Rieuxv are 
I present for the death of an innocent child: 
They had already seen children die - for many months 
now death had shown no favoritism - but they had never 
yet watched a childts agony minute by minute, as they 
had now been doing since daybreak. Needless to say, 
the pain inflicted on these innocent victims had 
always seemed to be what in fact it was: an abominable 
thing. But hitherto they had felt its abomination in, 
so to speak, an abstract way; they never had to witness 19 
over a long time the death throes of an innocent chil .' 
The death of this innocent child forces the priest to view evil 
in a way where he is more than a spectator. He comes to see that the 
boy's death flagrantly contradicts the logic of the first sermon. In 
the face of this tragedy with the small child, suffering can no longer 
be seen as the result of deserved punishment. The plague has struck 
down the guiltless, and any error in discriminating between wheat and 
phaff must call into question the validity and applicability of the 
18 
Ibid., pe 88-90. 
19 
Ibid., p. 192. 
I 
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deserved punishment theodicyo 
20 
Later in the novel, during the height of the plague, the priest 
gives a second sermon. In this second attempt at theodicy, Camus has 
Paneloux change his preaching style, as well as the content of his 
sermon. The pronoun 'youl dominates the first sermon, clearly because 
the priest rega3ýds himself as a member of the class 'wheat'. In the 
second sermon, however, after he has witnessed the death of the 
innocent child, he speaks of 'we', for the neat distinction between 
wheat and chaff has collapsed. The theodicy Paneloux ultimately 
employs in the second sermon will be discussed at some length when we 
discuss teleological theodicies later in this chapter. 
In his film, "The Virgin Spring", Ingmar Bergman includes a 
I discussion that is very similar to Paneloux's dilemma in seeing the 
suffering of the innocent child. In the Bergmanfilm a man discovers 
the body of his murdered daughter and shouts furiously at the heavens: 
You saw it, God. You saw it. The death of an innocent 
child, and my vengeance. You permitted it and I don't 
understand you. 21 
It should be clear that the punishment and warning theodicy is 
an inappropriate and illogical answer to the problem of evil for the 
20 
Ibid., pp. 198ff. It is to the priest's credit that at this point he 
abandons the punishment and warning theology altogether, considering 
he might have made a last ditch effort by falling back on Exodus 
20: 5 "1 the Lord Thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of 
the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generations 
of them that hate met'. 
21 
Anthony Schillani, Movies and Morals (Notre Dame: Fides Press, 1968) 
p. 102. Dostoyevski, in the "Rebellion" chapter of the Brothers , Karamazov sees the inappropriateness of this answer with respect to innocent children. In that chapter Ivan remarks to Alyosha, "so* the second reason I will not speak of gro,, rn-up people is that, besides being disgusting and unworthy of love, they have a compensation - they've eaten the apple and know good and evil, and they have become 'like God'. They go on eating it still. But the children haven't 
eaten anything, and are so far innocent. " Book V chapter 4, C. Garnett, trans. (New York: Modern Library, 1950) 
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religions of paradox, for the innocent suffer right along with the 
sinners. 
22 
The Free Will Defense 
A second more philosophically sophisticated form of the punishment 
and. warning theodicy can be found in the writings of St Augustine. In 
short, Augustine argues that far from being the victims of suffering 
human beings are actually the perpetrators. Theodicy (the justification 
of God's ways to man) is not Augustine's concern, rather his attention 
is focused on anthropodicy (the justification of man's ways to God): 
The will which turns from the unchangeable and common good 
and turns to its own private good or to anything exterior 
or inferior sins; it turns to its private good when it 
wills to be governed by its own authority; to what is 
exterior, when it is eager to know what belongs to others 
and not itself; inferior things, when it likes bodily 
pleasures. In these ways a man becomes proud, inquisitive, 
licentious, and is taken captive by another kind of life 
which, when compared to the righteous life we have just 
described, is really death. 23 
In his book, Emile, the great French romantic Jean Jacques Rousseau 
develops the free will answer to the problem of evil with a simple 
certitude: 
Enquire no longer, then, who is the author of evil. Behold 
him in yourself. There exists no evil in nature than what 
you either do or suffer, and you are equally the author of 
22 
McCloskey points out that this kind of answer was advanced to explain 
the terrible Lisbon earthquake in the late 18th century in which 
40,000 people were killed. Voltaire responded to this notion by asking, 
"Did God in this earthquake select the 40,000 least virtuous of the 
Pourtugese citizens? " (Cf. footnotes to H. J. McCloskey's "Evil and 
Omnipotencet'. ) Moses Maimonides in his Guide of the Perplexed (London: 
Friedlander, 1904) offers a similar kind of rebuttal to the punishment 
and warning theodicy. (Cf. chapter 24. ) 
23 
Augustine, On Free Will II ix 53. Augustine's Early Writings (London: 
SCM, 1958) p. 135. 
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both ... Take away everythin that is the work of man, 
and all that'remains is good. 
ý4 
Although Rousseau's view of evil is tied to a still somewhat 
optimistic view of human nature, or at least its possibilities, 
25 for 
Augustine, man has his capacity to sin because of the Fall. Adam and 
Eve Were created by God in a state of innocence with the blessing of 
free will. But the gift was gravely misused. They rebelled against the 
rule of God and in so doing took upon themselves the responsibility for 
the origin of evil, both moral and natural. Thus, as Augustine puts it: 
there are two kinds of evil - "sin and the consequences of sin". The 
sorrows and sufferings that befall the human race are seen as the 
punishment merited by sin. Man brought natural evil upon himself, and 
1 as a sinner under judgement, he cannot rightly call God into question 
for not intervening to stop the evils which are the consequence of man's 
sin. Many simply gets what he deserves in his experience oý '0 sin 
This 11ýkl free will defense" is a mainstay in the history of 
Christian theodicy. It was popularized and endorsed by Augustine, in 
the 4th century, and in many ways remains the predominant view in 
Christian theodicy today. Its influence can easily be traced through 
the work of Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, Martin Luther, Charles Journet, 
Karl Barth, and many others. In our own day, contemporary writers have 
24 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile M. Nugent (trans. ) (London: 1763) 
(reprinted 1854) p. 12. 
25 
For a full view of Rousseau's conception of human nature cf. his Essays 
on the Origin of Inequality (London: Everyman's Library, 1973). 
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done much to rehabilitate the free will defense to suit modern 
sensibilities. 
26 - 
As historically important and pervasive as this Augustinian point 
of view appears to be, it suffers, nevertheless, from a number of 
important defects. The most obvious problem with Augustine's answer 
to*the problem of evil is that it accepts as a literal truth the notion 
that the rest of the human race, countless numbers of people, are justly 
punishable for all eternity through the sinful deeds of two people. 
There may be acceptable ways of updating Augustine's view of the Fall so 
that modern people might be able to reconcile that view of human nature 
26 
Cf.: Thomas Aquinast Summa Theologica 1 23, ad. 2,3; 1 22, ans. 3 
and Summa Contra Gentiles 111,1,10.7; 111,79.2; Calvin's Institutes 
of the Christian Religion I, xviii, 1; 111 xxiii, 6; Luther's On the 
Bondageof the Will (6og-620); Barth's Church Dogmatics vol. 111/3; 
for more modern theological appropriation, cf. Charles Journet's The 
Meaning of Evil (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1963) and F. Petit's The 
Problem of Evil. (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1958). One of the 
clearest literary uses of the free will defense with its corresponding 
notion of the Fall of the human race can be seen in William Golding's cm) In this novel Jjord of the Flies (London: Faber and Faber, 1954). 
book Golding seems consciously to rewrite R. M. Ballantyne's Coral 
Island, an optimistic and superficial boy's book of South sea 
adventures against cannibals, pirates and savages. The difference 
between the two novels resides in the fact that although Golding uses 
the same characters as Ballantyne, he (Golding) sets out to show that 
evil arises not from external forces but in the fallen hearts and minds 
of human beings. Golding in The Writer in His Age remarks, "I am very 
serious. I believe that man suffers from an appalling ignorance of his 
own basic fallen nature. " (New York: Collier, 1965) p. 5. 
11 
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with the realities of contemporary anthropology. But whether Augustine 
would have been willing to allow this revision is doubtful. 
Beyond this historical point, there is a second practical concern 
which raises doubts about the Augustinian free will defense. Augustine, 
and those who follow him, allow the focus of theodicy to shift too 
qui ckly away from the victims of suffering; the practical reality of 
suffering is simply ignored when the Augustinians move from theodicy to 
anthropodicy. A third problem is connected to the first. Augustine 
seems committed to a notion of an historical, temporal Fall, but it is 
clear that prior to the existence of homo sapiens on this planet the 
conditions necessary for the experiencing of profound natural evils were 
already present. In this context, there is no way we can see all evil as 
proceeding from the temporal Fall. Fourth, and perhaps most important2y, 
there is, I think, a basic and fatal incoherence which lies at the center 
of this theodicy. It is self-contradictory to say that a creator, at 
least in the religions of paradox, is not responsible in some sense for 
the origin of evil. In orthodox thought after the time of Augustine, God 
was seen to be an omniresponsible deity who fore-ordained evil, though 
God's omniresponsibility does not relieve man of his own responsibility 
on a different level for moral evils. The real point is this: the 
Augustinian approach seems to suggest a kind of self-generating evil. If 
Adam and Eve were about to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil, how did they already seem to know what disobedience was? 
A fifth question to be entertained concerning all versions of the 
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punishment and warning theodicy, as well as the free will defense, is 
whether God could have made a world such that people had freedom of 
choice, but always choose the good? 
Charles Pierce would have answered this question with a resounding 
no. - He often refers admiringly to a book, Substance and Shadow, by Henry 
James, Sr., the father of Henry and William. The text contains several 
comments about this notion of creating a world where everyone chooses the 
good. Unfortunately, the book is also heavily ladened with the rather 
murky theology of Emmanuel Swedenborg. Consequently, a better idea of U 
the elder Jamesfs view of this 'goodf world can be found in the following 
excerpt from one of his letters: 
Think of a spiritual existence so wan, so colorless, so 
miserably dreary and lifeless as this; an existence 
presided over by a sentimental deity, a deity so 
narrow-hearted, so brittle-brained, and pretty fingered 
as to be unable to make god-like men with hands and 
feet to do their own work and go their own errands, and 
contents himself therefore, with making spiritual 
animals with no functions than those of deglutition, 
digestion, assimilation ... These creatures could have 
no life. At the most they would barely exist. Life 
means individuality or character; and individuality and 
character can never be conferred, can never be 
communicated by one to another, but must be inwardly 
wrought out of the diligent and painful subjugation of 
evil to good in the sphere of one's proper activity. 
If God made spiritual sacks, merely, which he might 
fill out with his own breath to all eternity, why then 
of course evil might have been left out of the creature's 
experiences. But he abhors sacks, and loves only men 
made in his own image of heart, head and hand. 27 
Ninian Smart takes a very similar kind of approach to the question 
of whether God could have made human beings who always freely choose the 
good: 
27 
Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of WiLliam Jame-s (New 
York: Macmillan, 1935, vol. I pp. 28-29). 
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None of the usual reasons for calling men good would 
apply in such a utopia. Consider one of those harmless 
beings. He is wholly good, you say? Really? Has he been 
courageous? No, you reply, not exactly, for such creatures 
do not feel fear. Then he is generous to his friends 
perhaps? Not precisely you respond, for there is no 
question of his being ungenerous. Has he resisted 
temptations? No, not really, for there are no tem tations 
(nothing you could really call temptations ... ii) 
2E 
From all of this, Smart goes on to conclude: 
that the concept of goodness is applied to beings of a 
certain sort, beings who are liable to temptations, have 
fears, possess inclinations, tend to assert themselves and 
so forth; and that if they were immunized from evil they 
would have to be built in a different way. But it soon 
becomes apparent that to rebuild them would mean that the 
ascription of goodness would become unintelligible, for the 
reasons why men are called good and bad have a connection 
with human nature as it is empirically discovered to be. 
Moral utterances are embedded in the cosmic status quo. 29 
Both the criticisms of James, as well as those of Smart seem to 
miss the point. The question at hand is whether it was logically 
possible to create a. race of human beings who freely chose to a2ways do 
the good. James and Smart have set about answering the question 
concerning what the consequences would be once God made such a race of 
. people. But concerning the question at hand, I see nothing logically 
impossible in the suggestion that God could make a race of people who 
always freely choose the good. In order to understand why I am taking 
thiý position, consider the following example: Since the beginning of 
the human race there have been a finite number of people who have 
existed on earth. And in the finite amount of time homo sapiens has been 
on this planet, they have made a finite number of moral choices. Now 
28 
Ninian Smart, "Omnipotence, Evil and Superman", Phil: )soPbY (April - July, 
1961) p. 192. 
29 
Ibid., p. 190-191. 
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let the two sides of a coin represent the two choices for moral good 
and moral evil. An d let each flip of the coin represent one moral choice 
freely made. It is, of course, logically possible that as long as we 
have a finite number of sides to the coin, and as long as we make a 
finite number of flips, the coin could land on the same side every time. 
It is highly unlikely, but it is still logically possible. If our 
analogy is a good one, then it is logically possible that there could 
exist a finite number of moral agents who made a finite number of moral 
choices, but those choices were always made for the good. There is 
nothing logically contradictory or inconsistent in this. In both the 
James and Smart objections to this position it is implied that tGod 
making beings who always freely choose the good' is incoherent. And this 
would certainly be true if we were suggesting that God forces men to 
freely choose the good. But that is not what this position is about. If 
God forced men to choose one way or the other, they certainly would not 
be choosing freely. But God could make creatures who had such good 
characters that although they had the ability to choose evil, they always 
preferred not to. Kant seems to be discussing this as a perfectly logical 
possibility when he refers to what he calls the 'holy will'. 
J. L. Mackie arrives at the same conclusion by using the following 
f or mulati on: 
If there is no logical impossibility in a man's freely 
choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there 
cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing 
the good on every occasion. God was not, then, faced 
with a choice between making innocent automata and making 
beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong: 
There was open to him the obviously better possibility 
of making beings who would act freely but always do right. 
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Clearly his failure to avail himself of this particular 
possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent 
and wholly good. 30 
Anthony Flew also concurs: 
Not only is there no necessary conflict between acting 
freely and behaving predictably and/or as the result of 
caused causes; but also Omnipotence might have created only 
people who would always as a matter of fact freely have 
chosen to do the right thing. 31 
In orthodox Christianity the character of Jesus has been thought 
to be both fully human and fully divine. And in the course of his 
earthly life, it is believed that Jesus never sinned. Now clearly this 
notion of Jesus' sinlessness is trumpeted among orthodox Christians 
because it was Jesus the man who did not sin, though he was subject to 
all the same temptations as the rest of us. If it were true that it was 
Jesus the God who did not sin, this would be no more interesting than 
saying that a square did not become a circle. By his very nature, Jesus 
the God cannot sin. Indeed, what makes the story of Jesus's temptation 
in the desert so poignant is that as a man Jesus was strong enough in 
character to stand up to such a giant temptation. 
Now if God the father could make one human being who was of such 
good character that he always freely chooses to do good, he could 
certainly make two. Indeed, in traditional Catholic theology there is 
the belief that Mary, the mother of Jesus, was also without sin. Now. if 
God cou14 make two people of such good character that they freely choose 
30 
J. L. Mackie 
., 
"Evil and Omnipotence", p. 209. This question about how the 
world might have been rather than how it is is raised by Shakespeare in 
King Lear when he asks why anyone need be challenged upon the rack of 
this tough world. (V, iii, 312). Tennyson's poem "The Lotus Eaters" 
forms a similar query about the world we might have had. 
31 
Anthony Flew, "Are Ninian Smart's Temptations Irresistible", Philosophy, 
vol. xxxvii, no. 139 January, (1962). p. 58. 
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not to sin, he could make ten. If he could make ten, he could make 
millions. If he could make millions, he could make everyone that way. 
God could have made any finite number of people who have existed or will exist 
on earth of such good character that they always freely choose the good. 
Anthony Flew sums up our conclusion on this free will defense 
quite well: 
If there is no contradiction here then Omnipotence might 
have made a world inhabited by wholly virtuous people; 
the free will defense is broken-backed; and we are back 
again to the original antinomy. 32 
It must be added here that it matters very little to our argument 
if Jesus or Mary actually did or did not always freely choose the good. 
All that need be the case is that it is logically possible that throughout 
either of their earthly lives, they did not sin. 
33 
Another way of raising this objection to both the punishment and 
warning theodicy, as: well as the free will defense, is to ask why God 
did not make Adam with the character of Jesus, the man, or someone as 
morally good, and Eve with the character of Mary, or someone with a 
- similar moral character. Their descendants could be very different in 
most of the myriad ways humans differ, but they would have one thing in 
32 
Anthony Flew, "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom", New Essays in 
Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955) p. 149. 
33 
This point is also made by D. J. Hoitenga in his "Logic and the Problem 
of Evil", American Philosophical Quarterly vol. iv (1967) pp. 114-126. 
There he suggests that the traditional Christian doctrine holds that 
in heaven the blessed will be confirmed in goodness without loss of 
their freedom of choice. Thus, Hoitenga suggests that it is not clear 
why God could not have created rational creatures preserved by grace 
from all sin - as Roman Catholics believe he did in the case of the 
Blessed V3-rgin Mary. 
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common: they would all be of such good moral character that they would 
always freely choose the good. 
Another staunch defense of the free will theodicy can be found in 
the recent work of Alvin Plantinga, 
34 
an American philosopher who uses a 
clever combination of modal arguments and notions of individual 'essence' 
to help circumvent problems for the free will defense. 
Plantinga takes as his point of departure Leibniz's Theodicee. In 
that work Leibniz suggests that evil in the world is due to the 
imperfection characteristic of all finite existence. God in His 
omniscience recognizes that any created world would suffer from some 
imperfection. In His infinite goodness and knowledge lie has chosen the 
least imperfect of these possible worlds, and by His omnipotence, He has 
brought it into existence. Thus, Leibniz concludes, this is the best of 
all possible worlds. His point of view had its severe critics, even in 
the late 18th century, when, for example, Voltaire in typical ironic 
spirit asked: "If this is the best of all possible worlds, what must the 
others be like? " 
Plantinga begins his defense of the free will theodicy by suggesting 
35 that Leibniz has made what he calls a 'lapse' . Plantinga argues that 
Leibniz might have followed a more successful route by proposing the 
notion that there are possible worlds which even an omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnibenevolent being is not able to bring about. 
34 
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 1974) 
and The Nature of Necessity (Oxford University Press, 1974) pp. 173-189. 
35 
Ibid., pp. 173ff. 
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Plantinga develops this idea through a number of amusing examples 
about Maurice choosing oatmeal for breakfast, Paul selling his aardvark, 
and Curley Smith, the fictitious mayor of Boston who must decide whether 
to take a bribe in exchange for his dropping opposition to the proposed 
construction of a new highway. 
Suppose if Mr Smith were to be offered the bribe he would reject 
it. Then it is the case, Plantinga argues, that God could not bring 
about a possible world in which Hr Smith existed, was offered the bribe, 
and accepted it. But suppose if Mr Smith were offered the bribe, he 
would take it. Then it follows, just as in the contrary example, that 
God could not actualize a possible world in which Smith was offered the 
bribe and he refused it. In either situation there is at least one 
possible world which cannot be actualized, even by an omnipotent, 
omniscient, omnibenevolent God. If we think for a moment of the nuumber of 
possible free choices, it is clear, Plantinga suggests, that there are 
many possible worlds which God could not bring about. 
In the second step to Plantingals argument he adds to this notion 
that there are possible worlds which even God could not bring about, a 
certain view of human essences that suggests people may be so corrupt that 
in the case of Curley Smith, for example, there is no possible world such 
that Mr Smith exists and would refuse the bribe were he to be offered it. 
According to Plantinga, Curley Smith suffers from "transworld depravity". 
Now suppose, Plantinga suggests, that transworld depravity is not 
only true of Curley Smith, it is true of the rest of us as well, indeed, 
true of any beings God could have created. The conclusion would follow 
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that "it is possible that God could not have created a world containing 
36 
moral good but no moral evil". 
Although this view would ostensibly account for the existence of 
moral evil, it says little about why the world contains natural evil. If 
Plantinga takes the Augustinian line that the natural disasters and 
hardships of life in the world are the consequence of human sin, we are 
still left with the thorny problem of why there were natural evils in 
existence before the advent of human life on this planet. Plantinga 
responds to this query with the rather ad hoe notion that natural evils 
exist as a by-product of the sins of the fallen angels. 
J. L. Mackie, in his recent book, The Miracle of Theism, poses some 
further difficulties for Plantinga's view: 
But how is it possible that every creaturely essence suffers 
from trans-world depravity? This possiblity would be realized 
-only if God were faced with a limited range of creaturely 
essences, a limited number of possible people from which lie 
had to make a selection, if he was to create free agents at 
all. What can be supposed to have presented him with that 
limited range? As I have argued, it is not logically 
, hould always act impossible that even a created persons S 
rightly; the supposed limitation on the range of possible 
persons is therefore logically contingent. But how can there 
be logically contingent states of affairs, prior to the 
creation and existence of any created beings with free will, 
which an omnipotent being would have to accept and put up with? 
This suggestion is simply incoherent. 37 
36 
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil p. 53. Dom Bruno Webb in Why Does 
God Permit Evil? also argues for an angelic origin to natural evil. 
(London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1941) pp. 33-35. 
37 
J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, p. 174. For other criticisms of 
Plantingals version of the free will defense Robert Richman, "Plantinga, 
y Vol. 50 (1972); God, and other Minds", Australian Journal of Philosqph 
William Rowe, "Plantinga on Possible Worlds and Evil", Journal of Philosophy 
Vol. 70 (1973); A. D. Steuer, "Once More on The Frec Will Defense", Lllgiana 
Studies. September issue (1974); and W. J. Wainwright, "Christian Theism 
and The Free Will Defense", International Journal of the Philosophy of 
Religion vol. 6 (1975). 
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I think that Mackie is entirely correct.. Plantinga doep not show 
that it is possible that all free beings must suffer from transworld' 
depravity. Indeed, it is odd that considering the fact that Plantinga 
believes in the existence of angels (which solved for him the problem of 
natural evil) he did not conceive of the possibility of the sinlessness 
of Jesus, the man, or Mary, his mother. Both of these logical 
possibilities seem like excellent counter-examples to the notion that any 
created human who also had free choice would suffer from transworld 
depravity. 
The Unreality of Evil Theodicies 
There are at least, three variations of theodicy which may be 
included under this heading: (a) the amount of evil is insufficient to 
create a problem; (b) that evil is an illusion; and (c) that evil is a 
deprivation, a distortion of something intrinsically good. We shall 
discuss these in order. 
(A) The amount of evil isinsufficient to create a problem. 
This point of view has been openly advocated by very few serious 
thinkers. C. S. Lewis adopts a fairly sophisticated presentation of this 
theodicy, but he is quite'the exception. 
38 In its more simple forms this 
38 
C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: Macmillan, 1978) pp. 55f. 
Lewis' argument is based on the view that "there is no such thing as a 
sum of suffering, for no one suffers it, 11. That is to say, there cannot 
be more suffering in the universe than the greatest amount suffered by a 
single person. It is pointless, he suggests, to add together the pains 
of different individuals, for no one in fact suffers all that pain. 
Even if Lewis' point that there is no such thing as a sum total of 
suffering were to be granted, there would still remain the indubitable 
fact that there are a great many people who suffer. To point out to x 
that he cannot experience y's pain seems cold comfort to-those who often 
think they are suffering like no one else has. It would perhaps be Is wiser, however, to deny Lewisl point altogether. x may not 'suffer y 
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answer may lie behind the prevalent eternal optimism which characterizes 
the spirits of what William James would call the thealthy minded'. On 
another level, I would suspect that this theodical formulation is 
widespread among many sincere and pious believers who have never carefully 
considered the problem of evil from the perspective of the victim, or 
perhaps among actual victims of suffering who refuse to ask the 
theoretical questions about the 'meaning' of their. suffering. 
The central claim to this theodicy seems to be that the amount of 
evil in the world, including human suffering, is insufficient to disturb 
one's belief about God's omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence. 
There is not enough evil to warrant the presumptuous act of calling God 
into account. 
39 From a logical point of view this idea is patently false. 
All that is needed for the problem of evil to arise is one example of 
moral or natural evil. Given the supposed attributes of God, a single 
example of evil is sufficient to create a problem. Even if a single 
example were not enough to create the problem, David Hume lists in his 
pain, nor y that of x. But a world where x and y are both severally 
suffering may in a perfectly intelligible sense, though not in Lewis, 
sense, be said to contain more suffering than a world in which x alone 
suffers. 
39 
Moses Maimonides seems to be arguing a version of this 'presumptuoust 
argument in his Guide of the Perplexed (chapter 24). Richard Swinburne 
disagrees on this point regarding whether one example of evil is enough 
to create the problem of evil. For a full explanation of this 
disagreement cf. his "The Problem of Evil", chapter 4 of Reaso ,n 
and 
Religion edited by Stua-rt Brown (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). 
Pavid Griffen does agree with the notion that one single example would 
be enough. In his introduction to God, Power ýn-d Evil. he says: 
"Furthermore, I do not give any account of the kinds of things I would 
consider genuine evil. There is no necessity that the reader and I agree 
on which things are genuine evils. All that is necessary is that we both, 
given our own value judgements believe that at least one thing has 
happened without which the world would have been better. That genuine 
evil in this sense has occurred is, of course, incapable of proof. But 
I also take it to be unnecessary to prove. It is one of those basic 
assumptions in terms of which we all live our lives, in spite of what we 
may verbally affirm. " pp. 28-ý9. 
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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion a catalogue of woes which should 
be sufficient to convince any serious thinker that we are beset with more 
than enough evil to create a problem: 
But though these external insults, said Demea, from animals# 
from men, form all the elements, which assault us from a 
frightful catalogue of woes, they are nothing in comparison 
of those which arise within ourselves, from the distempered 
condition of our mind and body. How many lie under the 
lingering torment of disease? Hear the pathetic 
enumeration of the great poet (John Milton). 
Intestine stone and ulcer, colic pangs, 
Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy, 
And moon struck madness, pining athrophy, 
Marasmus, and wide wasting pestilence. 
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: 
Despair tended the sick, bisiest from couch to couch. 
And over them triumphant Death's dart 
Shook but delayed to strike, though oft invoked 
With vows, as their chief good and final hope. 
The disorders of the mind, continued Demea, though more secret, 
are not perhaps less dismal and. vexatious. Remorse, shame, 
anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, 
despair - tormentors? How many have scarcely ever felt any 
better sensations? Labor and poverty, so abh. orred by everyone, 
are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those few 
privileged persons who enjoy ease and opulence never reach 
contentment of true felicity. All the goods of life united 
would not make a very happy man, but all the ills united would 
make a wretch indeed; and anyone of them almost (and who can 
be free of every one), nay, often the absence of one good (and 
who can possess them all) is sufficient to render life 
ineligible. 40 
It may be that Hume is overstating his case for the ubiquity of evil. 
Nevertheless, his point is still well taken. There is indeed more than 
enough evil to create a problem for the theist. The human condition, as 
Thomas Hobbes suggests in the Leviathan, is one that is often "solitary, 
wolfish, brutish and nasty". 
40 
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. by N. K. Smith (London: Thomas Nelson, 1947) p. 198. 
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Hume's awareness of the potentially overwhelming magnitude of 
evil has been shared by many who have endured the unparalleled atrocities 
of the 20th century. The realization of the omnipresence of evil has 
been brought home to our age, perhaps much more clearly than any other. 
Evil-is a positive, real and sometimes dominating force which often 
threatens us wi-th senseledis destruction. It trequently thwarts even the 
best of human purposes, and thereby calls into question beliefs about an 
all loving, all knowing, all powerful creator. Most notably, the World 
War II experiences of the Jews provides us with a constant reminder of 
the sometimes devastating. reality of evil. Man's capacity for inhuman 
acts can be seen very clearly in the Holocaust; it was there that relations 
between human beings seemingly reached their all time nadir on the scale 
of depravity and wanton cruelty. It may well be that people have always 
exhibited this pernicious hatred that seems to go beyond reason, but in 
the 20th century we have had the techilological skill and resources to 
4 
demonstrate that hatred far more effectively. It would seem that in the 
Holocaust we came face to face with evil beyond which nothing greater 
could be conceived, evil which led some Jewish thinkers to believe that 
God had lost his moralse" There can be no doubt about this matter from 
the perspective of the victim: the amount of evil does indeed create a 
problem. 
41 
In a period of tenyears, ending in 1945, Nazi Germany was responsible 
for the deaths of at least six million Jews. In a program whose stated 
purpose was the annihilation of world Jewry, several important facts 
are important to recall as we consider the impact of this heinous action. 
First, Jewishness was determined by a decision made by grandparents in 
the preceding century to raise their families as Jews. There was no 
opportunity to disclaim that heritage for the Jews during the reign of 
the Nazis. Second, the German government went to extraordinary lengths 
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to hunt down and kill -individual Jews, diverting vital military 
manpower and materials at a time when the war was being lost. Third, 
although mass murder was not a new phenomenon in the history of the 
human race, the Holocaust represents the first time that an effort 
was made to kill off a people for racial-religious reasons with no real 
clear benefit to the killers. Previous massacres were based on 
ulterior motives of gain in wealth, power or territory. Comparison 
with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Dresden fire bombings or the 
starvation in the Sahel are inappropriate, for these later events were 
performed or allowed with the purpose of gaining a strategic 
advantage. Four, Yiddish culture in eastern and western Europe was 
virtually eliminated. Not only was total destruction of villages and 
persons accomplished, but accounts of deatheamp life attest to efforts 
to wipe out all vestiges of humanity from the prisoners by a 
combination of brutality, obscenity, and perversion previously unknown. 
The horror of such magnitude wasto raise the possibility of the 
destruction of Judaism before the destruction of the Jews. Five, the 
world outside Germany was at least dimly aware of what was happening 
in the gas chambers and crematoria. Political and religious leaders 
made little effort to intervene before the end of the war. The silence 
of the Christian West, as one rabbi has put it, "was deafening". 
For Jewish theodical responses to the Holocaust, cf. the following: 
Emile Fackenheim's God's Presence in History (Now York: University 
Press, 1960), Quest for Past and Future: Essays in Jewish Theolog 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968). In these two books 
Fackenheim dismisses the problem as a logical problem. Indeed, he 
suggests that the Midrash "has a logic of its own". Richard Rubenstein 
in his After Auschwitz: Beginning of A New Era: (Indianapolis: Bobbs 
Merrill, 1966) argues that the Holocaust 
* 
is sufficient evidence that 
the God of Judaism is dead, as is the notion that the Jews are the 
chosen people. Also see the following: Elie Wiesel's Night (New York: 
1960); Thomas A. Indinopulos, "Art and the Inhuman: A Reflection on 
the Holocaust", The Christian Century vol. xci no. 35 October 16,1974; 
David Horowitz "The Passion of the Jews", Ramparts vol. xiii no. 6 June 
1972; Eva Fleishner (ed. ) Auschwitz (New York: Ktav, 1977); A. Davies 
The Crises of Conscience After Auschwitz (London: 1969) 
Many of the thinkers mentioned above were present at a gathering of 
theologians in New York for a symposium on Auschwitz and theodicy. 
These thinkers tried to answer the question "Where was God when six 
million Jews were killed, when few prayers, except for death as a 
relief from suffering, were answered? " The New York Times in an 
article entitled "In Search of God at Auschwitz", June 9,1974# p. E-5 
gives a fairly accurate account of what went on at that symposium. 
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The alleged evil is an illusion. When seen from a larger, or 
divine perspective, it has a different character. 
Mis statement admits of at least two separate. interpretations. 
The first is quite like the answer given to the problem of evil in the 
religions of dissolution. You will recall that in those traditions 
the problem is dissolved by suggesting that the whole world of temporal, 
changing things is an illusion, and what we call evil belongs only to 
this phenomenal realm. Therefore, at bottom level, evil is unreal. A 
variation of this first approach is to say, with the Christian Scientists, 
that although temporal things are much as we see them, those we call 
levill are not real. 
The other variety of this theodicy has been called the "aesthetic 
defense". It can be found in the works of Plato, Augustine and chiefly 
among 18th century optimists. Its adherents maintain although individual 
instances may be seen as evil, when viewed in a larger context, these 
evils are apprehended as part of a greater good. Sometimes the example 
of painting is, used to stress this point. Often when artworks are viewed 
close up or in segments they appear quite ugly. But when seen from a 
distance, or as a whole, the parts which formerly appeared ugly are seen 
to fit together in a grand pattern. Each of the individual parts, though 
some may be ugly, in their own way. contribute to the beauty of the painting 
as a whole. 
42 
42 
As Harnack points out in his History of DMma (London: Williams and 
Nergate, 1898) (vol. V, P. 114) this analogy to works of painting is 
very well established in Western theology. Augustine used this line of 
argument quite regularly in regard to the problem of evil. '"Augustine 
never tires of realizing the beauty (pulchrum) and fitness (aptum) of 
creation, of regarding the universe as an ordered work of art, in which 
the gradations are as admirable as the contrasts. The individual and 
evil are lost to view in the notion of beauty ... Even hell, 
the 
damnation of sinners, is, as an act in the ordination of evils 
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Alexander Pope seems to hold this position in Epistle I of his 
Essay on Man: 
Cease, then, nor order imperfection name, 
Our proper bliss depends on what we blame. 
Know thy own point: this kind, this due degree 
Of blindness, weakness, HeavIn bestow on thee. 
Submit. In this, or any other sphere, 
Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear: 
Safe in the hand of one disposing POW'r, 
or in the natal or the mortal hour. 
All nature is but art, unknown to thee; 
All chance Direction which thou canst not see; 
All discord, Harmony not understood; 
All partial evil, universal Good: 
And spite of pride, inerring Reason's spite 
One truth is clear, whatever is, is right. 43 
One might begin to'criticize the first version of the 'evil is an 
illusion' theodicy by suggesting that it goes against the Biblical view 
which clearly posits the-existence of real, substantial instances of evil. 
Beyond this Biblical criticism, however, one may suggest that this 
(ordinatio, malorum), an indispensable part. of the work of art. " 
Augustine: IlWe are like people ignorant of painting who complain that 
the colors are not beautiful everywhere in the pActure; but the Artist 
has laid on the appropriate tint to every spot ... 11 
(Ench. 111 2 11). 
43 
Alexander Pope, "Essay on Man" in The Works of Alexander Pope notes by 
Whitwell Elwin (London: Murry, 1871-1889 ). 'Among mo heologians 
this argument is often identified with G. H. Joyce's Principles of 
Natural Theology (London: Longmans Green, 1957) (chapter 17), where he 
suggests: Just as the human artist has a view of the beauty of his 
composition as a whole, not making it his aim to give each several part 
the highest degree of brilliancy, but the measure of adornment which 
most contribute to the combined effect, so it is with God. " This 
aesthetic position is also, I think, central to any clear understanding 
of G. K. Chesterton's enigmatic novel, The Man Who was Thursday (London: 
Arrowsmith, 1944). Only at the end of the novel, when Sunday's face 
suddenly expands until it fills the entire sky, and all goes black, do 
we understand Sunday is God, in whom a final reconciliation of good and 
evil inscrutably occurs. Still, Giacomo Le6pardi, a near contemporary 
of Popels, had another point of view: 
"Nought is worthy, 
Thine agonies, earth merits not the sighing 
Mere bitterness and tedium 
Is life nought else; the world is dust and ashes 
... Scorn all, for all is infinitely vainet' 
(Quoted in L. E. Loemker's 
"Theodicy", in The Dictionary of The History of Id vol. iv (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973). 
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theodicy falls short on at least two other counts: in t. erms of plain 
common sense, and on the level of more restrained philosophical discussion. 
On the common sense level Dostoyevski has captured in a painfully 
detailed way the positive and sometimes crushing reality of evil: 
"A 
, 
Bulgarian I met lately", Ivan went on, seeming not to 
hear his brother's words, "told me about the crimes committed 
by the Turks and Cirassians in all parts of Bulgaria through 
fear of general rising of the Slavs. They burn villages, 
murder, outrage women and children, they nail their 
prisoners by their ears to the fences, leave them so till 
morning, and in the morning they hang them - all sorts of things you can't imagine. People talk sometimes of 
bestial cruelty, but that's a great injustice and insult to 
the beasts, a beast can never be so cruel as man, so 
artistically cruel. The tiger only tears and gnaws, that's 
all he can do. He would never think of nailing people by 
the ears, even if he were able to do it. These Turks took 
pleasure in torturing children too; cutting the unborn child 
from the mother's womb, and tossing babies up in the air and 
catching them on the points of their bayonets before their 
Pother's eyes. Doing it before the mother's eyes is what 
. 
gave zest to the amusement. Here is another scene that I 
thought very interesting. Imagine a trembling mother with 
her baby in her arms, a circle of invading Turks around her. 
Theyfve planned a diversion; they pot the baby, laugh to 
make it laugh. They succeed. The baby*laughs. At that 
moment a Turk points a pistol four inches from the baby's 
face. The baby laughs with glee, holds out his little h'ands 
to the pistol, and he pulls the trigger in the baby's face 
and blows out its brains. Artistic, wasn't it? By the way, 
Turks are particularly fond of sweet things, they say. 44 
It would be very ditficult to read this passage and suggest that 
the evil depicted there is somehow illusory. Certainly for the victimst 
it is seen as very real. F. R. Tennant in his Philosophical Theology 
raises a philosophical objection to this 'evil as an illusion. 1point of 
44 
F. Dostoyevski, "Rebellion", in Walter Kaufmann (ed. ) Religion From 
Tolstoy to Camus (New York: Harper Brothers, 1961) p. 142ff. In 
commenting about this section of Do . stoyevski and the propensity to view 
evil as unreal, C. P. Jacks once remarked "For my own partt I would 
rather live in a world which contained real evils which all men 
recognized than in another where all men were such imbeciles as to 
believe in the existence of evil which has no existence at all. " 
Religious Foundations ed. by Rufus Jones (New York: Macmillan,, 1923) 
p. 105. 
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view: 
The empirical theist finds no comfort in the supposition 
that evil is an illusion of finite temporal experience, 
an inadequate idea, or an appearance which would dissolve 
away if we only saw sub specie aeternitatis. For if evil 
is an illusion, the illusion is evil ... The problem of 
evil is raised by the world as we find it, and it is not 
to be found by diverting attention to other-worldly 
cognition of a world order other than the phenomenal and 
the temporal. 45 
John Hick echoes this same kind of criticism when he suggests 
that the 'evil as an illusion' theodicy merely "redescribes the problem". 
Evil may be an illusion, but we must ask why this illusion seems to 
cause so much suffering. Evil may be maya, but why is there so much 
maya? The problem remains just as thorny as it was before the 
terminology was altered. 
H. D. Lewis comes to the same conclusion about the inadequacy of 
the 16vil is an illusion' theodicy in his Philosophy of_Religion: 
e. These views seem to me to be nonetheless vastly 
mistaken. Evil is genuine and positive,, and I have 
indicated already some of the main defects in systems which 
question its reality. The practical effects of treating 
evil as mere illusion have already been noted. But it must 
be added in fairness to the religions and cultures which 
tend to give evil, in the last event, no proper place in 
the universe, that much in the initial stages of the 
attitudes they represent involves a profound, almost 
obsessive, preoccupation with evil. It is the unendurable 
spectacle of evil in its most distressful and insidious 
forms that prompts the desperate search for release or 
oblivion by which mind and heart are alike averted from 
the reality of evil. This kind of escapism cannot, in my 
view, be good for either the individual or his society. 46 
Lewis's conclusion', however, seems to have fallen victim to the 
45 
F. R. Tennant, Philosophical TheoLogy vol. II (Cambridge, 1930) p. 181. 
46 
H. D. Lewis, The Philosophy of Religion (London: University Press, 1965) 
P. 308-309. 
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genetic fallacy. Since he has done a bit of amateur psychologizing to 
show the 'origins' of this belief about evil as an illusion, he concludes 
that the belief is false. But the real problem with this position 
cannot be found on psychological or anthropological grounds. It is to be 
found in its logical incoherence. 
John Wisdom gives a very good summary of the force of these logical 
objections: 
I will only say briefly that the theory of the unreality 
of evil now seems to me untenable. Supposing that it 
could be proved that all that we think evil was in 
reality good, the fact would still remain that we think 
it evil. This may be called a delusion of mistake. But 
a delusion or mistake is a real thing, as real as 
anything else ... But then, to me at least, it seems 
certain that a delusion or an error which hid from us 
the goodness of the universe would itself be evil. 
47 
It is true that the 'evil is illusion? theorist could respond to 
Wisdom by saying that seeing evil as though it were real is just 
another illusion. But this new illusion could then be pronounced a real 
evil, since it is now this illusion that actually deceives us about 
the true nature of reality, and hides the goodness of the universe from us. 
This could, of course, go on ad infinituri for no matter how many times we call 
the last evil an illusion, we always leave what is real behind, which 
eventually in its turn is to be pronounced as evil because it hides from 
us the way things really are. 
The aesthetic version of the "evil is unreal" theodicy can be 
dismantled on similar logical grounds. If Pope's line about 'disorder' 
being merely harmony not understood is to be taken literally, the 'partial 
47 
John Wisdom, "God and Evil", Mind vol. 44 (1935) p. 2. 
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evil? of the following*line must, if he is to remain consistent, mean 
something like 'that which when taken in isolation falsely appears to 
be evil'. But within the context of the poem, it seems to more 
naturally mean something like 'that which in isolation really is evil'. 
Line 12 is, in fact, quite equivocal. It hesitates between two 
logically incompatible views, that partial evil isn't really evil, since 
only the ? bigger picture' is real, and that partial evil really is 
evil, albeit a lesser evil. 
48 
(C) The alleged evil is a privation, a distortion of something 
intrinsically good. 
The most detailed exposition of this theodicy is to be found in 
chapters eleven, twelve and fourteen of Augustine's The City of God, as 
well as chapters three and four of the Enchiridion. In chapter three 
of the latter work Augustine explains the nature of evil in the following 
way: 
What, after all, is anything we call evil except the 
privation of good? In animal bodies, for instance, 
sickness and wounds are nothing but the privation of 
health. When a cure is effected, the evils which are 
48 
H. J. McCloskey criticizes the aesthetic formulation on grounds suggested 
by Wisdom: "This kind of argument, if valid, simply shows that some 
evil may enrich the universe; it tells us nothing about how much evil 
will enrich this particular universe, and how much will be too much. So, 
even if valid in principle - and shortly I shall argue that it is not 
valid - such an argument does not in itself provide a justification for 
the evil in the universe. It shows simply that the evil in the universe 
might have a justification. " In view of the immense amount of evil the 
probabilities are against it. McCloskey concludes that unless there are 
independent arguments in favor of this world's being the best logically 
possible world, it is probable that some of the evils in it are not 
logically necessary to a compensating good; it is probable, so 
McCloskey argues, because there are so many evils. Of"Evil and 
Omnipotence", pp. 100ff . 
122. 
present (i. e. the sickness and the wounds) do not retreat 
and go elsewhere. Rather, they simply do not exist any 
more. For such evil is not a substance; the wound or 
the disease is a defect ýf the bodily substance which, 
as a substance, is good. 
9 
A modern version of the 'evil is privation' theodicy, which 
relies heavily on some Augustinian principles, can be found in Errol 
Harris's The Problem of Evil. In that work Professor Harris suggests 
that evil 
is not, therefore, anything substantial, but is merely 
the negative aspect of what in its positive being is 
good. To revert to our examples, disease is the 
positive reaction of the organism to the effect of 
another positive influence (on the part of the viruses 
or bacteria, or the like) which tend to disrupt the 
organic self-maintenance of its system. Each positive 
trend is constructive and self-maintaining but they 
come into conflict. The evil involved is simply the 
degree to which the superior and more inclusive system 
fails to preserve its integrity. Evil is no positive 
entity or process. Similarly, stupidity is failure of 
insight and confusion of constructive thinking. So far 
as it is an effort to think and understand it is positive 
and good; and if it were not these at all it could not 
become confused nor would there be aiiy attempt to 
comprehend which could fail. Lastly, if we did not 
constantly strive to satisfy our desires, did not seek 
contentment and personal fulfillment, the material of 
moral action would be altogether lacking and so equally 
the means and occasion of moral failure. Wickedness is 
neither more or less than the persistent effort to fulfill 
*t* nS of oneself in ways which negate the very condi 
fulfillment both of ourselves and of others. 
A third example of 'evil as privation' can be seen in the work 
of the Catholic scholar, Germain Griesez: 
Evil thus has a negative character, it is in itself not 
a positive thing, but a lack of something. Yet not all 
lack is evil. The person who could murder another is not 
49 
Augustine's Enchiridion iii 11 (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clarke, 1873). 
50 
Errol Harris, The Problem of Evil (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 
1977) pp. 31-32. 
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evil for remaining unfulfilled in this respect. Doughnuts 
are not evil merely because they really do have holes in 
them. But a person who attacks the foundation of the 
other goods in another person by killing him does 
something wrong, because the choice to act in this manner 
narrows the scope of one's freedom to an arbitrarily 
selected subset of all the possibilities a human person 
can wish to further. A hole in one's gas tank, which 
allows the gasoline to leak out, also is something 
missing; the lack of integrity of the metal is a privation 
in this case, since there ought to be metal where the hole 
is. 51 
What these examples have in common is this: given the basic belief 
that the created order is good, and that God is the source of creation, 
a theodicy follows from these two points which holds that evil has no 
independent, substantial-reality. Augustine in the City of God rejects 
any theodicy which claims that evil is due to the material aspects of 
the world. Matter is good, God created it as good, therefore, everything 
created is good in its own way. Evil arises when that which is good is 
perverted or corrupted in some way. Augustine's chief concern in his 
privation theory is to show that evil is not oomething positive, rather, 
it is a lack of something. 
52 
We have already suggested in some d9tail that any theodicy that does 
51 
Germain Griesez, Beyond the Now Theism: A Philosophy of Religion (South 
Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976) p. 293. A similar position 
is also held by M. C. D'Arcy in his The Pain of the World and the Providence 
of God (London: Longmans Green, 19ý5) 
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When Augustine uses the privatio boni theme to describe evil in passages 
such as, "When the will abandons the higher and turns to what is lower, 
it becomes evil - not because that is evil to which it turns but because 
the turning is perverselt, it is clear that he is mounting a strong 
reaction against the Manichean heresy, to which he had been attached for 
some ten years prior to his conversion. (cf. On Free Will I, iii, 6 and 
The City of God XI 22f. ). 
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not view evil as something positive and real runs the danger of not 
taking the experiences of sufferers very seriously. On an existential 
level, the. level of experience, this theodicy is open to serious question. 
F. R. Tennant has rightly noted that the theodicist cannot easily argue 
that evil is a privation, unreal or nonexistent in the sense of being 
mere deficiency or negation. The privation theory owes its plausibility 
to the ease with which abstractions can be verbally manipulated. Tennant 
rejects this theodicy because he thinks it is reductionistic. He 
concludes: 
The fact that evil exists in the world is a primary datum 
for the empiricist-theist, knowable 5ý 
ith much more 
certainty than is the being of God. 
H. J. McCloskey arrives at the same conclusion about the Privatio 
boni defense by taking a much more philosophical2y rigorous route. He 
is inclined to admit that certain evils such as blindness and deafness 
are privations of proper goods. But the question for him becomes one of 
whether we can easily explain all evils that way. He argues rather 
forcefully that we cannot. 
54 
W. I. Wallace, in his Existence of God, 
expresses a similar point of. view on this matter: 
It may console the paralytic to be told that paralysis 
is mere lack of mobility, nothing positive, and that 
insofar as he is, he is perfect. It is not clear, however, 
that this kind of comfort is available to the sufferer of 
mala-ria. He will reply that his trouble is not that he 
lacks anything, but rather that he has too much of something, 
namely, protozoans of the genus Plasmodium. If the theist 
retorts that evil is nonbeing in the metaphysical not 
53 
F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology vol. II p. 181. 
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H. J. McCloskey, "Evil and Omnipotence", pp. lOOff. 
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crudely material sense, it would seem appropriate for the 
victim to inquire why God saw fit that the finitude of 
his creatures should take just this form rather than some 
other. Really the "evil is nonbeing1l ploy is a play on 
words, an unfunny joke. It is a sign of progress both in 
the philosophical acumen and essential humanness, that 
little is heard along these lines nowadays. 55 
The belief that evil and pain are mere privations of something 
good seems hardly a satisfactory theodicy. Admi 
best light, however, the privation answer may be 
fairly profound about evil never being an end in 
leads to, or is overcome by, the good. But this 
sophisticated notion will be discussed under the 
III. Evil is logically necessary 
ttedly, seen in its 
saying something 
itself - that it often 
somewhat more 
teleological theodicies. 
There are at least three versions of theodicy that could be 
included under the general heading, "evil is necessary". We have already 
had occasion to discuss one of these, (a) Alvin Plantingas free will 0 
defense, and have made passing references to a second, (b) Leibniz's 
notion that this is the best of all possible worlds. Both of these 
positions suggest that we could not have had a world with no evil. For 
Plantinga, this is because any possible world that God could have made 
actual would be filled with croatures suffering from transworld depravity. 
For Leibniz, the sense in which God could not have avoided evil is not 
simply that it was logically impossible. Rather, it was logically 
impossible given the fact that this is the best of all possible worlds. 
Since God is morally responsible for seeking the best, there can be no 
element in this world which should have been avoided. This argument, 
55 
W. I. Wallace, The Existence of God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1965) pp. 142-143. 
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it seems to me, is entirely a priori and its defects lie in the inherent 
inconsistency of the notion of 'the best of all possible worlds'. But 
enough of a critical nature has been said about both of these positions 
already 
(C) The contrast theodicy 
A third form of the 'evil is logically necessary' type might be 
labelled 'the contrast theodicyl. Baruch Brody, in his book, Beginning, 
Philosophy, briefly attempts to sum up the sense of this approach: 
A perfect world would be a world which we wouldn't 
recognize and appreciate, because we only recognize 
and appreciate something like good if we also experience 
its opposite evil. This is why God has put some evil 
into the world. 57 
In some versions of the contrast theodicy this claim is made even 
more strongly in terms of making it a logical necessity. Usually, this 
stronger version is posed something like this: 'In order for good to 
exist it is necessary for its opposite, evil, to exist'. Brody's version 
is somewhat weaker than this second formulation of the contrast theodicy, 
for he'suggests that evil is necessary "in order to recognize and 
appreciate the good". This distinction is a very important one. The 
second formulation suggests that without evil, good would not exist, 
while Brody's version suggests that although good would exist if we 
didn't have evil, we would not be able to recognize or appreciate it.. 
Although the second formulation looks like it is saying a good 
56 
For two clear arguments against the coherency of Leibnizls answer to 
the problem of evil, cf.: M. B. Ahern's The Problem of Evil, pp. 53-63; 
and James Ross's Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Toronto: 
Collier-Macmillan, 1969) pp. 127-130. 
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Baruch Brody, Beginning Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
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deal more, it is actually based on a not too subtle confusion. The 
proponents of this view are fond of using the analogy of color. If 
everything were blue, they suggest, we would not have blue as a concept. 
By analogy, if we did not have something to contrast with good, then the 
concept 'good' would not exist. But it should be clear that this is 
false. If all the items in the world were the same shade of blue, it is 
quite true that we would not be able to distinguish the blue, but it 
would not follow that the blue did not exist. We might not be able to 
recognize the blue, but it would, nevertheless, still be there. The more 
coherent formulation of the contrast theodicy is that of Brody who 
suggests that in order to recognize or appreciate the good, we must have 
its opposite, evil. If all the objects in the world were blue, it is 
true that we would be hard pressed to recognize and appreciate the blue. 
There are two main avenues of criticism we might explore with 
respect to Brody's version of the argument. The first assumes that what 
the contrast theodicy asserts is true. It then criticizes the argument 
on the grounds that there appears to be an immense amount of gratuitous- 
evil in the world. The other avenue of criticism suggests that the 
premises on which the contrast theodicy is based are false, and thus it 
is an invalid argument. Let us begin examining the first criticism by 
entertaining an example. 
Alvin, a free-lance painter, has been recently hired by the 
parsimonious paint company to demonstrate their new line of indoor house 
paints. When applying for the job Alvin was told by his interviewer 
that the company prides itself on its cost efficiency, and although he 
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would be required to make demonstrations in homes all over Britain, he 
must, under no circumstances, waste any paint. 
During his very first demonstration, Alvin is immediately beset 
with a serious problem. Mrs Higgins, his first customer, has suggested 
that Alvin paint some of her white living room wall with their new 
"Lagoon Blue", so that she might see the contrast between the new color 
and what she formerly had. As Alvin begins to paint the wall, the voice 
of the interviewer reverberates in his ears. 
How much of the wall should Alvin paint? Clearly, he should paint 
enough so that Mrs Higgins, a woman of normal intelligence and vision, 
can appreciate the contrast between her white wall and the now Lagoon 
Blue, but not a drop more than is needed to accomplish that task, for 
Alvin is not to waste any paint. 
It is very unlikely that Alvin would have to paint half the wall, 
or even a quarter or an eighth. Indeed, all that would be required would 
be something like the following: 
0 
The first condition of his employment has been met, for Alvin, 
Mrs Higgins, and any other observer of normal intelligence and vision, 
can easily see the difference between the formerly all white wall and 
the small experimental dab of Lagoon Blue. The second condition has also 
been met - Alvin has wasted very little, if any, paint. 
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Now let the Lagoon Blue stand for evil, while the white represents 
good. God, in our analogy, plays the part of the parsimonious paint 
Company as well as the painter, for he is responsible for the existence 
of the world and, if the analogy holds, he certainly would not allow any 
evil to exist which did not serve the important purpose of helping us 
distinguish evil from good. The question of course is quite simple: 
how much evil do we need to understand or appreciate the good? How much 
do we have? Certainly Dostoyevski and Hume would argue a good deal more 
than we need. 
In the other criticism of the "contrast theodicy" the thesis that 
"in order to apprehend and appreciate the existence of something, you 
have to have its oppositell, is denied. In order to understand vhy this 
premise is not acceptable, we must look for a moment at the orthodox 
Christian conception of heaven. If the principle which underlies the 
contrast theodicy is true, how do the souls residing in heaven realize 
they are experiencing heavenly bliss? Surely it is not because they are 
having experiences of evil in heaven. One might respond by saying that 
they remember evil from when they were on earth. But clearly this will 
not do, for babies who died shortly after birth would have no such 
experiences. Still, it could be argued, they would know they are in 
heaven because they could see people on earth suffering. But once again 
this will not do. If the souls were to watch, for example, the senseless 
murder of an innocent person, by the very fact that the souls were of the 
kind of moral character which merited heavenly bliss, they should feel 
for the victim with appropriate sadness and distress. This would also 
serve the useful purpose of allowing a contrast between the evil done to 
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the poor victim and their condition of heavenly bliss. But it would 
seem that by definition souls in heaven should not feel sorrow, and so 
we are left with a curious paradox: the souls in paradise cannot know 
they are experiencing heavenly bliss because they can't experience or 
apprehend evil in heaven. If they could apprehend or experience evil 
in heaven, they would not, by definition, be in heaven. 
One way out of this paradox is to suggest that the principle on which 
the contrast theodicy is based is false. Indeed, it seems perfectly 
plausible to say that the reason souls in heaven know what heavenly bliss 
amounts to is because they can contrast their condition, not with its 
opposite, but rather against the vision of God. They could know they are 
experiencing heavenly bliss by understanding that they are not God. The 
contrast need not be between opposites, it may be a contrast in degree 
rather than kind. 
Plato seems to be suggesting the same notion in Book nine of the 
Republic when he talks about the pleasures of taste and smell. These two 
sensations, Plato notes, seem not to depend for their existence on any 
prior experience of pain. Thus, the central notion of the contrast 
theodicy 'in order to understand or apprehend the existence of something 
you must have its opposite' can be denied, and the argument can be seen 
as unsound. 
58 
IV. Teleological Theodicies 
There are at least two versions of the teleological theodicy: 
(a) the moral quality theodicy; and (b) the theodicy of future harmony. 
58 
Platols Republic Book IX F. MacD. Conford, trans. (London: oxford 
University Press, 1970). 
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What these points of view have in common is that they both assert that 
evil in some way brings about good. They are different from the "evil 
is necessary" theodicies because the teleological approaches do not 
suggest that it is necessary that God brings about things the way he has. 
The-"moral quality" approach is so named because it emphasizes the moral 
59 
qualities which often result from the human encounter with evil. The "future 
hýarmonyll theodicy gets its name from its controlling belief that in some 
future harmony to come, a kingdom of God realized, all evils will be seen 
as actually resulting in good. 
-he moral quality theodicy: Baruch Brody briefly describes a version of t 
One of the greatest goods we possess are our moral qualities 
of, courage, mercy and compassion. But these qualities arise 
and develop out of the confrontation with evil and wrongs. 
So in order to allow us these prized moral ualities, God 
had to create a world in which evil exists. 
ýO 
r 
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This is an important point that has not been lost on David Hume. If the 
world God created was not the only world available to him, Hume suggests 
that there are at least four ways it might have been improved upon: 
(1) He notes that pain and pleasure are both used to motivate creatures 
to action and self-preservation. He wonders why in another kind of 
world they could not just be motivated by pleasure. Hick answers that 
such an "anaesthetic existence" would fail to provide the stimuli for 
hunting, agriculture, and the building of civilization and culture. (2) Hume wonders why a deity could not occasionally violate general 
laws of nature in order to produce pleasure and reduce pain in deserved 
cases. A fleet saluatory to society would always meet with good winds. 
(3) Hume wonders if human suffering might not be less if we were 
endowed with an increase in one single attribute - industriousness. And (4) Hume suggests that many natural evils could be eliminated if God's 
entire work of art did not resemble a work of art crudely unleft by its 
maker. He talks about the world needing rain, but not understanding how 
a good, intelligent, powerful God would allow floods. Overall, Hume's 
criticisms seem to ask questions about the way the world could have been. 
If He had done these things differently, Hume suggests, the world could 
contain less suffering. Hick remains unimpressed with Hume's 
suggestions, (Cf. The Dialogues Concerning_Natural Religion, )but gives 
insufficient reasons for dismissing Hume's queries. 
6o 
Baruch Brody, Beginning Philosophy, p. 116. 
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Richard Swinburne seems to have a similar perspective in his 
Existence of God, where he argues that natural evils provide, among other 
things, an-opportunity for people to grow in knowledge and understanding: 
If men were to have knowledge of the evil which will result 
from their actions or negligence, laws of nature must act 
regularly; and that means that there will be what I call 
victims of the system ... if men are to have the opportunity to bring about serious evils for themselves or others by 
actions of negligence, or to prevent their occurrence, and 
if all knowledge of the future is obtained through normal 
induction, that is from induction from patterns of similar 
events. in the past - then there wil h be serious natural 
evils occurring to animals and man. 
Swinburne entertains the possibility that God could have given 
people this knowledge by'just informing them of it, rather than having 
them experience it. But if this were the case, he argues, no one would 
fail to believe in God, and thus everyone would be compelled to 
accept the divine word. Additionally, no one would be in a position to 
acquire knowledge of the way the world works on their own. Thuss 
Swinburne concludes: 4 
that a world in which God gave to men verbal knowledge of 
the consequences of their actions would not be a world in 
which men had a significant choice of destinys of what to 
make of ourselves, and of the world. God would be far 
too close for them to be able to work things out for 
themselves. If Godýis to give man knowledge while at the 
same time allowing him a genuine chgice of destiny, it 
2 must be normal inductive knowledge. 
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Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, 1979) p. 210. 
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Ibid, C. A. Campbell's solution to moral evil is also a good example of 
this type., Like Hick and Swinburne , Campbell suggests that God has made the world a place for 'soul-makingt. Campbell also suggests that the 
moral qualities cannot be developed unless people are endowed with free 
will, which, in Campbell's words, "is meaningless if it is not freedom 
to choose wrongly as well as rightly". He argues that if free will 
exists, then a world without moral evil is inconceivable. He is, I 
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John Hick takes up this same point in the 3rd edition of his 
Philosophy of Religion. He seems to agree about the necessity of 
God creating human beings at an epistemic distance from himself; 
The other consideration is that if men and women had 
been initially created in the direct presence of God, 
who is infinite in life and power, goodness and knowledge, 
they would have had no genuine freedom in relation to 
their maker. In order to be fully personal and therefore 
morally free beings, they have accordingly (it is 
suggested) been created at a distance - not a spatial but 
an epistemic 9i stance, a distance in the dimension of 
knowledge ... 
Hick also concurs with Swinburne on the preferability of having 
evil in the world so that human beings may perfect certain moral 
qualities: 
ý *0 A world without problems and difficulties, perils 
nd hardships would be morally static. For moral and 
spiritual growth comes through responses to challenges. 
Accordingly, a person-making environment cannot be 
plastic to human wishes but must have its own structure 
in terms of which men have to learn to live and which 
they ignore at their peril. 64 
It is clear that Hick is in substantial agreement with Swinburne 
on the-importance of the moral quality theodicy, but he also goes a 
good deal beyond it. Indeed, lie seems to attach to the moral quality 
answer another point of view, which he feels is intimately related to it 
and makes it more plausible. He calls this second approach "eschatological 
think, committed to a rather curious argument. On the one hand, he 
suggests that humans are free, which means that they could do 
- it is otherwise. On the other hand, he seems to be arguing that 
logically necessary that at some point they choose evil. If it is 
logically necessary, then they could not have done otherwise. Campbell 
makes no distinction between necessity de dicto and necessity de re. 
Cf. On Selfhood and Godhead (Kýew -York: Macmillan, 195-7? T-pp. 274-275. 
63J 
ohn Hick, The Philosophy of Religion Ord edition) (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1983) pp. 45-46. 
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verification". It is at the heart of what we have labelled the "future 
harmony" theodicy. He conveys the sense of this second approach through 
the use of a parable: 
Two people are travelling together along a road. One of them 
believes that it leads to the Celestial City, the other that 
it leads nowhere, but since it is the only road there is, both 
must travel it. Neither of them has been this way before; 
therefore, neither is able to say what they will find around 
each corner. During their journey they meet with moments of 
refreshment and delight, and with moments of hardship and 
danger. All the time one of them thinks about the trip as 
a pilgrimage to the Celestial City. She interprets the 
pleasant parts as encouragements and the obstacles as trials 
of her purpose and lessons in endurance, prepared by the 
sovereign of that city and designed to make of her a worthy 
citizen of the place when at last she arrives. The other, 
however, believes none of this, and sees their journey as an 
unavoidable and aimless ramble. Since he has no choice in the 
matter, he enjoys the good and endures the bad. For him there 
is no Celestial City to be reached, and no all encompassing 
purpose ordaining their journeys; there is only the road 65 
itself and the luck of the road in good weather and in bad. 
Hick adds a rather short commentary to his tale: 
During the course of the journey, the issue between them is 
not an experimental one. That is to say, they do not 
entertain different expectations about the coming details of 
the road, but only about its ultimate destination. Yet, when 
they turn the last corner, it will be apparent that one of 
them has been right all the time and the other wrong. Thus, 
although the issue between them has not been experimental, it 
has nevertheless been a real issue. They have not merely felt 
differently about the road, for one is feeling appropriately 
and the other inappropriately in relation to the actual state 
of affairs. The opposed interpretations of the situation have 
constituted genuinely rival assertions, whose assertion-status 
has the peculiar charactP, -rIstic of being guaranteed retrospec- tively by a future crux. t)t) 
Thus, Hick sees an important connection between the moral quality 
theodicy mentioned earlier and its eschatological. verification at the 
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end of time, or, to use his metaphor, at the end of life's journey. It 
is at that time, Hick suggests, that it will be clear that the future 
harmony theodicy has been the proper intorpretation of the way things are. 
At the end, all evils will be seen as actually resulting in good. 
M. B. Ahern has suggested that Hick's thoodical position can be 
summed up in six points: 
(1) God's purpose in creating this world was to provide the 
logically necessary environment in which human persons could 
respond freely to His infinite love and freely accept a 
God-centred rather than a self-centred life. Such a world 
is better than a world without evil, or a world with less 
evil but with morally determined beings. 
(2) The freedom needed by human beings if they are to 
respond to God as free persons and not as automata logically 
supposes an element of unpredictability which makes it 
impossible for God to ensure that moral evil will never occur. 
(3) Pain and suffering are part of the environment logically 
necessary for the moral growth of persons by trial and 
0 
testing. 
(4) The apparen tly excessive pain and suffering in the world 
is due partly to its being the necessary condition of certain 
virtues and partly to the positive value of mystery that 
challenges faith and trust. 
(5) The joys of life after death will amply compensate for 
the difficulties of this life and there will be no human being 
who does not have them. 
(6) The existence of animals which will suffer pain is 
explained by their being a necessary part of an environment 
which sets men at a distance from God so that no one is 
compelled to ecept Him: their pain is compensated for by 
animal good. 
ý7( 
Swinburne would most certainly agree that his position includes 1-4 
above. Since his position, the moral quality theodicy, is subsumed in 
Hick's larger teleological perspective, we may effectively criticize them 
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both by attending to the shortcomings of Hick's approach. 
4tion leaves First, from the standpoint of the sufferer Hick's pos. 
much to be desired. From a practical point of view, evil cannot be 
regarded as instrumental to a greater good without losing sight of the 
evil'through a kind of objectification. If we regard all experiences of 
evil as related to a higher good, it requires the victim to rise above 
or to transcend the evil, which is precisely what the victims of 
suffering often cannot do. This point becomes quite clear when we bring 
the teleological theodicy to the bar of real experience. Something rings 
hollow when we approach the survivors of Auschwitz with the notion that 
their suffering has brought about compassion, higher moral values, and 
rededication to the fight against genocide in other parts of the world. 
To argue that the purpose of such atrocities is so that certain goods can 
come out of them seems difficult, if not ridiculous. When this kind of 
approach is taken, it often seems to subordinate the individual experience 
of evil to the construction of an all-encompassing theological system 
that says nothing sincere to the victims of suffering. When the viewpoint 0 
of the individual sufferer is kept central, neither later goods nor a 
future harmony can be allowed to rob the suffering of its reality here and 
now. It is true that sometimes the sufferer, or someone totally sympathetic 
with him, may see that a particular evil has led or will lead to some good. 
This is particularly true in cases of self-sacrifice, where the victim 
willingly allows himself to be harmed in order to bring about a greater 
good. But a warrant for broadening these kinds of selected cases seems 
unclear. 
On a philosophical level., there is another more serious problem with 
137. 
Hick's point of view. If his teleological approach is correct, i.., hy does 
there appear to be so much dysteleological evil, evil which cannot be 
seen to point to any obvious good. It is here that Hick resorts to such 
vague higher goods as "better moral character" or "higher awareness of 
the value of self-sacrifice". But I am not at all sure these 'higher 
goods' do justice to the evils experienced. I am reminded of one Jewish 
theologian, reflecting on the Holocaust who noted, "If one tries to hear 
a redeeming voice at Auschwitz, there is only silence". 
68 
This also 
seems to be the case with countless other evils: disastrous earthquakes, 
senseless accidents, serious birth defects. Even from a coldly 
dispassionate point of view, it is often very difficult to find even 
possible good ends for -them. 
If we could be guaranteed heavenly survival after death in reparation 
for the past evils we have experienced, the question could still be raised 
about whether eternal life would really make those evil experiences right. 
Doubts about the repairable character of survival after death have 
eloquently been voiced by Dostoyevski in the "rebellion" chapter of the 
Brothers Karamazov. Here Alyosha and Ivan are discussing the problem of 
evil. Ivan, who always seems to take the viewpoint of the sufferer, 
describes the "unanswerably clear case" of suffering children, and explains 
why he cannot accept that such suffering would in any way be repairable: 
I understand, of course, what an upheaval it will be, when 
everything in heaven and earth blends in one hymn of praise 
and everything that lives and has lived cries aloud: "Thou 
art just, 0 Lord, for Thy ways are revealed". When the 
68 
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mother embraces the fiend who threw her child to the dogs, 
and all three-cry aloud with loud tears, "Thou art just, 0 
Lord". Then, of course, the crown of knowledge will be 
reached and all will be made clear. But what pulls me up 
here is that I can't accept the harmony. And while I am 
here on earth, I make haste to make my own measures. You 
see, Alyosha, perhaps it may really happen that if I live 
to see the moment, or rise again to see it, I too, perhaps, 
may cry aloud with the rest, looking at the mother embracing 
the child's torturer, "Thou art just, 0 Lord". But I don't 
want to cry aloud now. While there is still time, I hasten 
to protect myself and so renounce the higher harmony all 
together. It's not worth the tears of that one tortured 
child who beat itself on the breast with its little fist and 
prayed in its stinking outhouse, with its unexpiated tears 
to "dear, kind God". Itts not worth it, because those tears 
are unatoned for. They must be atoned for, or there can be 
no harmony. 
69 
Alyosha then asks how these tears could be atoned for. Ivan responds: 
By their being avenged? But what do I care for avenging them? 
What do I care for a hell for oppressors? What good can hell 
do since these children have already been tortured? And what 
comes of harmony, if there is a hell? I want to forgive. I 
want to embrace. I don't want more suffering. And if the 
suffering of children go to swell the sum of sufferings which 
were necessary to pay for truth, then I protest that the 
truth was not worth such a price. I don't want the mother 
to embrace the oppressor who threw her son to the dogs. She 
dare not forgive him. Let her forgive him for herself, if 
she will, let her forgive the torturer for the immeasureable 
suffering of her mother's heart. But the suffering of her 
tortured child she has no right to forgive; she dare not 
forgive the torturer, even if the child were to forgive him. 
And if that is so, if they dare not forgive, what becomes of 
harmony. From love for humanity I dontt want it. I would 
rather be left with an unavenged suffering and unsatisfied 
indignation, even if I were wrong. Besides, too high a price 
is paid for harmony; it's beyond our means to pay so much to 
enter it. And so I hasten to give back my entrance ticket, 
and if I am an honest man, I am bound to give it back as soon 
as possible. And that I am doing. It's not God that I don't 
accept. 70 
Alyosha, only I most respectfully return Him the 
ticket. 
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I have quoted at length from this section of the Brothers Karamazov 
because it so forcefully represents the sympathetic point of view one 
must take in order to approach the reality of evil in a proper way. 
Rejecting a repaired and "happy world built on injustice and suffering", 
Ivan-sees that if one reflects that evil is altered or repaired by 
certain circumstances, this thought at once loses sight of the real evil 
experienced by the sufferer and, in a way, demeans the integrity of the 
victim of suffering. 
But beyond the question of the existential place of the sufferer in 
the theodicy of John Hick, there are also some logical and empirical 
confusions which must be cleared up regarding his view of survival. 
In developing his view of eschatological verification Hick appears 
to be committed to three distinct claims: First, that the self exists 
and continues to have experiences after death. The idea of verification 
makes little sense, Hick points out, if there are no selves left to do 
the verifying. Second, he suggests in the spirit of Biblical anthropology 
and much of modern analytic philosophy that it is unacceptable to 
conceive of people as disembodied spirits. Thus, lie argues for a form 
of resurrection of the body, rather than immortality of the soul. 
71 Third, 
Hick suggests that these resurrected bodies will live and have experiences 
in a space totally different in kind from our present, physical space.. 
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a 72 Some recent critics, Anthony Flew spear-heading the attack, 
have insisted that Hick's three claims axe not false, but rather they are 
meaningless. These philosophers suggest that the whole notion of the 
afterlife makes no sense because it is self-contradictory. There may, 
however, also be a confusion here among the critics. The real issue, if 
one reads Hick carefully, is not life after death, but rather experiences 
after death. It is true that there may be a contradiction about being 
biologically alive while at the same time being biologically dead, but 
there is nothing obviously contradictory about having experiences in a 
resurrected body. It is true that this would seem to require an act of 
omnipotence, but that would appear to be no real obstacle for the God of 
the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
The key to Hickfs view is that he is arguing that the notion of 
having'experience in a resurrected body that exists in a disparate realm 
of space is an empirically meaningful claim. 
73 
This is, of course, a 
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Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955). 
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ý vol. XVII (Apri'1P John Hick, "Theology and Falsification", Theology Zqqa 
1960) p. 20. It is of some historical interest to note that when C. H. Dodd 
in More New Testament Studies (Manchester U. P.: 1968); The Founder of 
Christianity (London: Collins, 1971); and Interpretation of the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977) introduced the notion in 
New Testament Scholarship that the Christian faith is not just a promise 
about rewards after death but was also realized here and now, MacIntyre 
and Flew challenged this position by asking the believers in realized 
eschatology to show the signs of it. Theologians and Biblical scholars 
had a difficult time in doing so without also having to acknowledge Flew's 
counter-evidence to Dodd's claim. In some ways it is helpful to view 
Hick's "eschatological verification" as a response to the challenge of 
Flew and MacIntyre. Rather than accept their position that theistic 
statements are unverifiable, Hick suggests they are verified in another 
realm. 
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much stronger claim than suggesting that it is free of self-contradiction. 
Hick's main argument advanced in favor of his thesis is that the assertion 
'I am having experiences in a resurrected body in a disparate realm of 
space' could be verified by someone watching me. Now even if we concede 
that this is an empirically verifiable proposition we must keep in mind 
at what time it becomes such. We might grant that it is an empirically 
me'aningful proposition then; the problem, however, seems to be whether 
it is empirically meaningful now. Indeed, Hick seems to come very close 
to admitting that this notion is meaningless now in the sense that we 
cannot now verify some stttte of affairs that would obtain then. 
74 
Such 
experiences cannot be shown to be false, Hick points out, but they can be 
shown to be true. In other words, if the proposition 'I am having 
experiences in a resurrected body existing in a disparate space' is false, 
then I can never verify its falsity for there would be no more 'me'. But 
if the claim is true, I can verify it by my experiences, and others could 
verify it the same way I do. But the difficulty still resides in the fact 
that the verification of these experiences could only be had then, while 
the problem we are addressing is whether they are meaningful now. As Hick 
has already suggested, since the verifying experiences could only be had 
then, presumably we can conclude that the whole matter is meaningless now. 
As Kai Nielson has suggested, "Hick in effect is trying to pull himself up 
by his own bootstraps". 
75 
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But perhaps there is a way out of this problem for Hick. The 
criticism we have outlined seems to rest on the verification principle 
of meaning. Although there have been various formulations of the 
, 1c, 
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principle since the publication of A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Log 
the following, I think, is a fair rendering of the principle: an 
assertion is meaningful if and only if some sense observation would be 
directly or indirectly relevant to itsconfirmation or disconfirmation. 
If this really is the foundation for the argument against Hick, lie may 
not be in serious difficulty after all. 
One problem which has been discussed in regard to the verification 
principle is its restriction to sensory data. There may well be other 
types of experiences which are quite genuine and of real noetic significance 
but are not sensory experiences. Consider Irememberingf, for example. 
It is generally agreed among philosophers and psychologists alike that 
remembering is not, strictly speaking, a sense experience, though the 
object or objects remembered may have originally been apprehended by the 
senses. Does it make sense to talk about remembering an object and then 
'remembering the remembering of an object19 Of course not, unless we want 
to say that we are restricted solely to our sense experiences. 
The experience of having a headache is also not a sense experience, 
yet it makes good sense to talk about the experience of having a headache. 
Other problems may exist for the verification principle as well. The 
principle says nothing about who is to do the verifying, nor when it is to 
be made. Indeed, one might ask what it is that verifies the verification 
76 
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principle. Certainly it is not sense experiences. If we use the 
verification principle to verify itself, it is a bit like asking a man if 
he always tells the truth and when he says yes believing him on the 
strength of his own testimony. If we use some other kind of verification 
principle, then we are still left with the sticky problem of verifying 
that principle. 
Let us now return to what is at stake here to see what this has 
to do with Hick's argument. We have suggested that the difficulty with 
Hick's position is that the experiences that would verify the statement 
'I am having experiences in a resurrected body existing in a disparate 
realm of space' could only be had then, and are not available to us now, 
from which it would seem to follow that all talk about then is meaningless, 
now. But consider the following example: Suppose after returning from a 
baseball game I were to say, 'I saw the Baltimore OrioleS play', and in 
anticipation of another game in the future I were to add, land I plan on 
seeing them again in the not too distant future'. Now suppose these 
comments were made in the presence of a confirmed logical positivist- It 
seems to me that he would have to object to my statements on the grounds 
that all such talk about the future was meaningless, since the sense 
experiences that could confirm it were not available now. Indeed, the 
very same objection could be made to my reference to the gamo just pa. st. 
Now suppose that any statements I made to this person, in an attempt to 
reply, were thought by him to be inadmissable unless they referred to trv-1 
my immediate sense experience. Indeed, he suggests that I am morely"'to 
pull myself up by my bootstraps. 
But if we look at this positivist view very closely, it may have 
some unwanted side effects. Any statements about the positivist's own 
mind would be inadmissable since I am not given to myself in sense 
experiences. Any statements about his own past and future would also be 
meaningless, including that time in the past when he first happened upon 
Alfred Ayer's book. Also, statements about others' minds would be just 
as meaningless, which would put him in the rather bizarre position of 
trying to refute someone who may not even have a mind, since one does 
not come to know about anotherts mind, strictly speaking, through sense 
experience. If the positivist were then to argue for the meaningfulness 
of these concepts, we could accuse him of attempting to pull himself up 
by his own bootstraps. 
If we were to grant that eschatological verification is an 
empirically meaningful concept, we must also say that Hick seems still 
to be going about his task in the wrong way. The critics insist on 
verification in this world, and Hick seems to fail to even meet them 
halfway-in resorting to verification beyond the grave. In some ways 
Hick seems to be willing to do the verification dance, but without paying 
the verification fiddler. 
We must, of course, keep in mind that showing that a concept is 
meaningful is different from showing what kinds of experiences would 
confirm or disconfirm it. Hick says this about establishing the truth 
of eschatological verification: 
I shall not spend time in trying to draw a picture of a 
resurrected existence which would merely prolong the 
religious ambiguity of our present life. The important 
question for our purpose is not whether one can conceive 
145. 
of after life experiences which would verify theism (and 
in point of fact one can easily conceivo of them), but 
whether one can conceive of sfterlife experiences which 
would serve to verify them. 77 
Hick hopes to find some experiential situation in the next life 
that would conclusively verify the truth not only of his theodicy, but 
also of Christian theism in general. But certainly he must tell us now 
what would show that his view is correct. This failure of Hick to specify 
when and how his brand of theodicy is to be verified has led to a problem 
discussed very clearly by J. E. Barnhart: 
Unfortunately, Hick's argument can be turned against him. 
For in the next liýe one could use Hick's argument to say, 
"well things seem to support the view of God's loving 
providence, but the final word is not yet in. By and by 
we will see that what seems to us to be divine providence 
is really a mistaken impression rooted in our failure to 
grasp the entire picture, for in the eschaton that is 
still to come after heaven, we will actually verify that 
ýhings are not at all like what they seem to be here in 
this temporary heaven. it 78 
Barhart points out that if one suggests. that this ", survival after 
heaven" view seems a bit too f ancif ul f or us to take seriously, the same charge 
could be levelled against Hick's initial view of heaven. Hick gives no 
specific point at which his eschatological view will be known to be the 
proper description of things. Barnhart argues that this vacillation might 
leave the residents at heaven in an epistemic quandry as to when the final 
word is in on eschatological verification. 
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In an earlier articleý9 Hick does suggest however that the Christian 
tradition offers two different accoimts of verifying experiences after 
death: the Beatific Vision and/or the experience of Christ in his 
kingdom. But Hick doubts that these two accounts can be combined as 
readily as many traditional theologians assume, and he also raises 
serious doubts about whether the Beatific Vision is meaningful to us now, 
"tor the exposition of it provides little more than the phrase itself 
f or discussionfl. 
80 
Hick seems to have a good deal more confidence in seeing Christ in 
his kingdom. He suggests that this might point unambiguously to the 
existence of a loving God. His notion of seeing Jesus in his kingdom 
appears to involve an experience of the fulfillment of God's purpose for 
I 
ourselves in conjunction with the experience of communion with God as he 
revealed himself through Jesus. 
It is important to note that this kind of experience, Hick suggests, 
would not prove his theodicy to be logically necessary and thereby 
conclusively established, rather he wants to claim that this kind of 
experience would remove his theodicy from the realm of reasonable doubt. 
But once again, this claim is beset with a host of difficulties* 
First, there is still the very real problem of observing Christ in his 
kingdom. It is very difficult to nail down exactly what he is talking 
about when he uses this expression. If it amounts to seeing Jesus in 
his resurrected body, presiding over all his subjects who were also in 
79 
John Hick, Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957) 
pp. 150-163. 
80 
Ibid. 
147. 
their resurrected bodies, how would this differ epistemically from 
Jesus' life on earth? Hick suggests that it would be different because 
the view of the onlookers would be radically different from the view 
they had on earth, for the truth of theism and the answer to the problem 
of evi-l were on earth still in the realm of reasonable doubt. 
81 This 
eschatological view would have to be sufficiently different in kind to 
make impossible the "faith response" that had been the hallmark of 
Christians for centuries. But if this were the case, there must also be 
an admission that we do not know now what kinds of observations could be 
made in heaven that would confirm Hick's particular brard of theodicy. 
82 
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The position taken by John Donne in a sermon preached at St Paul's on 
Easter day, 1628 is quite like that of Hickts. The text is: "For 'now 
we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face, now I know in 
part, but then I shall know even as also I am known. " In his sermon 
Donne writes: "These two terms in our text, Inuncl and ttuncl, now in 
a glass, then face to face, now in part, then in perfection, these two 
secular terms, of which one designs the whole age of this world from 
creation to dissolution thereof, for all that is comprehended in this 
world now, and the other designs the everlastingness of the next world, 
for that incomprehensibleness is comprehended in the other world then 
- these two worlds which design two such ages are now met one day, in 
this day in which we celebrate all resurrection in the root of the 
resurrection of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ blest forever. " 
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Edward Madden and Peter Hare have suggested in their Evil and the 
Concept of God (Springfield: Charles C. Johnson, 1968) pp. 83-90 and 
102-103, a completely different line of criticism from those I have 
taken here. They argue that Hick has committed three different fallacies 
in Evil and the God of Love which they label: "all or nothing"; "it 
could be worse"; and "the slippery slope". The first occurs as a result 
of the claim that Ifsomething is desirable because its complete loss 
would be far worse than the evil its presence now causes". The second 
is based on the claim that "something is not bad because it will be 
followed by all manner of good things". The third fallacy is the result 
of the mistaken belief that "if God once started eliminating evils of 
the world he would have no place to stop short of alperfect'world in 
which robots and not men were possible". Other criticisms of John Hick's 
approach can be found in G. S. Kane, "The Concept of Divine Goodness and 
The Problem of Evil", Religious Studies Vol. 11. (1975); G. S. Kane's "The 
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There are a number of other points at which Hick's theodicy might 
also be criticized. One of the most obvious vulnerabilities is his 
insistence on answering one very large question, why do the righteous 
suffer?, with an equally substantial question, do we survive death? 
We could very easily turn his argument around and say that the reason 
we can be certain of survival after death is that it will finally give 
u's an answer to the problem of evil. In Evil and the God of Love 
hypotheses are built, one on top of the other, with no real firm basis 
for speculation. 
Hick's parable about the journey seems, in a real way, to be 
loading the dice. If we call what the two people are experiencing a 
"journey", then we quite rightly begin to ask questions about where they 
might be going, and we immediately sympathize with the individual who has 
some sense of what she is doilig. But why should we use the analogy of the 
journey to begin with. Why not assume that they are out for a walk, with 
no destination in mind. In thio version the one person sees all the events 
of the walk as enjoyable exporiences to be savoured for their own sake, 
while the other porson 
overarching reason for 
In this example, it is 
all wrong, and suffers 
life depending on the 
continues to insist that there must be some 
all the experiences they are having on their stroll. 
clear that it is the latter person who has things 
from an inability to garner various meanings from 
situations that arise. 
83 
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comparing, for example, Leo Tolstoy's Confessions (London: Bradda, 
1960) with Albert Camust treatise on the meaning of life, The Myth of 
Sisyphus (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955). 
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Hick refers in his parable to difficult experiences as "obstacles" 
and "trials of purp ose and lessons of endurance". And it would appear 
that if we are to take this image seriously, we must conclude that some 
people, because of extraordinary amounts of suffering, fail their triaLs. 
Indeed, this is precisely what is wrong with Swinburne's analysis as 
well. The adherents to the moral quality theodicy speak as though in 
each encounter with suffering there is a real possibility of "passing 
the test" and gaining in genuine moral insight. 
84 
In reality, this is 
clearly not always the case. And, more importantly, it is not always 
the fault of the victims. H. D. Lewis points to this same difficulty with 
"soul factory" brands of theodicy akin to Hick's. 
The trouble with this answer is that there is much suffering 
which it does not cover, suffering which degrades more than 
it ennobles, distress and debility which reduces men to a 
state akin to that of brutes and does little to deepen their 
character and sensitivity. The same applies to another 
answer that has much truth in it, namely that suffering and 
need bring out charity and sympathy. It would certainly be 
a poor world in which men never had the opportunity to bear 
one another's burdens, but again there is a surd which 
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This position can be found in all of William James' writings about the 
problem of evil. In Pragmatism (New York: Macmillan, 1946) Ord ed. ), 
James compares the world to a football game. If the aim of the game 
were merely to get the ball over the goal line, James suggests, the 
team "would simply get up on some dark night and placo it there". But 
the aim of course is to get there according to fixed rules. "The aim 
of God is not merely ... to make men and to save them, but rather 
to 
get this done through the sole agency of nature's machinery. Without 
nature's stupendous laws and counter-forces, man's creation and 
perfection, we might suppose, would be too insipid achievments for God 
to have proposed them". James departs from the traditional Judeo- 
Christian conception of God, however, by suggesting that "one of the 
conditions of the game" is that human beings have the kind of free will 
where they are unpredictable, even by God. Consequently, his position 
may also be seen as another version of the limited God theory. 
150. 
cannot be brought under this explanation; there is a wide 
range of ills which seem out of proportion to any 
benevolence they help display or elicit. There are 
situations of sudden catastrophe and bereavement where it 
is perverse and provoking to proffer such consolation. 85 
When pressed on this point about excessive suffering, Hick has 
the following to say: 
Our solution then to this baffling problem of excessive 
and undeserved punishment is a frank appeal to the 
positive value of mystery. Such suffering remains unjust 
and inexplicably haphazard. The mystery is a real mystery, 
inpenetrable to the rationalizing, human mind. It 
challenges the Christian faith with utterly baffling, 
alien, destructive meaninglessness. 86 
Yet theodicy and mystery would appear to be antithetical. The 
purpose of theodicy is, by and large, to show the justice of God through 
appeals to reason. If the problem collapses into mystery, we have 
clearly left the arena of reason. 
Another major problem with Hick's point of view is that an 
" or ambiguity seems to exist in his position as to whether evil is reaL 
not. Hick's theological justification for the disasters and the morally 
heinous acts of life is to aver that they are Igenuine evils' but 
contained and overruled by God's ultimate purpose; he insists that they 
are utterly real, and yet relative to a final good in which "nothing will 
have been finally and sheerly evil". This ambiguity is engendered by 
Hick's desire, I think, to escape the answer given by the religions of 
solution, which would make evil ultimate and beyond God's sovereignty, 
85 
H. D. Lewis, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 312. 
86 
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, P. 371. 
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and monism which would ultimately deny the reality of evil altogether. 
In the end, Hick seems to yield to the latter in order to save God's 
omnipotence. And to be certain that omnibenevolence will also be 
preserved, he adds universal salvation after death. "Evil is really 
evil., really malevolent, and deadly ... and yet in the end it will be 
defeated and made to serve God's purpose. " 
In Camus' novel, The Plague, Father Paneloux's second sermon 
points to the same kind of ambiguity. You will remember that in the 
first of his homilies, the priest suggested that the plague could be 
understood as deserved punishment. You will also recall that a crucial 
event stands between the first and second sermons which changes Father 
Paneloux's view of theodicy. The event, the death of an innocent child, 
forces the priest to abandon the retributive justice position. 
In the second sermon, the priest introduces a new theodicy. The 
first sermon had attempted to demonstrate God's justice through the use 
of a kind of empirical method. The priest took stock of who had sinned 
and, consequently, who had died. Unfortunately, his equation, with the 
death of the small child, was shown to be too simplistic a view of the 
problem. The second sermon might be called a theodicy of last resort. 
It sounds very reminiscent of what Hick has said about the positive value 
of mystery. Father Paneloux: 
I understand that sort of thing is revolting because it 
passes our human understanding. But perhaps we should 
love what we cannot understand. 87 
Yet, it is of some interest that the priest does not, in the final 
analysis, resort to Hick's eschatological verification: 
87 
Albert Camus, The Plague, p. 201. 
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In other manifestations of life God made things easy for 
us and, thus far, our religion had no merit. But in this 
respect he put us, so to speak, with out backs to the wall. 
Indeed, we all were up against the wall that plague had 
built around us, and under its lethal shadow we must work 
out our salvation. He, Father Paneloux, refused to have 
any recourse to simple devices enabling him to scale that 
wall. Thus he might easily have assured them that the 
child's suffering would be compensated for by an eternity 
of bliss awaiting him. But how could he give that assurance 
when, to tell the truth, he knew nothing about it? For who 
would dare to assert that eternal happiness can compensate 
for a single moment's human suffering. 88 
At least one other thorny problem with Hickts theodicy remains 
to be discussed. Hick maintains throughout Evil and the God of Love 
that moral choices required by God's purposes for creation are, at 
least in part, unpredictable. In these sections of the book, Hick 
appears to be suggesting that God cannot know what these human choices 
will be until after the decisions have been made. Now if this is true, 
it is'difficult to see how God could have known in advance that his 
purposes for creation will be achieved in the ond. M. B. Ahern points to 
this same problem: 
How could God be certain, before creating, that a free 
response to the good would be made in even one case or 
at least in enough cases to justify the world's evils. 
Uncertainty about the good outcome of the world makes 
it doubtful whether God was justified in creating. The 
risk seems too great. Furthermore, although he believes 
all men, no matter how evil in this world will share the 
blessedness of an afterlife, Hick gives no clear ground 
for certainty of this. If unforced moral response to God 
and to good is a supreme value, it is difficult to see 
how it could be certain, either before creation or after 
it, and that all men will actually make this response in 
this life or in the next. For his belief Hick claims not 
absolute certainty but practical certainty because of God's 
88 
Ibid., pp. 201-202. 
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power to win people to himself. However, he does not explain 
how this power of God's is to be reconciled with unforced 
moral response in every instance. 89 
If Hick's view included foreknowledge of the events of the world 
the theory would not suffer from these problems. His view of the positive 
character of suffering might also be better accepted. But he has chosen 
not to take this route. Richard Swinburne's position does not suffer from 
these particular problems, f or Swinburne argues rather convincingly f or 
God's omniscience, which includes foreknowledge. But Swinburne is not 
arguing for eschatological verification. 
As I have attempted to show, Hickts proposed theodicy suffers from 
a number of difficulties. He all too often seems to employ the old 
theological trick, "if you can't refute it, incorporate it into your 
argument". This is particularly true of his arguments about the positive 
value of mystery and Iteschatological verification". Hick's theodicy in 
its present form would account for a world twice, five times, even ten 
times as evil as the present one. Indeed, because he suggests that 
senseless, irrational evil always has teleological worth, he could account 
f or an almost boundless amount of evil, a kind of hell on earth. Were the 
-world suddenly to turn into a giant Auschwitz, where all suffered in 
unspeakable agony, but which produced an occasional development of moral 
character, Hick's theodicy would remain unshaken. It would still be 
descriptive of the facts. Surely a theodicy which accounts for a world 
with any degree of evil must be seen as inadequate. 
John Hospers seems troubled by this very point, as we car. see from 
the following passage of his An Introduction to Philosophical Analysi : 
89 
M. B. Ahern, The Problem of Evil, p. 64. 
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It is true that people have to suffer pain in order to recover 
health, our medical knowledge being what it is, and the laws 
of nature (particularly of biology in this case) being what 
they are. But this consideration which does justify a 
physician in inflicting pain on a patient in order that the 
patient may recover, applies only to limited beings who can 
achieve the end no other way. Once we suspect, however, that 
the physician could achieve the goal without inflicting 
suffering on his patients, and that he is inflicting it 
anyway, we call him a cruel and sadistic monster. Now God, 
unlike the physician, is omnipotent; he could bring about a 
recovery without making a patient go through the 
excruciating pain. Why then does he not do this? If it 
is objected that this would require a miracle and that it 
would upset the orderliness of nature to continually perform 
miracles, it can be replied that the laws of nature could have 
been so set up that no miracle would be required in each case. 
After all, who is the author of the laws of nature? Why did 
God set up the causýil order in such a way as to require his 
creatures to die in pain and agony? There is not the excuse 
iii the case of God that there is in the case of the physician 
who can bring about his patientts recovery only by causing 
suffering, for God, being omnipotent as well as benevolent, 
could bring about the recovery without such means; indeed, he 
could have kept the patient from being sick in the first place. 
What would we think of a patient who first inflicted his 
child's leg and then decided to amputate it, although a cure 
was in his power and the infection was of his own giving to 
begin with? But this would be precisely the position of an 
omnipotent God, for being omnipotent, he'does not need to 
use evil means to bring about a good end. 90 
A similar comment can be found in Josiah Royce's The Problem of Job. 
In that work, Royce, keeping in mind the perspective of the victims of 
suffering, makes a pertinent comment on the inadequacy of theodicies which 
rely on a soul factory interpretation of evil: 
This talk of medicinal and disciplinary evil, perfectly fair 
when applied to our poor fate-bound human surgeons, judges, 
jailers, or teachers, becomes cruelly and even cynically 
trivial when applied to explain the ways of God ... I confess, 
as a layman, that whenever, at a funeral, in the company of 
90 
John Hospers, An Introduction to_Philosophic al AnaLysis, second edition. 
(Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963) pp-. - /ý64-465- 
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mourners who are immediately facing Job's own personal 
problem, who ask that terrible and uttermost question of 
God himself ... and require the direct answer - that 
whenever, I say, in such a company I have to listen to 
these half-way answers, to these superficial splashes in 
the wavelets at the water's edge of sorrow, while the 
black unfathomed ocean of infinite evil spreads out 
before our wide open eyes - well, at such times this 
trivial speech about useful burns and salutary medicines 
makes me, and I fancy others, simply and wearily heartsick. 
Some words are due children at school, to peevish patients 
in the sickroom who need a little temporary quieting. But 
quite other speech is due to men and women when they are 
wakened to the higher reason of Job by fierce anguish of 
our mortal life's ultimate facts. They deserve either 
our simple silence, or if we are ready to speak, the speech 
of people who ourselves inquire as Job inquired. 91 
Royce's comments lead us quite naturally to the next chapter, an 
analysis of the speeches of Yahweh and the repentance of Job. There we 
will discuss the notion of "seeing God" as an lanswer' to the problem of 
suffering. Before doing this, however, let us make some final comments 
about what has been accomplished in this chapter. 
We began this chapter by offering a critical analysis of most, if 
not all, of the major theodicies offered in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
In the course of this study, we have delineated four major kinds of 
answers to the problem of evil: punishment and warning theodicies; "the 
unreality of evil" theodicies; "evil is logically necessary" theodicies; 
and, teleological theodicies. In each of these four categories we 
explored a number of variations. In all of the examples of the first, 
three types, however, we have attempted to show that there is at least 
one basic logical flaw which renders those answers to the problem of evil 
invalid. In the fourth type, the teleological theodicies, the inadequacy 
91 
Josiah Royce, "The Problem of Job", in W. Kaufmannts Religjion From 
Tolstoy to Camus, p. 244. 
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is not to be found on logical grounds, rather, it lies in the fact that 
these answers seem to pay so little heed to the victims of suffering. 
Although John Hick's answer to the problem of evil is logically possible, 
from the standpoint of the victim of suffering, it is not particularly 
appealing. We have also attempted to show that although there are no 
logical problems which sound the death knell for Hick's approach there 
aie still a sufficient number of logical difficulties that his position 
on the problem of evil is often times unclear and ambiguous. 
In the following chapter we shall take a close look at the 
perspective offered by the Book of Job in the hope of laying the groundwork 
for a response to the problem of evil offered in chapter five that is 
logically consistent, true to the Christian form of life and at the same 
time is also sensitive to the needs and the point of view of the victim 
of suffering. 
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Chapter Four: IlSeeinR Godt' as an 'Answer' to the Problem of Suffering, 
"Did you say the stars were worlds, Tess? " 
"Yes. 11 
"All like ours? " 
"I don't know; but I think so. They sometimes seem to be like 
apples on our stubbard tree, Most of them splendid and sound - 
a few blighted. " 
"Which do we live on -a splendid one or a blighted one? " 
"A blighted one. " 
Thomas Hardy Tess of the d'Urbervilles 
"Solomon and Job have known best and spoken best of man's misery. 
The one the most fortunate, the other the most unfortunate of 
men; the one knowing by experience the emptiness of pleasure; the 
other the reality of sorrow. " 
Blaise Pascal Pensees', no. 357 
"I have been young, and now am not too old, 
And I have seen the righteous forsaken, 
His health, his honours and his quality taken. 
This is not what we were formerly told. " 
Edmund Blunden 
The Book of Job is perhaps the greates poetic work produced by the 
ancient Israelite community, both in terms of its poetic form and its 
intellectual perceptiveness and honesty. Thomas Carlyle has called it 
"the most wonderful poem of any age and language; our firstp oldest 
statement of the never-ending problem - man's destiny and God's way with 
him here on earth ... there is nothing written in the Bible or out of it 
of equal literary merit". 
1 Professor Rowley has referred to the Book 
. 
of 
Job as "the supreme literary masterpiece in the Old Testament, and one of 
Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes (London: The New University Library, 1957) 
p. 67. 
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the greatest creations of world literature". 
2 Similar sentiments have 
been expressed by such Jewish philosophers and exegetes as Gersonides and 
Maimonides, as well as other prominent thinkers of the Middle Ages. In 
the modern period, the works of disparate artists, thinkers and writers 
such as Martin Luther, Immanuel Kant, Robert Burton, William Blake, 
Alfred Tennyson, Carl Jung, Martin Buber, H. G. Wells, Robert Frost and 
Archibald MacLeish give evidence of the profound influence the Book of 
Job continues to exercize over the hearts and minds of sensitive people. 
Yet, despite its almost universal appeal, and the wide range of excellent 
3 
commentaries available on the book, the work sti. 11 possesses a number of 
characteristics which remain enigmatic*4 
2 
H. H. Rowley# Job (London: Thomas Nelson, 1970) p. 6. 
3 
S. R. Driver and G. B. Gray, A Critical and Exegetical_Commentary on the 
Book of Job 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921); S. L. 
Terrien, Exegetical commentary in ItThe Interpreter's Bible', vol. 3 (New 
York: Nashville, Abingdon, 1954); Paul Sanders, Twentieth Century 
Interpretations of the Book of Job (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968); 
Robert Gordis, The Book of Job: Eommentary, New Translation and Special 
Studies (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1978); H. H. 
Rowley (ed. ) Job (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1970); Marvin Pope, The 
Anchor Bible: Job (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965ý; 
Moses Butlenwieser, The Book of Job (New York: Macmillan, 1922); Morris 
Jastrow, The Book of Job (Phi adelphia: 1020) and J. B. Lippincotts, 1, 
E. Dhorme, A Commentary-on the Book of Job Harold Knight (trans. ) (London: 
Nelson, 1967T 
4 
There are any number of thorny-problems to be associated with the Book of 
Job. Among them are the following: What is the relationship between 
Isa. 52: 13 to 53: 12 and the poetry of Job? In these passages from Isaiah 
we find the suffering oil one individual who may represent a body of 
faithful prophets or a righteous remnant. Some scholars maintain that the 
suffering servant poem is dependent on Job, others the reverse; The Hebrew 
text is probably more ambiguous than any other Biblical book. The Revised 
Standard Versions' footnotes to Job reflect but a small sampling of the 
many textual difficulties and uncertainties with which the translator and 
interpreter of Job must wrestle: The relationship of the prose sections 
to the poetry is also a problem that has evoked a very large number of 
16L. 
The author may very well have lived in Judah shortly after the fall 
of Jerusalem in 586, though the time and authorship of the book are also 
matters of great debate. 
5 The influence of the prophet Jeremiah in chapter 
three appears to be quite clear, 
6 
but the poet is most certainly working 
in the large genre of Wisdom literature. 
Some scholars have thought the author to be a non-Israelite, 
peAaps from Edom, but this view is not. widely accepted. The principal 
reason for the development of this minority position is the lack of direct 
references in Job to the Covenent with Yahweh, as well as the omission of 
any mention of the Temple at Jerusalem. These omissions might just as 
well be understood, however, by taking cognizance of the difficult spiritual 
situation out of which the poet may be speaking. What is Israel's honest 
conflicting opinions, Cf., for example the difference between T. K. Cheyne's 
The Prophecies of Isaiah and S. Terrien's Interpreter's Bible, vol. 3; 
Another interesting problem is the proper place of Job in the Hebrew canon. 
In some manuscripts Job follows Psalms and Proverbs. In others, it stands 
between them. In Syrian versions it stands between Deuteronomy and Joshua. 
Its position varies in Greek and Latin manuscripts as well. There are 
also a number of other questions concerned with the relatiun of the Elihu 
sections of the text to the rest of the comforters. 
5 
For a good selection of theories on the date and authorship of Jobp Cf. 
H. H. Rowleyts From Moses to Qumran (London: Lutterworth Press, 1963) 
p. 173ff. Rowley discusses dates ranging from the patriarchal age to the 
second or first centuries B. C. Most recent writers agree, however, that in 
its original form the book was post-exilic in origin, and the secondary 
parts of later composition. 
6 
Cf. Jeremiah 11: 18 to 12: 6. 
7 
Cf. Samuel Terrien's Interpreter's Bible vol 3. pp. 884-888 for a full 
discussion of this possibility. Also, Terrien's Job: Poet of Existonce 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1958) and Walter HaTr-elson-'s Interpretinp, 
_ the Old Testament (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964) pp. 433 436. 
But this position which is advocated by J. C. Rylaarsdam in Revelation in 
Jewish Wisdom Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946) and 
by R. H. Pfeiffer in his Introduction to the Old Testament (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1948) is not without its difficulties. One of the principle 
problems is the fact that the Edomites at the time of Israel's fall were 
unkind neighbors, who in fact helped to contribute to the collapse of the 
nation of Israel. 
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hope now that the Temple has been destroyed? Is it possible for the 
Israelite people to continue-to believe in Yahweh's steadfast love at a 
time like this? 8 
Still, the major questions of the book seem to be couched on the 
personal level rather than a grand metaphor for the nation as a whole. 
. Indeed, the book can be seen as a continuation of questions raised by 
Jeremiah regarding the justice of the suffering of the righteous. 
9 The 
poet clearly sets out to deal with such questions. The Book of Job is 
important for the purposes of this thesis for it rýtises issues, often 
in a quite philosophically sophisticated way, about how one should go 
about asking and perhaps answering the problem of evil. The author takes 
as his framework an ancient and no doubt popular narrative about a 
blameless and upright man named Job, whom Yahweh tested and afflicted to 
see if his faith would endure the adversity. The archaic tale may date 
to as early as the 9th century, 
10 
and could also have circulated throughout 
the ancient Near East. The poet has incorporated the tale as the prologue 
(chapters 1 and 2) and the epilogue (42: 7-17) of the present work, though 
it is likely that he has reworked this material for his own purposes. 
A number of scholars have suggested that the epilogue is intrusive 
and that it destroys the poetic insights which have immediately preceded 
8 
The analogical use of Job as a symbol for Israel is also rather suspect. 
One of the chief shortcomings of the analogy is that Job is innocent, 
while Israel is not. 
9 
Cf. John Bowker's Problems of Suffering in Religions of tho World pp. 5-24. 
10 
Rowley, Job, pp. 21ff. 
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it in 42: 1-6. But it may well be the case that the author, having laid 
out his poetic conclusion, was nevertheless willing to let the denouement 
of the older narrative stand. Had he not added the older conclusion, the 
community was a whole may have done so. 
11 Another interpretation, as I 
shall show later, is that the importance of the epilogue lies not in 
what is given but how much and in what manner. 
It is sometimes argued that the prologue might have been eliminated 
as well. But the logic of the prologue is quite clear, and its 
transition to the main body of poetry is quite natural. The prologue is 
essential to the purposeqof the poetry and therefore is an important 
reworking of the prose narrative. The 'Satan' of the prologue is not 
the personification of evil to be found in later Judaism. Here he is 
the tester of man's faith, he is more like a devil's advocate than a 
devil. This adversary maintains that Jobs piety is the direct result 
of his having been blessed by Yahweh - that God has continually rewarded 
Job for his good faith. If his prosperity were taken aways Satan argues, 
Job would curse God. The adversary is permitted to visit various 
calamities on Job, but through it all, the protagonist holds fast to his 
faith in the justice of Yahweh. Satan now maintains that if Job himself 
were smitten with evil, he would surely curse the deity. 
The Satan answered the Lord saying, 
"Skin for skin! 
All a man has 
he will give for his life. 
But put forth your hand 
and touch his own flesh and bones 
and he will surely curse you to your face. " 
Ibid. 
k 
4 
Thenthe Lord said to Satan, 
"He is in your power 12 but preserve his life. " 
Job soon contracts a loathsome disease. Earlier he has lost his 
children and all of his worldly possessions. Job's wife, in the face 
of these calamities, has had enough. She suggests an alternative to 
Job: 
"Are you still holding fast to you piety? 
Curse God and die. ttl3 
But Job is ready, at least for the present, to receive evil from 
the Lord as well as good. When they hear of Job's misfortunes, three 
friends come to comfort him, but first they sit stunned with him in 
silence for seven days and nights: 
Then Job's three friends heard all the trouble that had come 
upon him. And they came, each from his place - Eliphaz the 
Temanite, Bildad the Shuhite, and Zophar the Noamathite - 
-having arranged together to come to condole with him and 
comfort him. Now when they caught sight of him from afar$ 
they could not recognize him. So they raised their voices 
and wept and rent their robes and threw. dust over their 
heads toward the heavens. They sat with him on the ground 
for seven days and for seven nights, no one saying a word, 
for they saw his agony was very great. 14 
12 
2: 4-6. All quotations from the Book of Job which are used in this 
chapter, except where otherwise indicated, have come from Robert Gordis's 
translation. 
13 
2: 9-10. 
14 
2: 11-13. Archibald Macleish in his play, J. B., gives a' modern setting to 
the book. In the first half of the poetic drama, Macleish retells the 
familiar story. J. B., the Job figure, is a successful businessman. He 
possesses all the trappings of a successful, upper middle-class lifet 
complete with attractive loving family. Then, one by one, his children 
begin to die. His business fails. Eventually, his health fails. 
Finally, the world is almost entirely destroyed by a nuclear bomb. 
Three friends come to comfort J. B.: A Marxist, A Freudian psychiatrist 
and a clergyman. The first assures him that none of his suffering is his 
167. 
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We have learned much earlier from the prose narrative that Job 
it... was blameless and upright, fearing God and avoiding evilii. 
15 
Clearly, it is Job's present condition, combined with this realization 
that he is innocent, that creates the problem of suffering for the poet. 
Eventually the friends become less sympathetic. They begin to maintain 
Job has sinned, no doubt unwittingly. Eliphaz, the oldest and wisest 
ot the comforters, is the first to speak. He reminds Job how often the 
protagonist himself has consoled sufferers in the past by recalling a 
great religious truth: 
"Think now, what innocent man was ever destroyed; 
and where were the upright cut off? 
Whenever I have seen those who plow inequity 
and sow trouble - they reap it! 
By the breath of God they are destroyed. 16 
and by the blast of his wrath they are consumed. " 
The other friends soon follow suit, and Job in turn protests his 
innocence. In anguish, he eventually suggests that Yahweh either come 
to his aid or take his life. He appeals for an umpire or a mediator to 
adjudicate his case: 
"If only there were an arbiter between us 
who could lay hands upon us both, 
who would remove Godts rod from me 17 
so that my dread of Him would not terrify me. " 
fault. The fault lies in class societies where capitalism is dominant. 
The second friend, the psychiatrist, tells J. B. he is not guilty of sin, 
for there is no sin. Now we have a better understanding of the way the 
human mind works, we know the notion of choice is really illusory. The 
clergyman responds to J. B. 's dilemma by falling back on Augustinian 
original sin. In the end, all three although certainly part of the 
contemporary conventional wisdom, are shown by MacLeish to be inadequate 
responses to the problem of suffering. 
15 
16 
4: 7-9. 
17 
9: 33-35. 
169., 
A second and third time the friends speak, advancing from gentle 
suggestion to specific accusation; indeed, by Eliphazls third speech, 
Robert Gordis suggests that the first of the comforters has been stripped 
of his urbanity by Job's continued recalcitrance: 
Finding his theory of Divine Justice contradicted by the 
facts, Eliphaz precedes to the time-honoured device of 
adjusting the facts to the theory. Accordingly, he 
invents a long catalogue of crimes committed by Job, of 
which we previously have heard nothing. Eliphaz is able 
to explain these alleged actions of Job on the ground God 
is so far away from him. 18 
In the words of Eliphaz: 
IlIt is because of your piety that He reproves you and 
enters into judgement with you? 
In fact, you wickedness is immense, 
for there's no end in your inequities. 
For you have taken pledges even from your kinsmen without 
reason, and stripped the naked of their clothing. 
No water have you given to the weary, 19 
. 
And from the hungry you have withheld bread. " 
But through all of this Job vehemently asserts his righteousness. 
From the cruel and unyielding dogmatism of hiý friends, he turns again 
and again to God, but he receives no answer. 
A fourth comforter, Elihu, enters the debate. For the most parts 
he vainly enlarges on what the other friends have already said, but he 
also adds a new possibility as to the cause of suffering: that it 
sometimes comes even to upright men as a discipline, as a warning to 
prevent them from, slipping into apostasy. 
"or a man may be chastened by pain upon his bed, 
by a perpetual strife in his bones, 
18 
Gordis, The Book of Job, pp. 238-239. 
19 
22: 4-8. 
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so that he loathes his bread, 
and his appetite abhors the daintiest food. 
His flesh wastes away so that it cannot be seen, 
and his bones protrude and cannot be looked upon. 
He himself draws near to the pit 
and his life approaches the emissaries of Death. 
But if there be one spokesman for him, 
one advocate among a thousand 
to vouch for man's uprightness, 
God is gracious to him, and He commands, 
"Free him from descending to the pit; 
I have found a ransom for him". 
Then his flesh becomes fresh as in youth; 
he returns to the days of his vigor. 
He then prays to God, and finds favor, 
and joyfully enters his presence. 
He recounts to men His goodness, 
and proclaims to men, saying, 
"I sinned and perverted the right, 
but it was not to my advantage. 
He has redeemed me from going down to the pit, 
so that I might see the light of life. 20 
But Job remains unmoved, even by the eloquence of Elihu. Finally, 
from the majestic voice in the midst of a whirlwind, 
21 God replies to 
Job. Ile forcefully enumerates the marvels of his creation: 
20 
33: 19-28. 
21 
Some scholars (cf. R. A. 'Watsonls The Book of Job (London: Hodder and 
Stroughton, 1942) and G. Rawlinson's Job (London: Funk and Wagnalls, 
1906) pp. 597-598) suggest that Elihu's words in chapter 37 have portended 
the whirlwind theophany. Storms are a common mode of divine revelation 
in the Old Testament. 'Whirlwinds' are a severe form of wind and r, ain 
storm that is rare in Palestine. (Cf. Ps. 50: 3; Nahum 1: 3; Zech. 9: 14. ) 
What makes this theophany unusual, however, is that they are most often 
public appearances of God for the sake of the community (e. g., Ex. 3: 1-12; 
19: 9-20). But in these examplest although God is present, he cannot be 
seen. Job is privileged to experience a private theophany. But it 
comes out of a whirlwind in the midst of a desert land. This seems to 
make the notion of tseeing God' in 42: 5 all the more ironic and mysterious. 
The use of the divine names in the Book may also point to the paradox of 
seeing God, but still having him inaccessible. 'Yahweh' is scrupulously 
avoided in the dialogue. There the names 'Ell, 'Eloahl, and 'Shaddail 
are used. In the prologue and epilogue 'Yahwehl is used. It is 
significant that Job avoids using the tetragrammaton, even after he has 
seen God. 
10 
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"Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind, saying, 
Who is this that darkens my plan 
by words without knowledge? 
Gird up your loins like a man; 
I will ask you, and you tell Me. 
Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth? 
Tell Me, if you have any understanding. 
Who marked out its measure, if you know it, 
who stretched the plumb line upon it? 
Upon what were the earthts pillars sunk: 
who laid down its cornerstone, 
when the morning stars sang together 
and all the sons of God shouted for joy? 
Who shut in the sea with doors 
when it broke forth from the womb whence it came, 
when I made the clouds its garments 
and dark clouds its swaddling clothes, 
prescribing My limit for the Sea , 
and setting for it bolts and doors, 
saying, "Thus far shall you come, and no farther, 
and here shall your proud waves be stayed"922 
Robert Gordis points out there is much more than sheer power to be 
I 
found in God's speeches from the whirlwind. He suggests there are at 
least two very important implied points: 
There are, in addition, two other significant ideas implicit 
in the Lordts words. In accordance with Semitic rhetorical 
usage they are not spelled out, but are left to be inferred by 
the reader. The first is that the universe was nor'. created 
exclusively for man's use, and therefore, neither it nor its 
Creator can be judged solely by man's standards and goals. The 
second is even more significant. The natural world, though it 
is beyond man's ken, reveals to him its beauty and order. It 
is therefore reasonable for man to believe that the universe 
also exhibits a moral order with pattern and meaningp though it 
is beyond mants power to fully comprehend it. Who then is Job, 
toreprove God and dispute with Him? 23 
Indeed, Job responds to the marvel of God's creation by confessing 
that his denial of God's justice was due to ignorance: 
22 
23 
Gordis, The Book of Job, p. 435. 
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Then Job answered the Lord, 
"I know that you can do all things 
. 
and that no purpose of Yours can be thwarted. 
You have said, 
"Who is this that hides My plan without knowledge? " 
Indeed, I have spoken without understanding, 
of things too wonderful for me which I did not grasp. 
You have said, 
"Hear and I will speak; 
I will ask you, and do you inform Me. " 
I had heard of You by hearsay, 
but now my own eyes have seen You. 
Therefore, I abase myself 24 
and repent in dust and ashes. 
The poet closes the book by adding a few verses to serve as a 
bridge between the poetry and the conclusion of the traditional prose 
narrative, 
25 
which now becomes the epilogue. Earlier.. Eliphas has assured 
Job that if he repented, God would forgive him and the protagonist would 
once again be able to intercede for sinners like himself. In a marvelously 
ironic passage, the Lord now castigates Eliphaz and the other comforters. 
God suggests that they can only be forgiven through the intercession of 
Job, who has spoken the truth about Him. 
After the Lord had spoken these words to Job, the Lord said 
to Eliphaz, the Temanite, "My anger is kindled against you 
and against your two friends, for you have not spoken the 
truth about Me as has My servant Job. Now then, take seven 
bulls and seven rams, and go to My servant Job, and offer them 
as a burnt offering to yourselves. My servant Job rust 
intercede for you, for only to him will I show favor and not 
expose you to disgracg for not speaking the truth about Me as 
did my servant job. it2 
24 
42: 1-6. 
25 
42: 7-17. 
26 
42: 7-8b. 
173., 
In the very end, Job's wealth is restored two-fold, he receives 
fourteen sons, three beautiful daughters and a happy life of one hundred 
and f orty years. 
27 
The final meaning and message of Job, like its composition and 
textual problems, has elicted a wide variety of responses over the 
centuries. The chief problem of interpretation arises from the fact that 
the speeches of Yahweh (chapters 38 to 42) majestically seem to ignore 
the issues as Job has posed them. The problem for Job is a straightforward 
one: why do the innocent suffer? But instead of giving a clear answer 
to that question, God confronts Job with a series of seemingly irrelevant 
questions destined to convince the protagonist of the paltriness of human 
knowledge and power. Indeed, some readers of the Book of Job have remarked 
that Yahweh responds from the whirlwind with a magnificent display of his 
power, when, in fact, his omnipotence has never seriously been in question. 
What has been suspect, however, at least from the perspective of Job, is 
God's goodness and justice, and the deity remains curiously silent about 
those attributes. We will return shortly to the problem of the Yahweh 
speeches, but let us first turn for a few moments to some other answers 
to the problem of Job's suffering which may be found elsewhere in the text. 
There are at least three other answers to the problem of suffering 
suggested in the Book of Job: (a)* that suffering is a divine test, 
(b) that suffering is retribution for past sins; and (c) that suffering 
is a discipline of warning to the just. 
27 
42: 11-17. 
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The first of these answers is suggested most strongly in the 
prologue. In the first scene of the book Satan is seen as a kind of 
prosecuting angel in the heavenly court, ironically insisting that Job 
has remained blameless and upright only because he has been well 
rewarded: 
Is it for nothing that Job has feared God? 
Have you not safely hedged him in, 
and his house, and all he owns, on every side?, 
You have blessed the work of his hands 
and his possessions have increased in the land. 
But put forth Your hand and touch whatever he owns, 
and he will surely curse You to Your face! 28 
If we accept this answer to Job's suffering, then the poetic body 
of the work is seen as the actual testing of Job's metal, first by 
removing all his wordly goods, and then by inflicting him with a dreaded 
disease. 
But this perspective is clearly inadequate for at least three 
reasons. First,, although Job receives all his worldly goods back in double 
proportion, the double restitution suggests not that Job has been tested, 
but rather that he has been unjustly deprived of his possessions, and 
therefore should be compensated doubly. 
29 An interesting point to note 
is that this is the same penalty exacted as compensation from thieves 
and negligent trustees as Exodus 22: 3,6, and 8 clearly indicates. 
A second good reason for dismissing the test argument as cogent is 
that Satan never appears in the epilogue and consequently God is never 
28 
29 
Robert Gordis, The Book of Job, p. 498. 
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actually declared the winner of the wager. Nor could it be said that 
Yahweh in any way collects his bet. It is inconceivable that these 
I 
elements would have been left out of the narrative if they were germane 
to the central meaning of the text. 
A third point which contradicts this test interpretation of Job's 
. suffering involves a realization of the way the world works outside the 
Bbok of Job. If we grant that the text is ostensibly about why the 
innocent suffer, and we answer this question by suggesting that the 
blameless are being tested and shall receive their just desserts 
everitually, then we must reckon with all those individuals throughout 
history who seem to have hung on stalwartly so that they might endure 
the test, and yet have not been rewarded. Keep in mind that nowhere 
in the text is it suggested that the reward might come in some life 
beyond the grave. 
30 
Job's view of death is starkly naturalistic: 
For there is hope for a tree - 
it if be cut down, it can sprout again 
and its shoots will not fail. 
If its roots grow old in the earth 
and its stump dies in the ground, 
at the mere scent of water it will bud anew 
and put forth branches like a new plant. 
But man grows faint and dies; 
and breathes his last, and where is he? 
As water vanishes from a lake, 
and a river is parched and dries up, 
30 
Cf. Lou 11. Silberman,. "Death in the, Hebrew Bible and Apocalyptic 
Literature", in Perspectives on Death, edited by L. O. Mills (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1969) pp. 13-32. Also, R. Martin-Archard, From Death 
to Life: A Study of the Development of the Doctrine of Resurrection in 
the Old Testament (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1960). 
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So man lies down and rises not again; 
till the heavens are no more he will not awake, 
nor will he be roused from his sleep. 31 
The poet refuses to dissolve the problem by taking refuge in a 
compensation beyond the grave. In this regard, he seems quite close to 
the -sentiments of the author of Ecclesiastes: 
Naked from his mother's womb he came, as naked as he came 
he will depart again; nothing to take with him after all 
his efforts ... The living know at least that they will die, the dead know nothing; no more reward for them, their memory 
has passed out of mind. Their loves, their hates, their 
jealousies, these all have perished, nor will 2 
they ever again 
take part in whatever is done under the sun. 3 
It should be clear that "evil as just punishment" for sins is also 
a weak interpretation of Jobts suffering, given the internal logic of 
the book. In fact, the work begins by telling us quite unambiguously 
that Job is "blameless and upright", 
33 
and this bit of information is 
provided by the omniscient narrator of the tale. In 29: 11-20, we gain 
an important insight about the logic of Job's former life style: 
Every car that heard me called me blessed, 
and every eye that saw me encouraged me, 
because I delivered the poor man crying out, 
and the fatherless who had none to help them. 
The beggar's blessing came upon me, 
and I brought a song to the widow's heart. 
I put on righteousness and it clothed me; 
justice was my robe and my turban. 
Eyes to the blind was I 
and feet to the lame. 
31 
14: 7-12. 
32 
Eccles. 5: 14; 9: 5f. (Revised Standard Version) 
33 
Job 1: 1. 
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A father to the poor was. I, 
and I took up the cause of the stranger. 
,I 
broke the fangs of the evil doer 
and snatched the prey from his teeth; 
and I thought, "I shall die in my nest, 
and shall multiply my days as the phoenix, 
with my roots open to the water, 
and the dew all night on my branches, 
my glory fresh within me, 34 
and my bow ever new in my hand". 
Job had initially lived with the same retributive perspective as 
the unbending comf orters. But in the grips of his suffering, which is 
clearly ascribed to God, the problem with that old syllogism becomes 
painfully clear. Since Job is aware of his innocence, with the same 
consistency with which his logical friends accuse him, he now must 
accuse God. To give into the friends would be tantamount to denying 
reality. Although Elihu does suggest in chapter twenty-two that Job 
has, in fact, sinned a great deal, Yahweh in chapter forty-two sharply 
rebukes all of the comforters for not speaking the truth, with the 
implication being that Jobts repeated protestations of innocence have 
been right all along. If one were to employ the argument from silence, 
in the absence of any incriminating evidence against Job, God's reply 
in chapter forty-two may well indicate a divine vindication of the 
protagonist as well as his argument. Nothing within the logic of the 
text could be construed as evidence for the truth of the comforters' 
position. And thus retributive justice for past sins cannot be considered 
as a tenable answer. to Job's question. 
34 
29: 11-20. 
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The third position, that "suffering serves as a discipline or 
warnin g to the just", is most clearly indicated by Elihu in chapter 
thirty-three. There the fourth comforter argues that God often uses 
evil to chastise even the just, so that they may not take their position 
for. granted. Although Elihuls position may legitimately be seen as a 
compromise between the rigid friends. and their traditional view of 
punishment, and Job who from the depths of his own experience cries out 
that he is blameless, it is, nevertheless, an inadequate point of view- 
Elihuls position is inadequate because it ignores the facts. At no 
point in the text could Job be accused of pride or intellectual hubris. 
Indeed, the artistry with which Job is kept from sounding arrogant and 
35 ' 
self-righteous as he answers his questioners is impressive. Job is 
certainly angry, confused, and at times seemingly on the verge of giving 
up, but he is never proud. Elihu's comments do violence to the facts 
in much the same way as the suggestions of Job's impropriety. In the 
final analysis, the real problem with Elihu's position is that there is no 
good evidence for it. James Wood points out that Job himself comes to the 
saric conclusion: 
The fact of his innocence prevented him from accepting any 
view of his suffering which sought to explain it as 
punishment for sin, or a corrective of misbehaviour toward 
God. Because he was conscious of his moral integrity, it 
was psychologically impossible for him to find peace of 
mind in a course of behaviour which as 9 umed that he needed 
to repent for sins he did not commit. 3 
35 
Cf.: 6: 24; 7: 20; 9: 1-3 and 19: 4-6. 
36 
James Wood, Job and the Human Situation (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1966) 
pp. 108-109. 
10 
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What is of interest about the three answers discussed here 
is that the poet dismisses them all, first on logical grounds, but also 
for existential reasons - they don't seem to take the sufferer seriously 
enough. It might accurately be said, I think, that the comforters fix 
on the second criterion of a viable theodicy, that it be true to the 
Judaic religions form of life, at the expense of ignoring the importance 
oý the first and third. 
Another point concerning the Book of Job which is often overlooked 
but is nevertheless central to an understanding of the text is that the 
author makes a very clear distinction between natural and moral evils. 
In chapters one and two, the first and third calamities to befall Job 
and his family are man-made, while the second and fourth are natural 
37 
catastrophes. This clear distinction points not only to the* 
philosophical sophistication of the poet, but it also contradicts the 
belief among some Biblical and Near eastern scholars that the ancient 
Jews were a "proto-logical people", who tended to bo associative rather 
38 than logically coherent and relevant. In the Book of Job# the poet 
seems to be suggesting in a not too subtle way that any answer to the 
problem of suffering which might follow in the body of his poem must 
honestly grapple with the reality of both kinds of evils. 
We have attempted to show that there are at least three answerq to 
37 
In 2: 13-15, the Sabeans attack Job's oxen and she-asses; in 2: 16, a 
great-fire burns his sheep and slaves; the Chaldeans invade and steal 
camels in 2: 17; and in 2: 18, wind comes across the desert and knocks 
down Job's house, destroying his sons and daughters. 
38 
For a good exposition of this position, Cf. W. F. Albright, From Stone A-F, e_t_o Christianity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press# 1940). 
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the problem of evil which the poet himself seems to have thrown open to 
serious doubt. We must now consider whether any other answer is to be 
found to the problem of Job's suffering. If a coherent answer could be 
found in the text, it would be of immense value to a constructive 
theo4icy which would aspire at once to be cognizant of the Biblical 
tradition, logically sound, and sensitive to the integrity of the 
individual sufferer. 
But first we must take a small diversion. As has been suggested 
earlier, it is sometimes argued that chapters 38 to 42 should not be 
considered as part of the original autograph. But as Driver and Gray 
have noted: 
The only ground for questioning this section as a whole 
lies in the nature of the contents which have appeared to 
some incapable of reconciliation with the standpoint of 
the author of the dialogue. 39 
It has not been uncommon for commentators to view the speeches of 
Yahweh as one spectacular irrelevance to the plot of the book. However, 
if the general line of thought in the remainder of this chapter is judged 
- to be correct, such doubts about the originality of the speeches from 
out of the whirlwind will, it is hoped, be seen as considerably less 
39 
S. R. Driver and G. B. Gray, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the 
Book of Job, Vol. I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921). 1 am 
aware there are grounds for questioning the originality of 40: 6 to 
42: 1. Driver and Gray themselves consider this second Yahweh speech 
a later addition, though others strongly disagree with this judgement. 
At any rate, exclusion of the disputed section from this thesis would 
do no great harm to the argument. What is important for my purposes 
is that Yahweh does appear on the scene, and Job does repent. Although 
Driver and Gray reject the second Yahweh speech, they still retain 
42: 2-6 as "integral to the book". 
forceful, if not completely unjustified. 
, Regarding the account of the theophany, Marvin Pope observes, 
"Either the book ends in a magnificent anticlimax, or we must see the 
highlight in. the Divine speeches". 
40 As has been suggested earlier, 
however, on first reading, the Yahweh speeches seem a disappointment, 
a kind of Divine non sequitor. In the heart of the work, Job has 
demanded on several occasions to be given an explanation for what he 
held to be his undeserved suffering. But in chapter 38 to 42 no direct 
answer is given to Jobts complaint. Rather, Job himself is put under 
questioning: "Who is this that darkens My plans by words without 
knowledge ?,, 
41 
In an overwhelmingly stunning rhetorical blast, Yahweh 
depicts the divine creative power and glory in such a way that Job's 
rebellion ceases. The same Job who has so defiantly called Yahweh into 
account soon recants and repents in dust and ashes. 
What has happened to Job to produce such a profound change of 
heart? We must now return to our original question: Is there an answer 
to the problem of suffering to be found in the Book of Job? In order 
to attempt to answer that query our attention must focus on the Yahweh 
speeches. 
In 42: 5, Job "sees" God. Before the theopany, Job had only heard 
of Yahweh through the intellectual speculation and traditional dogma, of 
his friends. Now, he "sees" Yahweh for himself. In this immediate 
40 
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experience with Yahweh, Job seems to find an 'answer', though it is 
clearly not the type of answer he had been expecting in the dialogue. 
42 
Job is overwhelmed by Yahweh's creative power and glory, and consequently, 
comes to see his own suffering in a new light. In Nahum Glatzer's 
43 
selection of modern commentaries (Judaic, Christian, and generally 
philosophical) on the Book of Job, an impressive number of writers 
understand Job's "seeing God" as the key to his apparent change of heart, 
though they go on to interpret his repentance in a number of vastly 
differing ways. Consider the following examples: 
(1) Job has appealed to God to appear, and is prepared 
"as a prince to enter his presence" (31: 37), bearing a 
convincing statement of his case with him. In answer to 
this challenge God does not answer, and presents himself 
in all his creative majesty. At once Job forgets his 
case, and ceases to be urged by his problems. In the 
presence of God these things vanish away, and only God is 
ieft. 44 
(2) What is God's answer? It is powerful, at once 
crushing and uplifting, and, as far as it goes, of eternal 
validity: it is God Himself. This means that God does not 
involve Himself with arguments for and against His dominion. 
but lets Himself be seen. His answer consists in manifesting 
His greatness in powerful speech and creative deeds. This, 
rather than the arguments of God's defenders, causes Job to 
grow silent and beg God's forgiveness. 45 
42 
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and if Job had the right arguments in his mouth, then Yahweh would 
answer him. 
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(3) It is the vision of God that has released him from his 
problem. His suffering is as mysterious as ever, but, plain 
or mysterious, why should it vex him any longer? He has 
seen God, and has entered into rest. 46 
(4) God offers Himself to the sufferer, who, in the depth of 
his despair, keeps to God with his refractory complaint; He 
offers Himself to him as an answer. 47 ' 
(5) It is often asked why he became. convinced by, and what 
it is that he became convinced of; but the answer is surely 
that whereas there had been brought before him the wonders 
of creation, what he saw was the far greater wonder, the 
wonder of the Creator. He does not say: "Mine eyes seeth 48 behemoth and leviathan". He says: "Mine eyes seeth Thee". 
(6) For if the rebellious hero here becomes a joyous 
confessor, and recognizes the divine omnipotence and 
voluntaristic purppsefulness of God, this is not entirely 
due to the effect of the arguments of chapters 38f. on his 
reason, but is ýartly the result of his experience of the 
divine reality. 9 
(7) He has pictured Job as finding the solution to his 
problem, not in a reasoned explanation or a theology, but in 
a religious experience ... His hero, Job, finds his 
satisfaction in a first hand experience of God. 50 
Other authors might be quoted here, but. the point, I think, has I 
already been made: large number of commentators suggest that Job's 
11seeing God" was crucial in bringing about his repentance. But we must 
now probe a little more deeply into just how the theophany provoked 
this change of heart. 
One avenue we might f ollow is to examine the kind of religious 
46 
Arthur Pea/ke, "Job's Victory", in Glatzer, pp. 197-205. 
47 
Martin Buber, "A God who Hides His Face", in Glatzerp pp. 56-65. 
48 
Leo Roth, "Job and Jonah", in Glatzer, pp. 71-74. 
49 
Emil Kraeling, "A Theodicy - and More", in Glatzer, pp. 205-214. 
50 
G. A. Barton, "The Book of Job: 'Seeing God", The Journal of Biblical 
Literature, vol. 30 (1911). 
encounter the poet is attempting to depict in the Yahweh speeches. 
As R. A. F. MacKenzie has observed, we must consider the presence of a 
third dialogue in the book. In addition to the conversations between 
Job and his friends, and the dialogue between Job and Godp there is 
51 
also. to be considered the dialogue of the author with his readers. 
It is this third dialogue, MacKenzie claims, which provoked the 
composition and inclusion of the Yahweh speeches. Beyond merely 
affirming that an encounter between Job and Yahweh happened, the author 
attempts to depict the inner dynamics of Job's profound religious 
experience. The poet tries to convey 
not merely that the theophany occurred 
it had upon Job. And that can best be 
God's self-expression in word. As the 
have expressed and revealed themselves 
the divine arbiter. Hence, the need f, 
speeches. 52 
but the effect 
done by means of 
other characters 
in speech, so must 
Dr the Yahweh 
But if Yahweh is to speak, what is He to say? MacKenzie speculates: 
a 
He might simply tell the story of Satan's challenge 
and its acceptance; or might contribute yet another 
analysis of the function of suffering in human life. But 
... either of these would be quite unsuited to the function that the speech must fulfill. It must be some form of 
self-revelation, which will at least remotely symbolize 
the impact on the human soul of an immediate encounter 
with God ... It must at the same time convey the 
overwhelming Otherness of God and his transcendence with 
respect to the man who is before Him. 53 
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For MacKenzie, the divine speeches of chapters 38-42 are a poetic 
expression of Job's "seeing God". It is a llsense impression of what 
the experienced presence of God is like". 
54 In the Yahweh speeches, 
the poet attempts to interpret and display the significance of the 
theophany for Job, though "mystery cannot be made clear in human 
language and concepts". 
55 
MacKenzie contends that the poet succeeded brilliantly in his 
portrayal of the divine-human encounter. For him, the two little 
syllables Mi zeh ("who is this ... 11) at the very beginning of the 
speeches from the whirlwind represents the "most shattering question 
that was every posed", 
56 
a question which sets the tone of the whole 
theophany section of the text and provides a basis for Job's radical 
change of heart. MacKenzie believes the message of the theophany is 
abundantly clear: 
God is God, and Job is a creature - the. experience of that 
simple but fundamental fact is the primary effect of this 
encounter. The remorseless piling-up of the subsequent 
questions, each one reducing poor Job further into his 
state of debasement, indicates to us the penetration of 
this truth into his inmost being. 57 
Another commentator, the German Protestant theologian and 
historian of religionst Rudolph Otto, sees a religious encounter with 
God underlying the Yahweh speeches. In his The Idea of the Holy, 
58 Otto 
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describes how the "holy" or "numinous unnamed something" at the heart 
of religious experience "transcends the ethicsll moral sphere and 
focuses on the awful, the mysterious, the tremendum, the majestic, the 
wholly other" .59 For Otto, chapters 38 to 42 of the Book of Job are a 
golclTine of expressions of the numinous: 
In the 38th chapter of Job we have the element of the 
mysterious displayed in rare purity and completeness, 
and this chapter may well rank among the most remarkable 
in the history of religion. Job has been reasoning with 
his friends against Elohim (God), and, - as far as 
concerns them - he has been obviously in the right. They 
are compelled to be dumb before him. And then Elohim 
appears to conduct his own defense in person. And he 
conducts it to such an effect that Job avows himself 
to be ovc: ýpowered - not merely silenced by superior 
strength. " 
Otto continues by suggesting that. Job, is presented with a theodicy 
which goes beyond the rational-ideas and solutions of the dialogue's 
comforters; here Job encounters a resolution to the problem of suffering 
which relies on "the sheer absolute wondrousness that transcends thought, 
on the mysterium, presented in its pure, nonrational form". 
61 
The 
accountýs of the eagle, ostrich, wild ass, wild ox, behenoth and leviathan, 
all of these glorious examples from nature 
express in masterly fashion the downright stupendousness, 
the wellnigh demonic and wholly incomprehensible character 
of the eternal, creative power; how incalcuable and "wholly 
other", it mocks all conceiving but yet stirs te mind to 
its depths, fascinates and overbrims the heart. 
92 
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Driver and Gray makes a similar observation when they comment: 
The first speech of Yahweh transcends all other descriptions 
of the wonders of creation or the greatness of the Grea or, 
which aro to be found either in the Bible or elsewhero. 
ý3 
To use the language. of Otto, this absolutely mysterious and 
frightening numen acts to fascinate Job in his encounter with God; it 
acts to overpower him in such a way that he repents and recants in dust 
and ashes. 
As helpful as these accounts may be, they still leave us in the 
dark as to what particulars were involved in Job's "seeing God". What 
is it exactly that led him to re-evaluate his stance of protest? Can 
the motivation for Job's repentance be explained further. If it cannot, 
this 'answer' would seem barely to help any more than the old cliche 
"God's ways are not man's ways". Indeed, that sort of answert at least 
at first blush, would not seem to take the individual sufferer very 
seriously. So we must ask: is there anything else that motivates 
Job's repentance? Is there anything that might be helpful in constructing 
a theodicy that aims at taking the victims of evil seriously? To simply 
say, "Job saw God, and that answered his question about undeserved 
suffering", will not do. It seems to beg the question. We must ask 
further: Why did seeing God benefit Job? 
George Dennis O'Brien attempts to answer this as well as related 
questions in his article, "Prolegomena to a Dissolution to the Problem 
of Suffering". Here he argues, as we have in earlier chapters, that 
63 
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the problem of suff. cring only arises when we hold "at once to the notion 
of an all good, all powerful Creator of the world, and this world, as 
we experience it, full of travail. If we change the notion of God (or 
the world) in certain ways the dilemma simply vanishes. " 
64 
O'Brien 
does-not, however, mention the attribute of tomnisciencel, which we have 
shown must also be included to generate the problem of evil as it is 
posed for the religions of paradox. 
Quoting Anthony Flew with approval, O'Brien claims that the problem 
of evil cannot cast doubt on the notion of an omnipotent, and benevolent 
God "for anyone who adopts any variant of the position that infinite 
creative power is its own sufficient justification, or leaves no room 
for justification"* 
65 
O'Brien observes that Thomas Hobbes successfully 
accomplishes a dissolution to the problem of suffering by holding that 
power is self-justifying. And though we may disagree in the end with 0 
Hobbes's position, we have much to learn from his unsentimental treatment 
of Job's repentance. Hobbes wrote: 
And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with Godt for 
the many afflictions that he suffered, not withstanding 
his righteousness. The question in the case of Job is 
decided by God himself, not fýqm arguments derived from 
Job's sin, but His own power. 00 
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O'Brien claims that here Hobbes "can still maintain that God is 
all powerful and good, but he conceives of the relationship between 
power and goodness in such a way that the supposed antinomy of God's 
power and goodness cannot arisett; 
67 
here there is*a "transformation 
of the frame of reference in such a manner that questions of justification 
in the ordinary sense*cannot be raised at all". 
68 
OlDrien labels this 
movement in Hobbes a "transfer from a formal to an existential frame of 
reference", 
69 
a common shift which takes place when an overriding concern 
for an existential relation displaces the need for formal explanations. 
This shift operates, as follows, in Hobbes's view of Job's repentance: 
We begin with a tformalt situation -a question of 
justification is asked, and it is expected that grounds 
or reasons for God's actions will be forthcoming. But 
what happens is that the voice from the whirlwind 
transforms it into an existential situation in which the 
relation between the questioner and the question becomes 
paramount. The Iformalt problem of justification is set 
aside because of the overriding situation between man 
and God. The shift is from question and answer to 
questioner and questioned ... What occurs in this dialogue? Surely Jobts question is not answered at all; 
rather, God simply asserts that He is, after all, God, 
and as the result of this tanswerl Job repents in dust 
and ashes. If some sort of radical shift in the framework 
is not involved, then the story is simply pointless 
because Job never gets an answer. Yet he repents. 76 
An exactly analogous frame of reference which shifts from the formal 
to the existential occurs, O'Brien suggests, in the case of a military 
situation where a soldier asks the General why he should obey the 
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latterts orders. Very often in such a situation the soldier would 
accept as an answer a shift in the frame of reference to the exi-stential: 
71 "Because I, the General, say so, that's why", Here the existential 
relationship of the General to the soldier displaces any formal concern 
about the justification of the command. Job, like the soldier, is 
enlightened by "seeing God", in the sense that he discovers he has been 
asking all the wrong questions. Once he discovers the overriding reality 
of the existential relation between God and himself O'Brien believes, 
the problem of suffering is transformed. As O'Brien suggests, "Once 
we realize that it is God who acts and man who receives, there is no 
real question of justifying God's aOt8 or condemning Him for His 
injustice to Job". 
72 The blank assertion that "God is God" rules out any 
independent standard of justification by which the deity might be 
questioned. "The answer to Job, then, is to remind him that he is in the 
ruler-ruled relation which he cannot escape.,, 
73 
Although I would agree with O'Brien on the point that the context 
. of 
Jobts encounter with God changes from a formal one to an existential 
one, I would part company with him on the reasons he suggests bring 
about the change. I am not entirely convinced O'Brien's position is 
sufficiently different from that of Hobbes. O'Brien mentions God's 
other attributes but he still seems to base his view on Hobbes' claim 
that power gives the right to command. His choice of a military metaphor 
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to describe the relation between God and Job is an indication of just 
how seriously he takes Hobbes' view of the self-justifying nature of 
power . 
In order to see clearly the difference between my position and 
that. of O'Brien's, as well as how they both differ from a third point 
of view, we must consider three possible interpretations of Job's 
repentance: (a) Job bows to Yahweh's power, but his submission is 
carried out-Itongue-in-cheek"; (b) Job sincerely repents when he 
perceives Yahweh's power to be self-justifying; and (c) Job sincerely 
repents because of the realization of Yahwehts power but also for a 
number of other relevant reasons. Let us first consider possibility (a). 
David Robertson's interpretation of Job's repentance is a good 
examples of (a). In his article, "The Book of Job: A Literary Study", 
Robertson attempts to demonstrate that '[irony pervades the entire book, 
and indeed, provides the key to a consistent. and adequate reading of 
God's speeches from the storm" . 
74 
For Robertson, Jobts repentance is more a "rol-ling with the 
punches" than a heartfelt change of position. He bases his position 
on Jobts propensities in the dialogue of the speeches of Yahweh and 
Job's response to those speeches. Already in the ninth chapter, 
Robertson argues, Job foresees that God "would not come to listen 
74 
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patiently to Job' s charges; he would come in a tornado, toss Job about, 
and scare him out of his wits". 
75 
If I summoned and he answered, 
I do not believe he would heed me. 
He would crush me with a tempest 76 And multiply my wounds without cause. 
Robertson also suggests that Job predicts his own Ittongue-in- 
cheek" confession. Again, as early as chapter nine Job sees that it 
will be necessary to calm God's wrath with a phony repentance: 
No good can withstand his wrath, 
Rahabts troops cringe beneath him. 
The less could I refute him, 
Or match words with him. 
Though innocent I could not reply; 
I would have to beg for mercy. 77 Though guiltless, my mouth would declare me guilty. 
By his insincere confession 'of guilt, Job wins the renewed favor 
of Yahweh, but at the expense of deceiving God and making him the object 
of an ironic joke. Robertson sees the author or Job offering an 
antidote to perenial maladies such as man's fear of fate, destiny and 
the unknown. Ile points out that the poet attempts to cure fear 
by means of its opposite, ridicule of the subject 
feared. We do not fear that which we feel beneath 
us in dignity; rather we scorn it ... While God may be more powerful than we are, he is beneath us on 
the scales that measure love, justice and wisdom. So 
we know of him what we know of all tyrants, that while 
they may torture us and finally kill us, they cannot 
destroy our personal integrity. 78 
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While I am inclined to agree Robertson has provided a consistent 
reading of the Book of Job, I remain unpersuaded that his is the most 
adequate interpretation of Job's change of heart. Robertson may find 
a good deal more irony in the book than is actually there. He admits 
that his essay is a "child of its age, the ironic age". 
79 He invites 
us to consider his argument, unorthodox as it is, because l1we need to 
take a variety of critical approaches to the Book of Job in order to 
better understand it's truly remarkable scope and profundity". 
80 
In the final analysis, however, I must agree with Edwin Good who, 
in responding to Robertson, suggests that he finally "tells us that 
both of its principal subjects are frauds - even righteous frauds", 
81 
which, I might add, are usually the worst kind. I would hold that it 
is more faithful to the text to see Job's repentance as a sincere 
change of heart, but we are still left with two competing views of why 
that repentance comes about. 
We must now consider (b) Job sincerely repents because of the 
realization that Yahweh's power is self-justifying. We have already 
observed that this is the position suggested by Hobbes, and in a more 
subtle fashion by O'Brien. It is also a view expressed by Gilbert 
Murray, who sees Jobts God as a deity who has no real duties toward men; 
Job cannot complain of injustice because God owes Job nothing: 
79 
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If God's rule conflicts with human morality, that is 
because human morality is such a limited thing, not 
valid beyond particular regions of time and space. 82 It is impertinence in man to expect God to be righteous. 
Murray understands. Yahwehts answer out of the whirlwind as a 
"long insistence on the puny and ephemeral nature of Job". 
83 The story 
culminates in the central argument: "Wilt thou disannul my judgement? 
Wilt thou condemn me, that thou mayest be righteous? Hast thou an arm 
like God, or canst thou thunder with a voice like him'19 
84 
Yahweh's only answor to Job's complaint, Murray claims, is a 
I 
reassertion of his divine power: 
God does not show, or even say, that he is righteous 
by human standards of righteousness; what he does assert 
is that he is, in Nietzsche's phrase, Jenseits von Gut 
und Bose (Beyond Good and Evil), and that the puny 
standards by which man judges right and wron 
apply to the power that rules the universe. 
g do n. ot 
Murray concludes his essay by contrasting Job with the ancient 
Greek philosophers: I 
If Plato or Aristotle had been present at this discussion I 
think they would have felt as explosive as Elihu the Buzite, 
but on different grounds. They would have pointed out that 
Jehovah was not answering the real question at all. No 
one had doubted his power, it was his justice they had 
questioned; and his only answer had been to reassert his 
power again and again in a storm of magnificent rhetoric, 
and demand how a worm like Job dares to ask any questions 6 
at all. 
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Murray suggests that the "oriental" Job, unlike the Greeks, was 
"accustomed to the rule of a despot or patriarch, and cared most for 
obedience to the supreme power; such power was in Job's view completely 
self-justifying". 
87 Although this may well be true for the time and 
place in which Job was written, we must still ask whether this view of 
power is something that is still viable for 20th century seekers for an 
answer to the problem of evil. If Murray's view is all that can be 
said about Jobts repentance, it seems to help contemporary people very 
little, for our doctrine of God bears little resemblance to an "oriental 
despot". 
A somewhat more profound view of (b) is given in Peter Geach's 
God and the Soul. In the chapter entitled, "The Moral Law and the Law 
of God", Geach raises the interesting-question concerning whether it 
makes sense, given that there is an almighty God, to defy him. Geach 
clearly, answers this question in the negative. He suggests that the 
world's "whole raison dletre is to effect Godts good pleasure". 
88 
Considering this, Geach argues, it is "insane" to set out to defy God: 
For Prometheus to defy Zeus made sense because Zeus 
had not made Prometheus and had only limited power 
ovor him. A defiance of an almighty God is insane: 
it is like trying to cheat a man to whom your whole 
business is mortgaged and who you know is well aware 
of your attempts to cheat him, or again, as the prophet 
said, it is as if a stick tried to beat or an axe to 
cut the very hand that was wielding it. 89 
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Geach believes that because God is "the supreme power, wholly 
different from earthly powers", his might is self-justifying and worthy 
of worship: 
This reasoning will not convince everybody; people 
may still say that it makes sense, given that there is 
a God, to defy him, but this is only so because, a 
Pritchard said, you can no more make a man think than 
you can make a horse drink. A moral philosopher once 
said to me: "I dontt think that I am morally obliged 
to obey God unless God is good". I asked him how he 
understood the proposition that 'God is good'. He 
replied. "Well, I have no considered view of how it 
should be analyzed; but provisionally I'd say it meant 
something like this: God is the sort of God whom I'd 
choose to be God if it were up to me to make the choice. " 
I fear that he has never understood why I found the 
answer funny. 90 
Geach seems content to leave his argument on more or less an 
intuitive level: when one fully realizes what the almighty power of 
God means, one simply cannot hold that defying God is a good option. 
But we must raise a question in. regard to Geach's view, and the 
view of Hobbes as well. Exactly what is the guarantee that benevolence 
and justice are tied up with the self -justifying power of God? We 
- have shown earlier that it is logically possible to be omnipotent, but 
demonic. Are we to submit to God on the basis of his power alone? 
Geach's straw man moral philosopher is clumbsily expressing an important 
point. On worshipping God for his power alone are we not, as J. S. Mill 
so forcefully put it, "bowing down to a gigantic image of something not 
f it f or us to imitate"? 
90 
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Interpretations (a) and (b) of Job's repentance may not be as 
far apart from each other as they initially appear. In a real way 
there is a decision made in both points of view that one horn of the 
Euthyphro dilemma must be saved at what seems like the expense of the 
other. Position (a) opts for the side that says ethical principles 
are independent of the will of God and that these values can and should 
be used in medsuring even His conduct. In this regard, Robertson's 
position is very much like Dostoyevskils Ivan Karamazov. In Interpretation 
(b), on the other hand, its proponents come very close to making the 
suggestion that God is iourthy of worship no matter what. Thus, the 
believers of this second view settle for the pole of the Euthyphro 
dilemma that insists that goodness is good just because God says so. 
Geach's affinity, with that horn of the dilemma can be seen in his rather 
curt reply to the moral philosopher. Murray's preference for that side 
of the problem can be ascertained in his remark that God is beyond good 
and evil. But the notion that we somehow need to choose one pole or 
the other of the Euthyphro dilemma, as we have shoum in chapter two, 
rests on a mistake. 
We could agree with Robertson that the ascertaining of what is 
good usually precedes any claims we may have about the will of God. 
Indeed, one of tha main tests available to us concerning whether a 
revelation is genuine or spurious is a test of the moral goodness of 
what is willed. We would usually not be inclined to call something 
good, in a moral sense, unless it fulfilled our criteria for a moral 
good. 
However, if one does not wish to make the morally good completely 
a 
198. 
dependent upon the knowledge of God's will, neither is it advisable to 
make it superior to the will of the divine or even an independent 
entity. 
We have already identified in chapter two a coherent avenue of 
escape from this conundrum. One way to reiterate what Mackie has 
suggested there is to say that the problem dissolves as a logical 
dilemma if we identify the will of God with the realm of values which 
constitute the goodness of things. This, divine will, Mackie arguest 
is also cognizant of what constitutes the most appropriate non-morally 
good life and reveals it to us through a set of prescriptions designed 
to have us follow that life. Thus, Mackie argues, there is a descriptive 
as well as prescriptive element to his proposal. W. G. Maclagan attempts 
a similar resolution of the problem when he comments: 
The moral experience is one index of what we mean when- 
we speak of God. Thus we do not have a prior conception 
of God, which must subsequently be'brought in some sort 
of relation with our notion of the realm of values so 
that either they depend upon him or he is conditioned 
by them. Rather, it is by starting with and developing 
a notion of values that we come to gain some idea of 
part of what is meant by the term 'Godt. 91 
In addition to the major criticism discussed above which covers 
both interpretations (a) and (b) of Job's repentance, some further 
remarks might also be made regarding their individual inadequacies as 
proper views of why Job repents. 
One particular problem with Robertson is he seems to want to 
91 
W. G. Maclagan, The-Theological Frontiers of Ethics (London: Men 
and Unwin, 1961) p. go. 
199. 
have it both ways. On the one hand, he tells us that he is an "ironic 
child of his age", and age which, presumably, contains a modern conception 
of God, even if it is one these "ironic" people decide to reject. Yet, 
in his essay he constructs an archaic, cardboard characterization of 
God, -one much older even than the Book of Job itself. This divine 
figure of Robertsonts lacks enough knowledge of others, not to mention 
self-knowledge, to be able to see through the calculated "repentance" 
of Job. Robertson measures an archaic conception of God by midern ethical 
standards and seems oddly surprised by the results. 
Position (b) suffel-s from another important problem if it is to 
be regarded as a proper interpretation of Job's repentance: it is not 
true to the text. Murray suggests that suddenly in the speeches out of 
the whirlwind Job becomes aware of the awesome power of God. But it is 
clear that on numerous occasions before the-Yahweh speeches Job is 
fully aware of Godts power, and his own power-less against it. Consider, 
for example, this passage from chapter twelve: 
Behold, He destroys and it cannot be rebuilt, 
lie imprisons a man and he is not released. 
He shuts up the waters and they dry up, 
or He sends them forth and they overwhelm the earth. 
With Him are strength and sound counsel; 
The misled and the misleaders - are all His. 
He drives counselors mad, 
and of judges lie makes fools. 
He opens the belt of kings 
and removes the girdle from their loins. 
He drives priests into madness 92 
and temple votaries into confusion. 
92 
Job 12: 14-19. 
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It should be apparent that as early as chapter twelve Job is 
quite clear about the power of God. I would venture to say that if the 
Yahweh speeches were not intended to show Job something more than the 
display of YahwehIs power, there would be no real reason for the 
change of heart. Why should another display of Yahwehts strength 
break down Job's integrity at the i? nd, when all hope for vindication 
93 of his life seems lost? 
Job's "seeing God" must involve something more than witnessing 
a display of sheer power. It must involve something new, something 
which helps to make proýer sense of theophany. In order to see what 
that something might be, we must return to. formulation (c) of Job's 
repentance: (c) Job sincerely repents because of the realization of 
Yahweh's awesome power but also for a number of other relevant reasons. 
Whýt we need to get clear about here are the other relevant 
reasons which might be sufficiently important to cause Job's change of 
perspective. As I have said before, I think that O'Brien is essentially 
right about a shift taking place where, because of the Yahweh speeches, 
the context of the God-Job encounter moves from a formal one to an 
existential one. I believe, however, that O'Brien is wrong on two 
points. First, it is not just power that changes Job's mind, it is 
omnipotence in consort with God's other attributes. Second, O'Brien's 
ch6 I ice of a military metaphor to describe the new relation between God and 
93 
For further criticisms of Geach's position, cf. D. Z. Phillips, Death 
and Immortality (London: Macmillan, 1970) particularly chapter 2. 
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- Job obscures more than it enlightens. A more appropriate metaphor, I 
would suggest, for understanding the God-Job encounter is the relation 
between parent and child. Let us now return to this first point so that 
we may more fully develop interpretation (c) of Job's repentance. 
. 
In chapter two of this thesis I suggested that it is important 
to understand each of the divine attributes: omnipotence, omniscience, 
om, ibenevolence, and creator of the universe, within the context of each 
other. One cannot adequately be discussed without understanding its 
relationship to the others. The author of Job seems to make this same 
point. Consider again, for example, the opening lines of the speeches 
from the whirlwind: 
Where were you when I laid the earth's foundations? 
Tell me, if you know and understand. 
Who settled its dimensions? Surely you should know. 
Who stretched his measuring-line over it? 
On what do its supporting pillars rest? 
Who set its corner-stone in place, 
when the morning stars sang together 
and all the sons of God shouted aloud? 
Who watched over the birth of the sea, 
when it burst in flood from the womb? - 
when I wrapped it in a blanket of cloud 
and cradled it in af og 
when I established its 
Ca ýounds, 
fixing its doors and bars in place, C) and said, "Thus far shall you come and no farther, 
and here shall your surging waves halt". 
In all you life have you called up the dawn 
or shown the morning its place? 
Have you taught it to grasp the fringes of the earth 
and shake the dog-star from its place; 
to bring up the horizon in relief as clay under 4 seal, 
until all things stand out like the folds of a cloak 
when the light of the Dog-star is dimmed 94 
and the stars of the Navigator's Line go out one by one? 
94 
- Job: 38: 4-15 (Norman C. Habel's translation with my amendations). 
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In these original queries God is not just displaying his power, 
He is challenging Jobts comprehension of the original governing structure 
of the universe. In addition to displaying His creative gcnius, God 
is also making a specific comparison of His divine intelligence with that 
of Job's. In doing so He leads Job back to the primordial scene to 
experience the original mystery of the cosmos. 
If Job were the first man endowed with wisdom, where was he when 
tho rest of the heavenly council was celebrating the founding of the 
earth? Was he absent that day? Does he Imow how it was controlled by 
the creator? Can he summons the dawn to shed light on the mystery? 
In the Lordts second speech, attention is given to divine justice. 
Earlier, in 9: 19-24P Job accuses God of all but ignoring the evil done 
to Job; In 40: 6-14 God addresses the problem directly. He does not 
accuse Job of lying about his innocence but rather of violating God's 
integrity. Job has mistakenly assumed that he had a proper perspective 
on the larger teleological context of Godts justice. The Lord reminds 
Job that it is not necessary to condemn the divine in order to affirm 
one's own integrity. 
One of the realizations Job makes, then, which may have much to do 
with his change of heart, is the discovery that the various attributes 
which go into the making of any meager description of God cannot properly 
be separated. 
The other element in Job's repentance involves the point I have 
made about the inappropriateness of O'Brien's military metaphor. In 
Job's encounter with God in chapters 38-42, he comes to "see" two things 
that the military metaphor does not capture. The first of these is that 
God is the creator and sustainer of Job in much the same way a good, 
intelligent and effective parent is the creator and sustainer of his/her 
child. 
A child, of pourse, is ordinarily thought to have an obligation 
to obey his parents. Indeed, a child. who makes no effort to please 
a benevolent, wise and effective parent who has created and nurtured 
ýim is normally thought to be behaving reprehensively. The child's 
obligations-to the parent are fulfilled by conforming to the wishes of 
the parent, provided those wishes are in the child's best interest. 
95 
If all of this is Dorrect, then we might rightly say that Job is 
under a similar moral obligation to obey God. In the midst of listening 
to the whirlwind speeches, he suddenly realizes this obligation. For 
unlike the parent-child relation-where the older the child becomes the 
less the parent is responsible, in the case of the God-Job relation the 
sustenance is permanent. 
Another element that may go into the making of Job's change of 
heart is connected to the point made above. In addition to Job perceiving 
that God is the creator and sustainer of himself, He is also the creator 
and sustainer of the entire universe. He brought it in to existence and 
continually keeps it in existence through His will, so that in a real 
way God could be said to be the legitimate owner of the universe. The 
owner of any property, of course, under normal circumstances has the 
95 
For a simi 
. lar point of view, *cf. Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of 
Theism, pp. 183ff., and Baruch Brody's "Morality and Religion 
Reconsidered", in Readings in the Philosophy of R)Jigion B. Rody (ed. ), 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974. 
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right to tell those to whom he has loaned it what they are allowed to 
do with that property. Thus, God has a legitimate right to tell Job how 
he should conduct his life. Indeed, this view that God is the creator, 
sustainer, and therefore the owner of His creation is continually 
reit*e. rated throughout the divine speeches of Job, as well as the rest 
of scripture. 
If we understand these two points about Job's obligation to God 
in light of Job's change of heart, it becomes clear that the context 
shifts from a formal to an existential relation, not merely because the 
Lord's display of sheer power, but also because God has created and 
sustained Job, as well as the world around him. 
Still, one might raise. an objection here. that there are clearly 
lots of morally corrupt parents and pernicious landlords. Given the 
facts of the story of Job could we not say that although Job had a prima 
facie duty to be obedient and long-suffering in respect to Godl that 
obligation was abrogated by the moral degradation in which he was forced 
to lives 
In order to meet this objection we must recall that God's power 
cannot be understood as being independent of His other attributes. - 
Divine omnipotence can only be fully comprehended in consort with Godts 
nature as the omniscient and benevolent creator of the universe. The 
suggestion that Job is under no moral obligation to obey and respect God 
because He is like an ethically corrupt parent does not work, for 
unlike even the best of earthly parents, by His very nature God cannot be 
morally corrupt. 
204. 
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Thus, Jobts repentance is related, I believe# to his profound 
realization that this all good, all powerful and all Imowing God has 
created and sustained him as well as the world around him, and it is 
this realization that changes the context of the God-Job encounter 
from a formal relation to, an existential one. 
Job is not left with the particular$ of a philosophical theodicy. 
. In the end, what he does have is trust that God does have a telological 
view by which evil will be overcome. Thus, in our final analysis of 
Job it can be said that he settles for a position that is logically 
coherent, true to his religions form of life, and takes the individual 
sufferer most seriously. 
With this realization of what Job has learned firmly in mind I 
shall discuss in the final chapter the framework of a viable Christian 
theodicy which goes beyond the Book of Job. 
0 
mc6. 
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Chapter Five: Prolegomena to a Christian Theodicy 
If there were no obscurity, man would not feel his 
corruption, and if there were no light, man would not hope 
for a remedy. Thus, it is not only just, but useful to 
us that God is hidden in part and discovered in part, for 
to man it is dangerous to know God without knowing his own 
misery as it is to know his misery without knowing God. 
Blaise Pascal 
Despair over the earthly or over something earthly is 
really a despair about the eternal and over oneself, 
in so far as it is a despair, for this is the formula for 
all despair. But the despairer ... did not observe what was happening behind him, so to speak; he thinks he is in 
despair over something earthly and constantly talks about 
what he is in despair over, and yet he is in despair about 
the eternal. 
Soren Kierkegaard 
Man, the scientists say, is an animal that thinks. They 
are wrong. Man is an animal that loves. It is in man's 
love that God exists and triumphs: in man's love that life 
is beautiful; in man's love that the world's justice is 
resolved. To hold together in one thought those terrible 
opposites of good and evil which struggle in the world is 
to be capable of life, and only love will hold them so. 
Our labor always, like Job's labor, is to learn through 
suffering to love ... to love even that which let us suffer. 
Program notes to Archibald MacLeishfs J. B. Yale 
Drama School (1958) 
I. 
In chapter three we attempted to make a distinction between . 
theodicies prohibited by reason and those allowed by reason. We have 
discovered in the first group we find the Punishment and Warning Theodicies: 
retributive justice and the free will defense; The Unreality of Evil 
Theodicies: the amount of evil is insufficient to create a problem, evil 
is an illusion, and evil is privation of good; and the Evil is Logically 
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Necessary Theodicies: certain versions of the free will defense and 
the contrast perspective. Because of one or more logical flaws, all of 
these responses fail as logically consistent answers to the problem of 
evil. 
. Those theodicies which are allowed by reason include both 
the 
Classical Hindu and Hinayana Buddhist versions of monism, the dualistic 
responses to the problem of evil offered by Plato, Zoroastrianism, process 
thought, and limited God theories such as that offered by J. S. Mill and 
the various possibilities suggested by David Hume in the Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Relirlon. 
1 
We have also seen that despite some 
logical problems, John Hickts version of the teleological theodicies 
can be numbered among those responses to the problem of evil that are 
allowed by reason. All of the members of this second group are logically 
consi stent and therefore possible candidates for the job of answering 
the question: "Why does evil exist? ". 
As we have mentioned earlier, however, logical consistency is not 
the only criterion by which theodicies might be measured. In addition 
to the first criterion, it has also been suggested that any viable 
theodicy must be true, at least in a broad way, to the form of life out 
of which it arises or out of which an answer is sought. And thirdly, we 
have suggested that any workable response to the problem'of evil must take 
the individual sufferer seriously. 
I 
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, parts X and XI. Cf. 
also part V where Hume suggests "this world, for all (we know) is very 
faulty and imperfect, compared to superior standard; and was only the 
first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it ... 
P. 194. 
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If we examine carefully those theodicies which have already passed 
our first test of logical consistency, we find that, the monistic faiths, 
Classical Hinduism and Hinayana Buddhism, fail on both the second and 
third criteria. The purpose of this entire discussion has been to 
discover if there is some answer or group of answers within the Christian 
form of life, that might respond adequately to the problem of evil. Both 
of these monistic responses deny some the basic ontological presuppositions 
on which the Christian faith is based. Indeed, it would be logically 
impossible to call oneself a member of the Christian tradition while 
still adhering to either of these positions. Because the basic 
metaphysical presuppositions on'which those monistic faiths are built 
are so radically different from those of Christianity, they cannot be 
considered as viable responses in the Christian tradition. In a curious 
way, because of the same metaphysical presuppositions, Classical Hinduism 
and Hinayana Buddhism also seem to fail the third criterion. Since both 
traditions would have us believe that at bottom level individual 
personalities, as well as evil itself, do not really existr there seems 
to'be a fundamental denial of the importance of the individual sufferer. 
The dualistic responses would seem to do well in meeting the third 
criterion. The writings of J. S. Mill and Hartshorne, as well as the 
ethical dialogues of Plato give ample evidence of a genuine concern 
for the plight of the individual sufferer. None of these dualistic 
approaches, however, seem as effective in meeting the second criterion. 
All of the limited God theorists, Plato, Zoroastrianism and the process 
thought of Charles Hartshorne deny at least one of the traditional 
attributes of God discussed in chapter two. For Plato, Zoroastrianism 
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and J. S. Mill, God is not omnipotent. The same can be said for the 
process thought of Hartshorne if we construe omnipotence as the ability 
to do anything that is logically possible. Additionally, it could be 
argued that God does not create the world ex nihilo in any of these 
dualistic points of view. It might be said that each of these responSes 
denies at least one aspect that seems to be fundamental to the classical 
Ohristian conception of God. 
Upon closer examination, even the theodicy of John Hick seems to 
fail the second criterion. On one level we might simply say that his 
position is not an adeqVate Christian response because he holds a view 
of omniscience that is radically different from the classical position 
that God knows all true propositions. This point, perhaps, could be 
argued. Nevertheless, on a more fundamental level, it may also be 
said that Hick fails to give sufficient weight to the person of Christ 
in his theodicy. Quite simple, the crucifixion and atonement seem to 
0 
, serve no central role in his answer to the problem of evil. The same 
criticisms might seem also to apply to the Book of Job. But since Job 
was written several hundred years before the advent of Christianity, it 
might more sensibly be said that the Book of Job meets our criteria for 
viable Judaic response to the problem of evil but it is, as. I shall soon 
show, still incomplete as a Christian theodicy. 
Still, we may have managed to tether ourselves in a kind of double- 
bind. On the one hand, it would seem to be the case that the only 
theodicies which meet our first criterion of logical con8istency are 
those thaý appear doomed by the second or third tests. On the other 
hand, if Mackie is correct, any theodicy which adheres to the belief in 
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the traditional attributes of God, as well as the reality of evil, seems 
to be prohibited by reason. 
But let us return at this point to the work of J. L. Mackie in 
the hope of showing that he may have overstated his case when he 
sug'ests, in effect, that all Christians answers to the problem of evil, 9. 
which adhere to the classical conception of God, are prohibited by 
reason, * If Mackie is correct then there can be no logically consistent 
theodicy in the Christian tradition. 
In chapter two we presented J. L. Mackie's case for viewing the 
problem of evil as a logical problem, that is, as a "problem of 
clarifying and reconciling a number of beliefs". According to Mackie, 
the Judeo-Christian theologian must (but cannot consistently) hold to 
I 
the following theistic set of beliefs: 
i. God is omnipotent. 
ii. God is omniscient. 
iii. God is omnibenevolent. 
iv. There is evil in the world. 
Mackie states the problem quite clearly in his recent book, The 
Miracle of Theism: 
According to traditional theism, there is a God who is 
both omnipotent (and omniscient) and wholly good, and 
yet there is evil in the world. How can this be? It is 
true that there is no explicit contradiction between the 
statement that there is an omnipotent and wholly good 
God and that there is evil. But if we add the at least 
initially plausible premises that good is opposed to evil 
in such a way that a being who is wholly good eliminate$ 
evil as far as he can, and there are no limits to what 
an omnipotent being could do, then we do have a 
contradiction. A wholly good omnipotent being would 
either eliminate evil completely, if there really are 
evils, or, there cannot be such a being. 
The problem of evil in the sense I am using the phrase is 
essentially a logical. problem: it sets the theist the 
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clear task of clarifying and if possible reconciling 
the several beliefs which he holds. It is not a 
scientific problem that might be solved by further 
discoveries, nor a practical problem that might be 
solved by a decision or action. And the problem in 
this sense signally does not arise for those who view 2 the world differently from traditional theism. 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains the two possible ways of resolving 
the logical problem of evil as Mackie has posed it: 
With an argument that seems to involve us in a 
contradiction, two courses are open to us. We can 
scrutinize the meaning of the terms employed in the 
argument more carefully, and ask whether we have not 
perhaps made a mistake in supposing a contradiction to 
arise. Or we can accept the fact that a contradiction 
does arise and avoid it by abandoning one of those 
statements, the joint affirmation of which leads to 
the contradiction. 3 
Traditional Christian theism is, of course, committed to the truth 
of all propositions i. through iv. Consequently, MacIntyre's second 
suggestion is out of the question. If the groundwork for an answer to 
the problem of evil is to be laid, it is the truth of MacIntyre's f irst 
course that must be established. 
If we keep Mackie's phrasing of the dilemma before'us, we will 
recall his admission that "the contradiction does not arise immediately" 
among the terms 'evil', tomnipotentt, lomnibenevolent' and lomniscientle 
Rather, some "quasi-logical rules" or "additional principles" are needed 
to demonstrate the contradiction. Earlier, in chapter two, we added a 
fifth premise (v. God created the world ex nihilo) to see if that would 
2 
J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, pp. 150-151. 
3 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Difficulties in Christian Belief (London: SCM Press, 
1959) P. 17. 
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produce the logical. inconsistency. We saw that it did not. Consequently, 
we added Mackie's additional principles as premises vi. and vii. 
vi. Good is opposed to evil in such a way t, hat a good 
thing always eliminates evil as far as it can. 
vii. There are no limits (other than logical ones) to 
what an omnipotent and omniscient being can do. C, 
From these two "at least initially plausible" premises, Mackie 
d6rives something like the following: 
viii. An omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient being 
would eliminate evil completely. 
and 
ix. 'An omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient being 
exists' and 'evil exists' are logically incompatible. 
If Mackie's conclusion (ix. ) follows from his premises (i. through 
viii. ) then it would also follow that any answer to the problem of evil 
which accepted the traditional attributes of God would be logically 
inconsistent and therefore prohibited by reason. In charging that such 
a contradiction exists Mackie has attempted to show that all of the 
initial premises (i. through iv. ) cannot be true at the same time, under 
any circumstances. He has added premises vi. through viii. to support 
his charge of inconsistency. 
It must be admitted that if premises vi. and vii. are true# then 
viii. and ix. f ollow quite nicely and, indeed, we would be f aced with 
a logical contradiction. Certainly vii. is true, at least by virtue of 
Mackie's definition of omnipoience. For the moment, then, let us grant 
him the truth of vii. But why should we assume that vi. is true? 
If vi. is true, what kind of truth is it? Certainly it is not a 
necessary truth, for no inherent contradiction would arise from its 
denial. If it is not a necessary truth, it must be a contingent truth. 
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But if it is a contingent truth, then it is possible that it is not true 
at all. If it were the case that vi. is not true at all, then the truth 
of viii. and ix. would collapse, for their supposed truth rests on the 
prior truth of each of the premises i. through vii. 
The question essentially becomes one of what sort of evidence we 
can give for and against the truth of vii.? Mackie must argue that the 
evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the truth of vii. But the critic 
of Mackiets formulation might attempt-to show that certain counter- 
evidence might be brough forth which would contradict the notion that 
'good is opposed to evil in such a way that a good thing always 
eliminates evil as far as it can'. 
Suppose, for example, there was some greater good to be achieved 
in a particular situation by the endurance of a certain amount of pain. 
Indeed, suppose it were the case that this greater good could only be 
accomplished through the endurance of this very real pain. We would then 
have a case where good was not opposed to evil in such a way that a good 
thing always elminates evil. 
4 This is certainly a logically possible 
situation. 
5 Mackie has not shown why this could not be the'actual 
descriptive account of the'attitudes and actions of God. Indeed, it may. 
4 
For a more detailed version of this objection see James Ross's Introduction 
to the Philosophy ofReligion (New York: Macmillan, 1969) pp. ý20-123- 
5 
Another way to put this objection is to say that Mackie insists what is 
needed to falsify the claim that an all-powerful, all-loving, all-knowing 
God exists is one example of absolute, utterly useless evil which cannot 
be overcome. But it is not clear that we can give such an example. One 
might suggest that Mackie would have to disprove the existence of God in 
order to prove that any instance of evil is absolute; hence, Mackie's appeal 
is circular, presupposing what it intends to prove. 
. 
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well be the sort of view that Job finally settles on. What we are 
sugges 
: 
ting here is "at least initially plausible" and would give us a 
new look to premise vi. 
vi (b). Good is not necessarily opposed to evii in such a 
way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far 
as it can. 
If we add our new premise vi (b). to the truth of Mackiefs vii., 
we get something like the following: 
vii. There are no limits, other than logical ones, to what 
an omnipotent being can do. 
viii (b). An omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omniscient being 
-would not necessarily eliminate evil completely. 
and 
ix (b). 'An omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient being 
exists' and 'evil exists' are not logicall incompatible. 
One way to show what we have done in the above argument is to 
recall our remarks regarding the distinction between "genuine evil", 
"apparent evil" and "prima facie evil". As we have suggested earlier, it 
may be the case that all prima facie evil is actually gonuine evil. It 
is also logically possible that some prima facie evil is genuine and some 
is merely apparent. Both of these conclusions would follow from Mackie's 
argument. But there is also still a third logically possible state of 
affairs in which all prima facie evil is actually only apparent. The key 
point to understand here is that all three of these situations is a, 
logically possible state of affairs and therefore allowed by reason. It 
could be the case that Mackie is correct, but there is nothing logically 
necessary about his formulation of premise vi. nor about his conclusion- 
in ix. 
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Another way to phrase the same point is to look at Christianity 
as a religion of prima facie paradox. The prima facie paradox may indeedt 
as Mackie has suggested, be actual, but it is also logically possible 
that it is merely apparent. 'John Wisdom makes a helpful remark which 
comes close to the heart of this issue: 
One might have expected that in the sphere of religion 
everyone would have learned by now to move carefully 
and neither at once to accept nor hastily reject what 
sounds bewildering. But no, even here we find a 
tendency to reject strange statements with impatience, 
to turn from them as absurd or unprovable or to write 
them down as metaphor - deceptive, or at best, merely 
picturesque. Only a few months ago someone came to me 
troubled about the old but bewildering statement that 
Christ was both God and man. Ile asked those who taught 
him theology how this could be true. Their answers 
had not satisfied him. I was not able to tell him what 
the doctrine means. But I did remind him that though 
some statements which seem contradictory are self- 
contradictory, others are not, that indeed some of the 
most preposterous statements ever made havg turned out 
to convey the most tremendous discoveries. 
It is important to understand two features of Wisdom's comment. 
First, that the prima facie religious paradoxes or contradictions mWj 
indeed turn out to be genuine self-contradictions, though there is also 
the possibility that they will later be seen as merely apparent. And 
second, it is only those that turn out to be merely apparent which may be 
illuminating or "tremendous discoveries". 
Some commentators on the work of Professor Wisdom seem to miss, this 
second point and in the process make him out to be something akin to a 
6 
John Wisdom, "Paradox and Discovery", in Paradox and Discovery (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1965) p. 124. Later, 'we shall argue that the 
incarnation is, in fact, an excellent example of a religious paradox 
that is merely apparent. 
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believer in Tertullian's dictum: I believe because it is absurd. 
T. F. Torrance, f or example, makes the following observation about Wisdom' s 
view as applied to Christian theology. 
The task of a living and constructive theology is 
to discover and work out the interior logic of our 
knowledge of God, but in the nature of the case it 
will not be able to avoid constant tension between 
the material logic thrusts upon it from the side of 
the redeeming operations of God in Christ, and the 
logico-verbal atoms of our thought and speech that 
are already schematized to this world, for the Truth 
of God as it is in Christ breaks through all our 
linguistic and logical forms. 7 
But if we examine again the words of Wisdomfs which occasionod this 
remark, we can see that in Wisdom's view the fruitful paradoxes are those 
that turn out to not be self-contradictory. Torrance seems to be saying 
I, just the opposite and, in so doing, relegates language about God to the 
same class as language about round squares and married bachelors. 
Wisdom's point is quite relevant for our discussion of Mackie's 
argument, for it at least points to the possiblity that Mackie has 
overstated his case. In a similar vein, Nelson Pike has attempted to 
show that the believer need not be cowed by an appeal to Mackiets 
construction of the sup posed logical contradiction. Pike challenges 
those of the Mackie-Flew persuasion to prove the falsity of a claim 
like: "A good God could have a morally sufficient reason for allowing 
evil to exist". Pike suggests that just as a child may not be old 
enough to understand why his mother causes him so much pain in curing 
him of a certain sickness, and yet the mother has morally sufficient 
reasons for doing so, so a limited human being may not understand what 
7 
T. F. Torrance, Theological Science (London: Oxford University, 1969) 
P. 279. 
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a perfect God's sufficient reasons could be for allowing evil. 
8 Indeed, 
this is precisely the position the author of Job seems to be suggesting. 
M. B. Ahern arrives at a similar conclusion about the argument 
proposed by Mackie, as well as incompatibility arguments in general which 
attempt to argue that any answer in the Judeo-Christian tradition which 
adheres to the traditional attributes of God must be prohibited by reason: 
There are two general conclusions from this study: (1) 
Apart from positive proofs of God's existence, it cannot 
be shown that the world's evil is logically compatible 
with the existence of a wholly good, omnipotent and 
omniscient being, or that the conditions for 
incompatibility are in fact met. (2) It cannot be shown 
that the worldts evil is logically incompatible with 
Godfs existence, or that the conditions for compatibility 
are not in f act met. 9 
Ahern continues by arguing although it cannot be shmm there is a 
logical connection between evil and the non-existence of God, it may be 
possible to show there is a synthetically necessary connection between 
them: 
We saw that such a connection cannot be made by means of 
the principles used by Epicurus, Augustine, Hume and others. 
Perhaps it can be established by other principles, e. g. a 
good. being always prevents suffering to innocent children. 
It might be argued that such principles are synthetically 
apriori and necessarily true. Strictly speaking, this 
view does not come within the scope of the present study. 
It involves questions about the notion of synthetically 
apriori principles which could only be discussed in a 
separate study. But since in the chapter on the general 
problem no fewer than eight principles about goodness 
8 
Nelson Pike, God and Evil, p. 102. Pike also points out in "Hume and 
Evil", Philosophical Review (1963), reprinted in God and Evil$ that 
Hume overlooks the possibility that God permits evil for a good and 
justifying purpose. 
9 
M. B. Ahern, -The Problem of Evil (New York: Schocken Books, 1971) p. 78. 
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could be proposed as synthetically apriori were hold to 
be false it seems reasonable to believe that satisfactory 
principles will probably not be found. The question here 
is noted as a possible non-theist position which the study 
has not discussed. The study has dealt with problems 
about logical compatibility raised for theism by evil and 
claimed that none of them can be shown to be decisive. 10 
This indefinite conclusion has real significance for our study. a 
Far from containing air-tight solutions to the problem of evil, Christain 
revelation may very well leave the problem shrouded in mystery as we 
have seen in chapters 38-42 of Job. If this indefinite conclusion is 
the best honest Christians can do, it lays open the possibility the 
evils of this world may be merely apparent. Any teleological theodicy 
that suggests in the end the prima facie paradox of evil may be shown 
to be merely apparent would therefore appear to be a candidate of the 
class of the responses to the problem of evil which are allowed by reason. 
If one or more of these theodicies at the same time appears to be true, 
at least in a broad way, to the Christian form of life, then it would 
appear we have one or more Christian theodicies that are both logically 
sound and religiously acceptable. If it could be demonstrated one or more 
of these theodicies was also quite sensitive to the needs and perspective 
of the individual sufferer, then the task of this thesis would be 
complete. In the remainder of this chapter I shall attempt to sketch 
the bare framework of a response to the problem of evil that may well 
meet these three conditions. 
ii. 
One way to begin our discussion of a viable Christian response to 
10 
Ibid., pp. 78-ý9. 
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the problem of evil is to recall two of the principal f laws in the 
theodicy developed by John Hick in his Evil and the God of Love. The 
first of these was that Hick's view of omniscience does not allow for 
God's knowing future contingent human actions. In chapter two we have 
demonstrated that by understanding the distinction between necessit-y 
de dicto and necessity do re it can be shown that Godts knowledge of 
ýuture free human choices is not logically contradictory. By taking 
this view of omniscience we may make an important step in developing a 
teleological thoodicy that is true to the conception of God as conceived 
in classical Christian theism. 
We have suggested that the other deficiency in Hickts point of 
view occurs at a more fundamental level - he seems to deny any central 
role to Christ in the formulation of his answer to the problem of evil. 
Some might suggest the reason Hick spends so little time 
discussing the'role Christ should play in any distinctively Christian 
response to the problem of evil is that it is clear from the outset 
any doctrine of the incarnation rests on a number of murky and logically 
contradictory claims. Consequently, any theodicy which uses as its 
centrepiece the dual natures of Jesus fails to meet our first criterion 
for a viable theodicy - logical consistency. These critics might argue 
further Hick has wisely avoided any central references to the person, of 
11 
Cf.: Maurice Wiles' "Christianity Without Incarnation"; Michael 
Goulder's "Jesus, the Man of Universal Destiny"; Leslie Houlden's 
"The Creed of Experience"; and Don Cupitt's "The Christ of Christendom", 
all in The Kyth of God Incarnate (London: SCM Press, 1977). 
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Christ in his theodicy precisely so his position might be numbered among 
those that are allowed by reason. 
There is at least ample circumstantial evidence to be found in 
The Myth of God Incarnate 
12 for the view Hick has very carefully left 
out-any reference to Jesus in Evil and the God of Love because he thinks 
any traditional view of the incarnation is self-contradictory. Indeed, 
in the former work Hick argues the orthodox doctrine of Jesus' nature has 
no clear content and therefore no non-mataphorical interpretation. Hick 
suggests to say that the historical Jesus was also God is to utter a 
contradiction as devoid pf meaning as to say that a circle is also a 
square. 
13 
If Hick is correct, any answer"to the problem of evil that relies 
heavily on the person of Christ would contain some central elements that 
were not only prima facie paradoxical, but were genuinely paradoxical 
and therefore logically incoherent. 
I think, however, Hick's perspective is profoundly mistaken for 
at least two important reasons. First, in a real. way Hick throws out 
the proverbial baby with the bath water. By removing the person of 
Christ from his theodicy, he ceases to hold a distinctivOlY Christian 
point of view. Indeed, he has abandoned the Christian form of life 
altogether. Second, I think it can be successfully argued the doctrine 
of the incarnation is not a logically inconsistent or incoherent doctrine. 
In fact, it may well be the one doctrine that gives a special kind of 
12 
Ibid., pp. ix-xi and 167-185. 
13 
Ibid., p. 178f. 
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coherence to the problem of evil as it is expressed in the Christian 
form of life. In order to make this claim, however, we must first show 
the doctrine of the incarnation is a belief that is not prohibited by 
reason. 
- In order to develop a satisfactory response to Hick1s doubts 
about the classical conception of the incarnation, we must engage in two 
different but related tasks: we must get clear, as best we cant on 
what it means in philosophical terms to say that something is an X, 
where x is a member of a certain class. Additionally, we must also 
discern, at least in a broad way, the clearest interpretation of what 
The first it means to say that "Jesus was fully human and fully divine". 
task can be completed, I think, in a fairly straight forward manner. 
Something is an x if and only if that thing possess all the essential 
properties of x. We mean by an essential property of x one that must be 
present in order to call that thing an x. 
14 
If we keep this analysis of the identity of members of a class in 
the backs of our minds for a moment, we may proceed in an attempt to 
answer the question regarding the proper interpretation of "Jesus was 
fully human and fully divine". Let us begifi then with a philosophical 
interpretation of this phrase: 
14 
I do not mean to minimize the complicated debate on the problem of 
identity. Often this problem has been answeped by fairly abstruse 
metaphysical concepts such as 'eternal forms', IsubstancesIp and 
'essences'. I do not wish to become embroiled in these debates and 
suggest this simple analysis. 
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(a) Jesus possessed all the characteristics of men, 
while at the same time having all the characteristics 
of God. 15 
(a) will not do as a proper interpretation of "Jesus was fully 
human and fully divine", for there is clearly a difference between 
kinds of attributes, be they predicated of man or God. Some men are 
tall and some are short. Some humans are . bald, while others have full 
heads of hair. It is clear that Jesus could not possess all the 
characteristics of men, for that would require him to be simultaneously 
tall and short, bald and hairy, etc. 
To solve this probýem we might suggest another formulation of 
what it means to say that Jesus was fully human and fully divine. 
(b) Jesus had all the essential attributes of God while at 
the same time possessing all the indispensable properties 
of a man. 
We have seen an essential property or attribute of x is one that 
must be present in order to call that thing an x. Now the questions 
arises: can a being who possesses the essential attributes of God 
simultaneously possess the essential attributes of human beins? U 
Another way to phrase this question is to ask if a being who is 
omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent and creator of the universe can 
at the same time be limited in knowledge, power, etc.? 
At first blush it would appear the answer to this question is no. 
15 
Many if not all of the insights for my approach to the philosophical 
problem of the incarnation have come from chapter 8 of Stephen T. 
Davis' The Lop 
__ 
ic and Nature of God (London: Macmillan, 1983). 
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The Jesus of the New Testament, for example, seems at times to be 
lacking in knowledge . 
16 As MacIntyre has pointed out, when faced with 
a prima facie paradox two routes are open to us. We can either say 
that Jesus Christ in some sense had both sets of properties, and thereby 
reduce discussions of the nature of Jesus to arguments about matters 
akin to round squares, or we can take what is sometimes referred to as 
a*kenotic approach to the incarnation, and thereby argue that the paradox 
is merely apparent. In this second point of view it is readily admitted 
Jesus did not have properties like omniscience, omnipotence, or any 
other divine attributes inconsistent with being a human being. But at 
the same time he continued to possess those divine attributes which were 
consistent, with his humanity, and was also capable of regaining in his 
ascension those essential, properties given up. This perspective brings 
us to a third formulation of the notion that Jesus is fully human and 
fully divine: 
(c) Jesus was in possession of certain essential divine 
attributes, as well as certain human attributes and there 
was no logical contradiction between them. 
At first this seems like an initially plausible interpretation, 
but it also suffers from a major flaw. Formulation (c) would be satisfied 
even if Jesus only possessed say, the attribute of omniscience, but at 
the same time was deficient in all other divine properties. If this were 
a proper description of the nature of Jesus he would seem to be inferior, 
for example, to the God of J. S. Mill. We must once again, therefore, 
amend the definition of fully human and fully divine to look like this: 
16 
Mark 5: 30; 13; 32. 
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(d) Jesus was in possession of certain divine attributes 
as well as certain human attributest and there wasýno 
logical contradiction between them- The divine properties 
were sufficient to make him God, while the human properties 
were sufficient to make him a man. 
But perhaps this new formulation still leaves us with a major 
difficulty. How could Jesus be truly God if he lacked some essential 
attribute(s) of the divine. Earlier, we have seen, for example, the 
Jesus depicted in the New Testament appears not to have been omniscient. 
In order to answer this difficulty we must make a distinction between 
what Stephen Davis calls "Jesus simpliciter" and "Jesus as truly God". 
17 
It would be false to sayJesus had all the divine attributes or was God 
simpliciter. But the traditional conception of the incarnation does not 
necessarily imply this. 
18 What it does insist, however, is Jesus Christ 
was truly human and truly God. Another way to put this is to say that 
during the earthly life of Jesus, he was God as best as lie could be 
revealed in human form. 0 
There are certain things he could not have done unless he were 
God (forgive sins, for example). And, there were also clearly things he 
could not have done without a "truly human" nature (die on the cross, 
, worry 
in the Garden of Gethsemane). But at the same time it is clear 
that only one person forgave sins and died on the cross. 
This brings us to our major response to Hick's suggestion about 
the incoherence of any traditional doctrine of the incarnation. In 
17 
Stephen Davis, The Logic and Nature of God, p. 128. 
18 
By the traditional conception I mean the formulation of the doctrine 
brought forth at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 A. D. 
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the same way that a skilled cricket batsman could choose to play a 
match'from his weaker side of the wicket, so too an omnipotent being 
could choose to temporarily limit his power so he might truly become 
human. The same can be said, it seems to me, about omniscience. An 
omniBeient being could choose not to know the truth of certain 
propositions or a whole range of propositions for that matter. 
But another objection might once again be raised at this point. 
One might grant that an omnipotent being could choose not to exercise 
his power, but how is it that an omniscient being could abandon the 
knowledge of the truth of certain propositions, without ceasing to be 
omniscient? Can a being who is potentially omniscient choose not to 
know something? At first, this seems like a very peculiar idea, but 
I see no logical problems with an omniscient being giving up some of 
his knowledge. In order to understand this is a logical possibility, 
consider the following example. Suppose person A were to ask person B 
what the 148th digit of pi happens to be. B, who is quite a good 
mathematician, nevertheless, finds the question trivial and unimportant. 
Consequently, he responds to A by saying, "I know what to do in order to 
discern the answer, but at this point I do not know it, nor do I wish to". 
We might say about person B that in a curious kind of way he could 
both be said to know what the 148th digit of pi is, and at the same time 
to not know it. The sense in which he does not know it is cleart for if 
he were told to answer yes or no to the question his response would 
clearly be no. Yet, at the same time his answer does not do justice 
to the fact B could know the answer any time he liked. 
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In a roughly analogous way, the same could be said about Jesus: 
He was omniscient in the sense that he could have exercised his 
knowledge of all true propositions at any time, but freely chose to 
live as a human being without that knowledge. At the same time, there 
is also a sense in which Jesus could still be said to be omniscient, 
since in freely choosing to limit his knowledge he still had the 
potential for omniscience. Týe first sense of omniscience is sufficient 
for Jesus to have retained his human nature, while the second sense 
was sufficient to make him divine. 
19 
Still, the notion of kenotic incarnation is not without its 
critics. Don Cupitt, Maurice Wiles and John Hick, among others, are 
all highly critical of this approach. ' Cupitt seems to argue on the 
basis of three points. First, "kenosis is not a theory designed to 
account for the facts, but rather about how one can go on believing in 
the incarnation in a time when the old arguments have broken down". 
20 
Second, kenosis leads to anthropomorphisms. And thirdq kenosis leads 
to an incoherent "triple consciousness in the incarnate Lord". 
21 
I find the first of Cupittts criticisms puzzling for at least 
three reasons. First, even if Cupitt were correct about the motivation 
of Christian apologists, and I think he is not, 
22 the origin of their 
19 
-A similar argument can be given, I think, for the other major attributes. 
20 
Incarnation and ýtvth, P. 43. 
21 
Ibid., p. 45. 
22 
Cupitt is, I think, mistaken when he implies that the linventiont of 
the notion of kenosis has come along recently as a stop-gap measure 
for giving some meager credability to a crumbling doctrine of the 
incarnation. As early as Irenaeust Against Heresies (iii, 119 3) there 
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argument would say nothing about the truth or falsity of it, unless 
Cupitt can show that the genetic fallacy is no longer a fallacy. 
is a suggestion of the possibility that Jesust divine attributes may 
have been "quiescent" or "sleeping" during the temptation, cruxificion 
and death of Jesus. Cyril of Alexander in Quad Unus Sit Christus 
(viii, 1,319) formulates a similar possibility when he offers that 
the Logos "willed to permit human experience to prevail over him". 
Similar, though admittedly cryptic, remarks may also be found in 
Gregory of Nyssals Oratio Catechetic Magna, (XXIV). On the continent, 
various thinkers in the 19th century Lutheran tradition such as 
Thomasius in Christi Person und Werk (1853), Godet in his Gospel of 
St John and Dorner in The Doctrine of the Person of Christ (1861) had 
suggested by mid-century that Jesus may have depotentiated himself by 
abandoning his divine attributes for a while. In England, the 19th 
century congregational divine, A. M. Fairbain in his Christ in Modern 
TheologY (PP. 470-478)-developed a distinction between the "physical" 
and "ethical" attributes of God, providing the way for subsequent 
kenotic theorists such as Charles Gore, Frank Weston, H. R. MacKintosh 
and P. T. Forsyth. Perhaps A. M. Ramsay in From Gore to Temple sums 
up best the emergence of the kenosis doctrine of the incarnation when 
he says "that doctrine has sprung from the consideration of the 
historical data of our Lord's life considered side by side with the 
belief in His deity. On the one hand the Gospels depict Jesus Christ 
as living a genuinely human life: He advances in knowledge. He 
learns, He asks questions as needing to know the answer. He shows 
ignorance (cf. Mark 13: 32). On the other hand, the church worships 
Him as divine, and reads in the Gospels of His perfect revelation of 
the Father. How were Christian teachers to express the two aspects 
of the Incarnation, without allowing the one to override the other. 
It was one thing to assert the dogma of a perfect Godhead and perfect 
Manhood coexisting in the one Person. I-That was more difficult was to teach about the incarnate life without making the humanity seem 
unreal or the deity seem to be ousted by the human limitations. Inevitably, the problem may be more keenly felt in the modern church 
with its concern for history than it had been in the ancient church 
with the concentration upon the framework of dogmatic definition. " (London: Longmans Green, 1959), pp. 31-32. 
A second reason I find Cupitt's first objection a bit odd is that 
the way the objection is raised displays a kind of ambiguity in regard 
to what counts as a "fact". Certainly, we must count Jesus as being 
a man born in Palestine during the first century as a fact, but are we 
also-to count Jesust performance of miracles as facts or might we 
-not be better off to see miracles in Wisdom's terms as a certain 
donnecting technique of the facts? A third peculiarity of Cupitt's 
first criticism is that he seems to be selective in reading the New 
Testament text. Any ambiguous passages, which might be counted in 
favor of kenosis are ignored. Consider this example from Phillipians 
2: 5-8: 
His state was divine, 
yet he did not cling 
to his equality with God 
but emptied himself 
to assume the condition of a slave, 
and became as men are, 
he was humbler yet, 
even to accepting 2 
death, 
death on a cross. 3 
Certainly this passage should not be used as a definitive proof 
text for kenosis. Nevertheless, it can be used as credible evidence in 
its support, but Cupitt seems curiously to ignore this and other New 
Testament passages. 
Cupitt's other two objections to kenotic interpretations of the 
incarnation have been dealt with rather effectively by Brian Hebblethwaite 
in "The Logical Coherence of the Doctrine of Incarnation". 
24 About 
23 
The Jerusalem Bible (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1968). 
24 
in Incarnation and Kyth, pp. 6o-62. 
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Cupitt's charge that kenotic theories lead to anthropomophisms 
Hebblethwaite says the following: 
These (Cupittts) objections fail because they themselves 
depend wholly on what we can imagine anthropomorphically. 
I notice that anthropomorphisms come from critics who 
themselves, at least in considering the'r opponents' 
views, think only anthropomorphically. 
B 
Concerning the criticism kenosis leads to an incoherent triple 
consciousness for the son of God, Hebblethwaite comments: 
It is'a travesty to suggest that for kenotic Christology, 
divinity is predicated of Jesus' humanity. This is 
certainly to confuse the natures. We predicate divinity 
of Jesus, because we believe his humanity to be the 
vehicle and experession of the eternal son. There is no 
conversion of the Godhead into flesh. To think this is 
to operate with some crude picture of two kinds of stuff. 
Nor is there any reason to postulate three consciousnessest 
where God incarnate is concerned. Indeed, it is hard to 
take such playing around with theological concepts 
seriously. All we need is Jesus' own sense of filial 
dependence on the one hand, and God's awareness of ýis 
(Godts) own acts through incarnation on the other. 
26 
Maurice Wiles' criticisms of kenosis are directed primarily at 
Hebblethwaite's version of the theory. Although Wiles proposes 
several different lines of attack, one of the most interesting of his 
objections to Hebblethwaitets view can be found in the following 
passage: 
But Hebblethwaite's argument can be turned on its head, 
and I am genuinely uncertain which way up it functions 
better. For if it is logically conceivable (as 
Hebblethwaite's view of the incarnation insists that 
it is) for God to be actually identified with a human 
person without in any way taking away from the full and 
genuine humanity of that human person, it follows that 
25 
Ibid., p. 61. 
26 
Ibid., p. 60. 
ETA 
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God doos not, in fact, draw near to us as individual men 
and women or share our suffering as directly as he 
apparently could. 27 
Wiles seems to be suggesting that if Hebblethwaite's view of the 
incarnation is true (and not merely allowed by reason) it would have 
the unwanted consequence of putting Jesus in a position of not sharing 
in our suffering as directly as he might have. Although Wiles' point 
is correct, I'm not sure why this should count as a criticism against 
Hebblethwaite's view in particular on the concept of kenotic incarnation 
in general. One might agree with Wiles while at the same time pointing 
out Jesus had temporarily given up his divine ability to sympathize 
with us all by taking on his own human suffering as an individual man. 
It could be said that Jesus had voluntarily given up divine sympathy 
in favor of a very real human empathy. One might argue that this is 
not an unwanted consequence by any means. 
f John Hick's criticisms of kenosis are many and varied. Most o. 
them can be summed up, however, in his claim that if kenosis 
is to be put forward as an answer to our problems, 
it needs to be expounded and discussed at first hand. 
If there is a viable understanding of incarnation here, 
let someone lay it on the table. 
ýt 
Although Hick's call for discussion is commendable, we must keep 
'N in mind He seems already to have made up his mind about any but the 
most mythological accounts of the incarnation: 
I have suggested that the incarnation motif should 
in fact be understood as a basic metaphor. If this 
is right, then the centuries long attempt of 
27 
Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
28 
Ibid., p. 50. 
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Christian orthodoxy to turn the metaphor into metaphysics 
was a cul-de-sac ... 
29 
Later, he concludes: 
... the idea of divine incarnation is a basic metaphor, 
functioning as a religious myth, and that it is a 
category mistake to try to specify it as a hypothesis 
of, theological science. 30 
Despite an initial Kierkegaardian remark that I must confess to, 
teing unable to understand what the expression "theological science" 
might moan, -two general remarks might be made concerning Hick's view 
of the viability of any'orthodox interpretation of the incarnation. 
The first of these is that he appears to have decided in some kind of 
apriori way against the possibility of any non-mythological view of 
the incarnation, be it kenosis or otherwise. And second, anyone who 
suggests a non-mythological account of the incarnation in Hick's view 
is making an error by trying to specify the position as-a hypothesis of 
"theological science". I think that Hick is, quite simply, mistaken on 
both of these points. 
31 
I have already suggested in a very general way an interpretation 
of the expression "Jesus is fully human and fully divine" which I believe 
is not logically incoherent, nor is it metaphorical. More specifically, 
I have also suggested that this particular kenotic view of the 
29 
Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
30 
Ibid., p. 49. 
31 
It is of some interest that when Hick does specifically criticizes 
kenotic accounts of the incarnation he concentrates on older versions 
such as that of Frank Weston in The One Christ (London: Longmans, 
1907) and H. R. MacKintosh's The Doctrine of the Person of Christ 
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clarke, 1912). 
incarnation is one that is allowed by reason. I will have more to say 
about this view of kenosis in the following section. Additionally, I 
will argue in the last part of this chapter that religious assertions 
like "Jesus is fully human and fully divine" are more than just 
expressive or evocative utterances, though, as we shall see, they do 
not function with the same logical status as scientific hypotheses. 
For the moment, however, let us return to our original chore in this 
chapter: the amending of John Hick' s teleological theodicy. What we 
have done in the last several pages is to attempt to show that there is 
nothing logically contradictory about the phrase "Jesus was fully human 
and fully divine". We may now use this traditional. Christological 
doctrine, with its newer kenotic twist, as the centerpiece for 
constructing a distinctively Christian response to the problem of evil 
that at the same time takes the pain of the individual sufferer seriously. 
In summarising the second section of this final chapter we might 
once again call to mind Wisdom's observation that sometimes prima facie 
paradoxes turn out to be merely apparent, and it is those apparent 
paradoxes which may be theologically illuminating or "tremendous 
discoveries". We have suggested Job's "discovery" may have been the 
possibility of a larger teleological framework in which to view his 
suffering. In the classical doctrine of the incarnation, as well# we may 
have one of these "tremendous discoveries". This is by no means a 
necessary conclusion, but certainly one that is allowed by reason. Let 
us now, in the third part of this chapter, return to the person of 
Christ, with an emphasis on his kenotic incarnation, as the foundation of 
our proposed theodicy. 
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III. 
'In an article entitled, "The Problem of Suffering: A Dialogue", 
which appeared in the Expository Tines, Cyril Rodd makes a remark about 
the special attitude of the reflective Christian toward the problem of 
evil: "As a Christian I cannot consider the problem without turning to 
Jesus" . 
32 
In his Church Dogmatics IV/1, Karl Barth observes: 
What God is and what it is to be divine is something 
we have to learn where God has revealed Himself and His 
nature, the essence of the divine. And if He has 
revealed Himself in Jesus Christ as the God who does 
this, it is not for us to be wiser than He and to say 
that it is in contradiction with the divine essence. 
We have to be ready to be taught by Him that we have 
been too small and perverted in our thinking about 
Him within the framework of a false idea*33 
The same spirit is expressed in this passage from The Christian 
Lif e: 
As we search for a knowledge of God in the world that 
is unequivocally achieved both objectively on God's 
side and subjectively on man's, as we look for a point 
where his name might be clearly and distinctly hallowed 
on both sides in and for the world, we can think only 
of the one Jesus Christ. In him the knowledge of God 
in the world does not lack either the definitiveness of 
the objective element, as in the case of the attestation 
by the Church and Christians, or that of the subjective 
element, as in the case of the hidden glory of God in 
his creation. In him the circle closes which elsewhere 
is disturbingly open on one side or the other. 34 
32 
Cyril Rodd, "The Problem of Suffering: A Dialogue", Expository Times, 
(August, 1972) P. 342. 
33 
Karl Barth, C. hurch Dogmatics IV/1 (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clarke, 1956) 
p. 60. 
34 
Karl Barth, The Christian Life (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clarke, 1981) 
p. 123. 
236. 
. 
Although God would have been capable of revealing himself through 
a dead dog if he wished, the message which the Christian form of life 
is obligated to proclaim is that God has revealed himself in the person 
of Jesus Christ. In a real way, in Christ the adherents to Christianity 
"see-God". Consequently, we must attend very carefully to what God has 
done'in Christ in order to answer the question: Qualis sit Deus? (What 
kind of God is this? ) 
Barth's point of departure is the particular revelation of God in 
Christ. He sees as "untenably corrupt and pagan't any conferring of 
general conceptions (such as "absolute in contrast to all. that is 
relative, exalted in contrast to all that is lowly") to God. 
Rather, we must learn "to correct our notions of the being of God, 
to reconstitute them in the light of the fact that he has done this ". 
35 
If we assume Barthts general Christological point of departure we can 
see in returning to Mackie's premise vii. (There are no limitsp other 
than logical ones, to what an omnipotent being can do. ) that this is an 
inadequate definition of omnipotence for the believing Christian. ror 
Barth, God reveals himself, through Christ, to be a victim of suffering. 
By following this line of reasoning, Barth broadens our conception of 
evil to include a distinctively theological element. This added 
dimension revolutionizes the existential relation between God and 
humankind, thereby recasting the question of theodicy. 
Barth suggests we must reevaluate the meaning of "omnipotence" in 
35 
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/1 p. 186. 
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light of the story of Christ, where God has allegedly cho. sen, to reveal 
himself. If this approach is not used when discussing Christian 
responses to suffering then we run the risk of denying one of the 
major tenets of the Christian form of life. Barth seems to understand 
this. point quite clearly when he makes the following remark in The 
Doctrine of the Word of God: 
Theology follows the language of the Church, as 
far as in its questions as to the correctness of 
the Churchts procedures therein, it measures it, not 
by a standard foreign to it, but by her very own 
source and object. 36 
No theologian has reflected more extensively on the relation 
between the person of Jesus Christ and the concept of God's omnipotence 
than the 20th century kenoticist, P. T. Forsyth. In his book, The Person 
and Place of Jesus Christ, Forsyth makes a strong appeal for a kenotic 
conception of the incarnation as well as what he calls a I'moralisation 
of dogma" in light of the revelation of God in Christ. Seeing Jesus 
Christ as "holy love" (which is God's essence), -Forsyth describes how 
the divine attribute of omnipotence comes to be moralised: 
... God is not God physically but morally, not by 
power but by love. That is the Christian revelation. 
The nature of the Godhead is Holy Love. There lies 
the region, the nature and the norm of his omnipotence. 
It is no arbitrary or casual omnipotence, which puts 
out power just for the sake-of doing it or showing it. 
It can do, not everything conceivable to freakish fancy, 
but everything that is prescribed by Holy Love. To a 
physical omnipotence it is indifferent. Such being its 37 
nature its object with humanity is a kingdom of holy love. 
36 1 Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word-of God (translated by G. T- Thompson) 
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clarke, 1936) p. 2. 
37 
P. T. Forsyth, The Person and the Place of Jesus Christ (London: Hodder 
and Staughton, 1909) p. 313. 
238. 
This divine love is revealed to us through the person of Jesus 
Christ whose love 
is not a love which might itself be finite, only with 
a miraculous physical omnipresence; but it is an almighty 
love in the sense that it is capable of limiting itself, 
and, while an end, becoming also a means, to an extent 
adequate to all love's infinite ends. This renouncing, 
self-retracting act of the son's will, this reduction of 
Himself from the supreme end to the supreme means for the 
soul, is no negation of His nature; it is the opposite, 
it is the last assertion of His nature as love. It is no 
negation of His freedom; it is rather the freest energy 
of His whole will. He never willed something so mightily 
and freely as the subjective, the renunciation of self- 
will to the holy requirement of God. It is the concentrated 
omnipotence of love, and not of mere power, that underlies 
His earthly existence. 38 
In much the same way we have argued in part two of this chapter, 
Forsyth suggests that the divine qualities of omniscience and omnipotence 
were present in Christ, but "He consented not to know, and was mighty 
not to do". The action of the divine attributes in Christ "was at once 
reduced, concentrated, intensified within the conditions of the saving 
work" . 
39 
Forsyth continues: 
The divine qualities were kept, but only in the mode that 
salvation made necessary. Jesus did not know everything 
actually, empirically, but only what was needed for the 
work. But as that is the central final work in human 
38 
Ibid., pp. 313-314. 
39 
Ibid., A. D. Lindsay makes a similar remark in his posthumously published 
Selected Addresses (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957). On pp. 67ff. 
he makes ample use of Kierkegaard: "If we rightly consider omnipotence, 
then clearly it must have the quality of so taking itself back in this 
very manifestation of all its powerfulness that the results of this act 
of the omnipotence can be*independent. It is only a miserable and 
worldly picture of the dialectic of power-to say that it becomes greater 
as it can compel and make things dependent. Socrates knew better: the 
art of using power isto make free. " 
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nature, the knowledge required for it contains the promise 
and: potency of all knowledge. And, as to the exercise of 
power, he did what God alone could do in forgiving human 
sin, 
-a 
salvation which is a nucleus and germ of all worthy 
power beside. His knowledge, his power, his presence were 
all adjusted to his vocation. His vocation was not to 
apply or exhibit omnipotence, but to effect the will of 
infinite love, and master all that set itself against that. 
All that divine vocation was only possible to one who had 
a divine position. The world's redeemer must be the son 
of God. 40 
In his essay, "The Manhood of Jesus in the New Testament", C. F. D. 
Moule stands with those who express an even more radical conception of 
kenosis. Indeed, he Coes well beyond the kenotic point of view of 
Forsyth who he says 
explain(s) the human limitations suffered by the divine 
Son of God in terms of deliberate act of self-emptying, 
as though the pre-existent Son of God voluntarily emptied 
himself of divine perogatives for a time, in order to 
share to the full the human lot, and resumed his full 
capacities only after the death on the cross. 
41 
Citing the passage in Philippians which I quoted earlier, Moule 
suggests that Paul points to a "divine paradýx which stands every human 
scale of values on its head", he observes: 
I agree with those who interpret harpagmos not, concretely, 
as "something worth snatching", but, abstractly, as "the 
act of snatching" (i. e., virtually "acquisitiveness"), and 
who render the phrase in which it occurs in some such way 
as: "Jesus did not reckon that equality with God meant 
snatching: on the contrary, he emptied himself asell 
This would mean that, whereas ordinary human valuation 
reckons that God-likeness means having your own Way, 
getting what you want, Jesus saw God-likeness essentially 
as giving and spending oneself out. 
42 
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Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus-Christ p. 319. 
41 
C. F. D. Moule, "The Manhood of Jesus in the New Testament", Christ, Faith 
and History, edited by S. W. Sykes and J. P. Clayton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972) p. 96. 
42 
Ibid., p. 97. 
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For Moule, it was because Jesus was in the form of God he 
"recognized equality with God as a matter not of getting but of giving". 
In this context, "kenosis actually is plenosis"; which means the human 
limitations of'Jesus are seen as a positive expression of his divinity 
rather than as a curtailment of it. 
Kenosis is understood by Moule not just an a negative emptying out 
but also as a positive fulfilling. He thinks this may teach us something 
terribly profound about the divine attribute of omnipotence. 
Moule notes 
It is easily forgotten that the omnipotence of a personal 
God is exhibited (to quote the collect) 'most chiefly in 
showing mercy and pityi. 43 
Following Forsyth and Moule, Geddes MacGregor in his book, He Who 
Lets Us Be, argues for a now vision of God as essentially self-emptying 
and thus self-fulfilling. MacGregor sees the idea of kenotic power as 
the most profound and useful insight in the history of Christian thought. 
He emphasizes the omnipotence of God is not properly -Lo be conceived as 
the ability of an unrestrained or unfettered deity to do anything and 
everything. For MacGregor, such a definition of the theistic attributes 
makes God "seem like an oriental despot twenty feet tall" . 
44 Rather, he 
says, divine omnipotence should be understood as it is revealed in 
Christ, as the creative power of self -sacrificing and self -emptying love. 
43 
- Ibid., p. 98. 
44 
Geddes MacGregor, He Who Lets Us Be (New York: Seabury Press, 1975) 
p. 72. MacGregor also provides a valuable critical historical survey 
of the concept 11omnipotence" in this text. 
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MacGregor criticizes philosophers of religion such as Mackie and 
Flew whose positions indicate an 
uncritical acceptance of the traditional way of formulating 
the character of divine omnipotence as though it were the 
infinite exercize of a super-sultanic power, and of a 
radical failure to take seriously enough the theological 
proposition that God is love. 45 
In his Philosophical Issues in Religious Thought, MacGregor makes 
the same point: 
The modern philosophers who try their hand at restating 
the old objections with which the problem of evil confronts 
theism, use as their model what theologians aver about 
the nature of God and his relation to nature. They do it 
so properly, of cottrse, since the problems with which they 
purport to deal arilse only in a theological context. They 
do not usually take into account, however, the whole 
theological context. It would be pointless apart from 
the context, preferring to confine themselves rather to 
certain doctrinal propositions that may be accounted the 
most easily manageable for logical treatment. In the case 
of the forms of the argument put forth by Flew and Mackie, 
'the neglect of the rest of the theological picture to which 
the propositions belong is so conspicuous as to make 
theologians wonder how they could rest content with a 
model that is distorted and diminished, *a caricature that 
ludicrously traduces the theological situation in which 
the problem arises. 46 
Wittgenstein had had much to say on this matter of framing pictures 
that might be of relevance here. He suggests the disagreement between 
a philosopher (such as Mackie or Flew) and a theologian (such as Forsyth 
or MacGregor) on religious issues is not a matter of discovering 
empirical facts. The disagreement is much more fundamental. What it 
comes down to is the use. of different kinds of pictures - or in some 
45 
Ibid. 
46 
MacGregor, Philosophical Issues in Religious Thought, pp. 167-168. 
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cases, where the believer uses a certain picture and the unbeliever 
does not. 
47 MacGregor is suggesting Flew and Mackie are willing to 
accept only a small part of the Christian picture. 
John Wisdom is another philosopher who holds the position that 
disagreements concerning religious matters usually do not involve 
empirical facts, but rather the picturing of the facts. Wisdom quotes 
a passage from J. P. Marquand's novel, H. M. Pulham, Esquire, to illustrate 
how it is possible to have all the items of a pattern and to still miss 
the pattern. A man confides to a friend that "Kay and I are pretty 
happy, Welve always been happy". But when the skeptical friend challenges 
this remark, the first man offers an explanation that although he and 
Kay have had their skirmishes during the marriage, the sum total of the 
facts of their lives "adds up" to happiness. 
Wisdom is quick to point out it is not at all a question of 
addition, as if one could sit down and tally up a balance sheet. Rather, 
he suggests, it is a matter of interpreting the marriage or seeing the 
marriage in a certain way. 
Wisdom offers a second example which will make this point about 
picturing the world a bit clearer. Two friends are engaged in a 
discussion about a particular character in a story they both have read. 
One says, "Really, she hated him", but the second protestst "She didn't, 
she loved him". Both friends have read the entire book. They begin to 
47 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures on Aesthetics, Psychol)py and Religiou 
Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966-Y, particularly his discussion 
of the last judgement. 
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trade information back and forth in case the other has missed a 
critical point in the story. But alas, they have both read it very 
carefully. ' At this point, Wisdom asks a question about what their 
dispute really involves. The disagreement cannot be about the facts 
of the story, since they are in full accord as to the actual episodes 
depicted in the book. The dispute, Wisdom argues, is about their 
different interpretations or "picture preferences" regarding the facts. 
48 
A third example is offered by Wisdom which has become the source 
of much theological discussion over the last forty years. Two people 
return to their "long neglected garden". Seeing a number of flowers 
still growing, one concludes that a gardener has tended the plot in 
their absence. Concentrating on numerous weeds also growing in the 
garden, the other concludes the gardener does not exist. After a 
lengtýy investigation, they fail to detect the presence of the 
gardener. Still, the first person holds fast to his view that the 
gardener exists, only now his conclusion is that the gardener is 
invinsible. 
At this point in the story Wisdom makes a very perceptive remark. 
He suggests, as I think Wittgenstein would have been inclined to do, 
49 
0 
that the two are no longer in-disagreement about the facts. Each 
agrees as to which organic items in the garden can properly be referred 
to as flowers and which should be called weeds. There is no disagreement 
48 
John Wisdom, "Gods" Proceedings of the Aristotele3. n S )ci volume XLV 
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(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953) pp. 149-159. 
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about the facts of the case. Their difference of opinion concerning 
the presence of the invisible gardener is due, not to a dispute over 
the facts, but rather to their different picture preferences. Let us 
label the picture preference of the first person the "garden story". 
This will be quite instructive when looking at what Anthony Flew has to 
say in the retelling of Wisdom's tale. 
In Flewts version of the story the two people are turned into 
"explorers who come upon a jungle clearing" .50 Nevertheless, Flew 
still has the first explorer view the clearing, discover the flowers, 
and proclaim that "some gardener must tend this plot". And, once again, 
after a series of experiments fail to confirm the assertions of the 
firsto he moves to speak of an invisible gardener. At this point, Flew 
asks an important question: "What remains of the original assertion? , 
51 
But perhaps an even more fundamental question can be raised. 
Flew's version is perhaps better referred to as the "jungle story". 
After looking at both versions of the tale, one might ask: how is it 
that two philosophers start out to tell a story about the same mix of 
flowers and weeds and one sees the picture of a garden, while the 
other prefers to see it as a jungle clearing? The answer to this 
question can be quite illuminating concerning the ways in which 
different people may view the problem of evil. Some, like Anthony Fýew, 
begin by picturing the world as a series of natural events fraught with 
blind pain, disease, misfortune, etc. Forsyth and MacGregor, howeverp 
50 
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51 
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begin by picturing the world containing these evils as coming into 
existence by the creative power of God. All three men would agree, I 
think, as to what events and situations in the world count as prima 
facie evils. Their disagreement arises when they begin to discuss 
the-ultimate meaning of that prima facie evil. Flew, of course, would 
suggest that the prima facie evil in reality is actual evil, while 
Forsyth and MacGregor would insist that it is merely apparent. Clearly, 
their dispute is not about the "facts" of the world, it hao to do with 
the interpretation of the world as a whole, a picturing of the world 
which goes beyond or lieý behind the facts. 
It is important to understand in these examples of Wisdom's he 
is not advocating religious belief. What he is suggesting is that given 
ambiguous "facts" different picture preferences are possible. 
Wittgenstein's use of the duck-rabbit example. is designed for the same 
purpose. Because the facts may be read in more than one way, we may 
52 
come to the picture illustrated below with the notion of "seeing" a 
duck. Indeed, if we come with that notion, then a duck will appear 
before our eyes. Conversely, we will find a rabbit if we are ready 
to see a rabbit. With a genuinely ambiguous picture like the duck- 
rabbit, we simply "see it as" one or the other. In order to change to 
the other perspective, Donald Hudson argues, 
53 
a certain kind of 
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conversion must take place, though the "facts" of the picture do not 
change. What can be said about the duck-rabbit can also be said about 
the garden-jungle clearing, and, it seems to me, by extension to 
picturing the world as a whole. We may either come to picture the 
world as created by an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God, 
or, in the case of Flew and Mackie, as a closed physical system which 
had no beginning and perhaps no end. 
Although Wisdom is not advocating religious belief, what he does 
recommend, is that 
We must not forthwith assume that there is no right and 
wrong about it (picture references), no rationality or 
irrationality, no appropriateness or inapropriateness, 
no procedure which tends to settle it, nor even-that this 
procedure is in no sense a discovery of new facts. 54 
Indeed, the kind of "connecting technique" suggested by Wisdom has 
been used in discussions of works of art for some time. There are, for 
example, many different interpretations of Shakespeare's "Hamlet". Some 
argue that the young Hamlet is hopelessly mad throughout most of the 
play, others that he has crafted his craziness in order to catch his 
fatherts murderers. No new lines may be added to the play to decide 
the dispute. It can only be arbitrated by making reference to what is 
already there. The beat interpretations of the play, Wisdom would most 
surely suggest, are those that do the best job of connecting the knoKn 
facts. It would be absurd and unreasonable, for example, to argue that 
Hamlet should be played as a comedy or a farce. For much the same 
54 
John Wisdom, "Gods", p. 197. 
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reasons, it would be ludicrous to propose that the duck-rabbit picture 
was in fact a profile depiction of Ronald Reagan's head. Preferred 
connections, in Wisdom's view, are thoSe that best accommodate the 
available evidence. 
55 
One way to appreciate this point about the logical consistency of 
picture preferences or "preferred connections" is to say it is simply 
another way of referring to our first criterion of a viable Christian 
theodicy. Does a particular "picture" present a logically consistent 
view? Do all of its parts fit in an organic whole? How does it 
answer challenges to intornal consistency? 
56 
If we return to our discussion of the concept of God's omnipotence 
within the context of the Christian picturing of thingst the importance 
of this digression should be clear. Anthony Flew in his "Theology and 
Falsification", insists on his particular picturing of the concept of 
omnipotence, indeed, of his picturing of the World as a whole. In the 
process, he ignores the possibility suggested by Wisdom in the beginning 
of this chapter that certain concepts used in the religions of paradox 
may be only apparently contradictory. We might also criticize Flew on 
the front suggested by MacGregor. He seems to be unable to see the 
larger Christian form of life in which the classical attributes of God 
55 
This is one of the major points that sets Wisdom's view off as different 
from R. M. Hare's "bliks". Cf. The latter's contribution to "Theology 
and Falsification" in Flew and MacIntyre's New Essas in Philosophical 
Theology. 
56 
These criteria do not push one in the direction of coherence theories 
of truth I shall try to show in the final section of this chapter. 
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find their home. Flew fixes on those elements of the theological problem 
of evil which are most amenable to logical analysis, but at the same 
time neglects some of the logical possibilities - possibilities which are 
fundamental to any Christian answer to the problem of evil. 
.. 
So far in this final chapter we have attempted to accomplish a 
number of tasks. First, we have tried to show none of the theodicies we 
h ave analyzed thus far has been able to pass at the bar of our three 
criteria for a viable Christian response to the problem of evil. Along 
the way, we also proposed that Mackie has overstated his case when he 
argues in effect all answers to the problem of evil which adhere to the 
traditional Christian conception of God are prohibited by reason. 
After making these remarks about Mackie, we then went on to show John 
Hick's teleological theodicy might become a viable Christian response 
to the problem of evil if we were to adjust his conception of omniscience, 
as well as making a central place for the person of Christ in his 
teleological answer. 
N ext, we attempted to show that Hickts reticence in discussing 
the role Christ might play in Christian theodicy is probably couched in 
his belief that any non-mythological account of the incarnation is 
logically contradictory. By entertaining various non-metaphorical 
formulations of what it means to say that Jesus is ofully human and 
fully divine", and finally settling on one which we have shown is 
allowed by reason, we-have attempted to demonstrate that Hick is 
incorrect about the possibility of a coherent doctrine of the incarnation. 
As we have seen, the view shown to be one that is allowed by 
reason is associated with a family of approaches to the doctrine of the 
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incarnation which are often called "kenotic". After entertaining 
various criticisms of kenosis offered by Hick, Wiles and Cupitt, we 
further explicated the notion of kenosis with insights provided by 
Barth, Forsyth, Moule and MacGregor. 
A comment of MacGregorts led us to a discussion of the notion of 
11picturing" facts. With the help of Wittgenstein and Wisdom we have 
suggested the difference between philosophers such as Flew and Mackie 
and theologians like Forsyth or MacGregor is not in terms of "facts"j, 
but, in WisdomIs words, different "connecting techniques". Cý 
In the section which is to follow we must continue our task of 
constructing a viable Christian theodicy. This will be done by f irst 
making some romarks regarding our third criterion, the requirement that, 
any viable Christian theodicy must take the individual sufferer 
seriously. We will be concerned with showing how the story of Christ 
might serve to confirm the importance of understanding the practical 
reality of suffering. Additionally, we will also more fully explicate 
the particulars of the teleological Christian theodicy we are proposing. 
Finally, in the last section of this thesis we will attempt to 
grapple with a host of questions relatod to why we should believe this 
theodicy in particular or the message of the Christian faith in general. 
What justification can be given fo r holding religious assertions? The 
answer to this question is clearly related to a number of vexing issues 
about foundational principles, the logical status of religious 
propositions, and the rationality of religious beliefs. 
IV. 
We have made some very general remarks about a Christo-centric 
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answer to the problem of evil which is both logically consistent and 
true, in a broad way, to the Christian form of life. For the next 
several pages, we must now make some remarks concerning just how the 
story of Christ might confirm what has already been said in previous 
chapters about the importance of understanding the practical reality 
of suffering. Once again, in order to do this, we must return to the 
person of Jesus Christ in whom God himself became a victim of suffering. 0 
It would be difficult to think of anyone who has reflected more 
profoundly on the problem of evil in the context of the New Testament 
than D. M. MacKinnon. In his Borderlands of Theology, he openly 
criticizes the "convention of Christian practice" which allows the 
Gospel narratives about Jesus to be read 
as if they were oriented toward a happy ending, as if 
the resurrection faith which gave them birth was 
powerful to obliterate memory of the sombre events 
which they desoribe. 57 
MacKinnon acknowledges that the Gospels are expressions of the 
Easter faith, but he also lingers on the practical reality of suffering 
which is so evident in the Gospel accounts of the life and death of 
Jesus. On the Gethsemane narratives, for example, MacKinnon says the 
f ollowing: 
If I am honest, I think that I must say that I should 
cease to believe altogether unless I believed that Jesus 
had indeed prayed that the hour might pass from him, had 
indeed been left alone to face the reality of absolute 
failure. It is fashionable nowadays to speak of Christ 
as victor, as if the agony and the disillusion, the sheer 
monstrous reality of physical and spiritual'suffering 
57 
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which he bore were a kind of charade. The idiom of a 
superficial dosmic optimism, often expressing itself 
ritually in patterns of liturgical symbolism, is 
currently fashionable, as if a world that knows, as 
ours does, extremities of terror as well as hope, 
could be consoled by a remote metaphysical chatter. 
But the Gospels, including that of John which does 
not chronicle the episode of Gethsemane, recall our 
imaginations to a figure prostrate on the earth, 
afraid and desolate, bidding men and women see in him 
the ground of all creation. 58 
Even in the fourth gospel, MacKinnon reports, Jesus is properly 
seen as a victim of suffering. Before the author of John "reminds his 
readers that the Word through whom all things take their origin became 
flesh he insists that the word so came among his own he was rejected". 
MacKinnon: 
Yet behind the language of the prologue something 
more can be discerned, something whose appeal is 
universal, even if the appeal is grounded in the 
author's appraisal of the One concerning whom he 
writes. In these verses the reader finds himself 
raised to a level that is beyond optimism and 
pesimism, as one usually understands those two 
contrasted attitudes. The author is sure that the 
ground of the world is itself good; he is sure of 
this because he identifies the ground with what men 
have heard and seen in Jesus; yet, Jesus was rejected, 
and his glory was most fully revealed when he was 
lifted up from the earth upon a Roman gallows959 
MacKinnon sees in the incarnation that God in christ takes on a 
"contingency so sheer and unequivocal that inevitably at all levels 
we shrink from it, preferring necessary absolutes whether abstract 
values, or institutions, or even spiritual experiences". 
60 
But the 
realization that there is no escape from contingency with Christ is 
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especially evident in the "supremely revealing and supremely. authoritative 
moment in human history" when the son of God, the ultimate victim of 
suffering, cries upon the cross: "My God, my God, why have you forsaken 
me? " In this cry of dereliction 
It was made plain that the Son of God's acceptance 
of the ultimate triviality and failure of human 
existence, whose depths at the moment he finally 
plumbed, the whole language of perplexity, uncertainty, 
bewilderment, hopelessness and pain, even of God- 
forsakeness, was laid hold of and given a sense by 
the very God himself and converted into, the way of 
his reconciling the world unto himself. 61 
We will talk more about this reconciliation in a moment; What is 
important now, however, is to attend to a subtle point made by Professor 
MacKinnon. If Jesus was the son of God, and if sub specie aeterni and 
,, sub specie crucis are in some sense the same perspective, then the 
rejection wrid crucifixion of Jesus can only be "evil itself". 
MacKinnon agrees with Barth in seeing the figure of Judas Iscariot 
"as where the problem of evil is raised with archetypal and definitive 
seriousness", for there is Godts actual engagement with the issue. 
For MacKinnon, the problem of evil, in its ultimate sense, must not 
be seen "apart from, but in terms of, the betrayal and rejection of 
Christ". 
62 
What is one to say about this "evil itself" of which God in Christ 
becomes the victim? Certainly this evil was no mere illusion, deprivation 
of good, nor deserved punishment for sin, The agony and passion of Christ 
was not deleted by a later interpretation, right or wrong# that his 
61 
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suffering and death was an occasion, indeed the occasion for good. In 
the Gospel accounts, as MacKinnon so skillfully points out, the evil 
and the good of Christts fate are simply juxtaposed: 
There is no solution offered ... of the riddle of Iscariot 
through whose agency the son of man goes his appointed 
way. It were good for him that he had not been born. 
The problem is stated; it is left unresolved, and we are 
presented with the likeness of the one who bore its 
ultimate burden, and bore it to the end, refusing the 
trick of bloodless victory to which the scoffers, who 
invited him to descend from the corss, were surely 
inviting him. 63 
Finally, we see in the account of Christts death that even the 
Father ts sympathy with the son as he cried out those last words from 
the cross could not alter the dreadful reality of Christ's suffering. 
In an analogous kind of way, perhaps the same can be said about our 
suffering as well. What can also be said, without contradiction, about 
our suffering, is that through the person of Christ we have more than 
a-sympathetic response to our plight, we have in him a real, hum-an 
empathetic attitude to our suffering. In the crucifixion of Christ the 
plight of the individual sufferer is understood most poignantly. 
But it must also be emphasized that in Christ's suffering we see 
not only the practical reality of evil in all its graphic horror, we may 
also perceive a widening of its reference. Earlier in this thesis we 
saw that Hick defines evil as that "which we dislikey shun and avoid". 
But if the story of God suffering in Christ is accepted as true, a now 
dimension or context to the practical reality of evýl must be understood: 
63 
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ultimate evil must be that which opposes God and his will. That which 
is an affront to God is that which is finally evil. If we comprehend 
this point on an existential level one is led directly to the concept 
of sin, a distinctively theological concept which defines people as out 
of relationship with God. Sin cuts people off from the revolutionizing 
-existential relationship between God and human kind accomplished in 
Jesus Christ. 
Earlier, in our remarks about Job in chapter four, we discussed 
the existential relationship which is produced by. an awareness of the 
ontological gulf between God and humankind that radically alters the 
context of doing theodicy. Here we shall examine how, given the notion 
that God and people are reconciled in Christ, the task of justifying 
God cannot be seen apart from the work of Christ. We shall use some 
insights gained from P. T. Forsythts The Justification of God to help us 
accomplish that task, 
64 
No theologian, past or present, has taken the perspective of the 
victim of suffering as seriously as Forsyth. He writes during the height 
of the great war as a person who has "witnessed the lid coming off hell". 
But while he affirms evil's "bloody and tortured zotreamll, he clings fast 
to an interpretation of the saving work of Christ and discovers that only 
at the cross can an adequate theodicy be constructed. In The Justification 
of God Forsyth develops a theodicy that he hopes will not only be helpful 
to the Church at large, but also to suffering soldiers in the trenches. 
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Forsyth sees the war as "making at least one contribution to 
65 
human salvation - it is sints apocalypselt The war came as such a 
shock because people had forgotten the heinous acts of which people are 
capable. John Hick in discussing Forsythts theodicy, suggests that he 
"brought teleological theodicy back to reality, both divine and human". 
66 
In Forsyth's view, the evolutionary perspective that tended to view 
mankind as continually developing and advancing in knowledge, gopdness 
and spirituality, had led to a gross underestimation of humankind's 
capacity to do evil. A kind of evolutionary optimism, Forsyth believed, 
has also led to an inadequate conception of God. Forsyth suggests that 
in the period immediately preceding the war the divine was seen as "a 
tender God, in no sense judge, ... an attractive God, more 
kindly than 
holy, more lovely than good". 
67 
He argues that the evil of that 
particular war had begun to correct these misconceptions and force a new 
context for theodicy: 
What is it that would justify God to you? You have 
grown up in an age that has not yet got over the delight 
of having discovered in evolution the key to creation. 
You saw the long explanding series broadening to the 
perfect day. You saw it foreshortened in the long 
perspective, peak rising on peak, each successfully 
catching the ascending sun. The dark valley, antres 
vast, and deserts horrible, you did not see. They 
were crumpled in the tract of time, and folded away 
from sight. The roaring rivers and thunders, the 
convulsions and voices, the awful conflicts latent in 
nature's ascent and man's - you could pass these over 
in the sweep of your glance ... But now you have been 
65 
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flung into one of those awful valleys. You taste what it 
has cost, thousands of times over, to pass from range to 
range of those illuminated heights. You are in bloody, 
monstrous and deadly dark ... Every aesthetic view is blotted out by human wickedness and suffering. The air 
is as red as the rains of hell. The rocks you stood on 
fall on you ... 
68 
- In the sixty years since Forsythts death, we have seen German 
death camps, Stalin's purges, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
tiagic wars in Korea and Vietnam, and other heinous acts of people done 
to people too numerous to mention. His suggestion about the need for a 
now context for understanding the problem of evil is today clearly just 
as appropriate: 
We are bidden to recognize that God's demand on man 
takes the lead of man's demand on God. And both are 
overruled by God's demand on God. God's meeting 
his own demands. And we learn unwillingly that only 
God's justification of man gives the secret of man's 
justification of God ... In a word, there is but one 69 theodicy, and it is evangelical. 
In contrast to the discredited evolutionary optimism# Forsyth sees 
Christianity finding its hopes not in the order of this world: 
The world's convulsions, therefore, need not destroy 
it. Rather, it rose from the sharpest cries, the greatest 
war, the deadliest death, and the deepest grave the world 
ever knew - in Christts cross. 70 
In this context a 
68 
Ibid., P. 159. 
69 
Ibid., p. vi. 
70 
Ibid., p. 57. 
257. 
religious and theological theodicy in our only refuge 
... The only'vindicator of God is God. And his own theodicy is the cross of his son Jesus Christ. 71 
Forsyth further elaborates the dynamics of his theodicy: 
The world does not ask the question as it is put by the 
Church. The Church, starting from the Holy One, asks 
how man shall be just with that God, and she owes her 
existence to the answer in Christts cross and Gospel. 
But the world, with its egoist start, asks how God 
shall be just with man. The one brings man to God's 
bar, the other brings God to mants. Christ deals with 
both. The first question he answers with Godts free 
justification of man, the second question he makes 
us recast. Ile does not bring God to mants bar but to 
Godts own, since there is none greater. He bring's 
God's providence to the bar of God's own promise. His 
own Gospel. He attunes it to Godts own conscience, 
His own nature; he embodies the self-justification of 
God. 72 
Forsyth insists that the only possible kind of theodicy in the 
Christian tradition is "an adequate atonement". 
73 For him the justification 
of God is not a philosophical, nor even a systematic, answer. It is a 
religious one, and, above allf a practical one. God thought it best not 
to put thought about the problem of evil on a new line, but rather to 
place "the thinker in a new life". 
74 
The final thoodicy is in no discovered system, no 
revealed plan, but in effective redemption. It is 
not in the grasp of ideas, nor in the adjustment of 
events, but in the destruction of guilt and taking 
away the sin of the world ... It is not really an 
71 
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answer to a riddle but a victory in a battle ... We do not see the answer; we trust the Answerer, and 
measure by Him. We do not gain the victory; we are 
united with the victor. 75 
Forsyth argues very forcefully that the Christian experience 
places the believer in a new perspective, a new picture of the world, if 
you Vill, wherein onets own suffering comes to be seen as less than 
ultimate given God's own suffering in Christ. The context of theodicy 
is radically shifted as the center is altered from the justification of 
God to the existential relation between God and humankind, radically 
altered through Christ's victory over sin and evil. 
It is of interest that Forsyth goes on to develop a teleological 
theodicy, which, we have attempted to show earlier in this chapter, is 
one of the few members of the class of responses to the problem of evil 
that are allowed by reason. Forsyth suggests that 'fall things will 
work together for the. good". But his teleological response is not 
based on a shallow optimism about world history. -It. must be grounded in 
the saving work of Jesus Christ. Apart from Christ, evil cannot be seen 
as an occasion for good. Forsythts position differs from Hick's in a 
radical way. Hick believes that any discussion of the incarnation of 
Christ must be undertaken with the realization in mind that all such 
references are metaphorical, while Forsyth literally makes the dual natures 
of Jesus the centerpiece for the construction of his response to the 
problem of evil. The importance of Christ as the foqal point in Christian 
75 
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theodicy is also clearly expressed by D. M. MacKinnon. Indeed, MacKinnon 
suggests that the notion of a teleological answer to the problem of evil, 
at least within the Christian form of life, cannot be understood any 
other way: 
Such concepts as reconciliation, and the overcoming 
of evil by good, are to be interpreted in terms of 
the opus opeýatum of the ministry of Jesus, and not 
vice-versa. 10 
Oliver Quick is another writer who insists that teleological theodicy 
is impotent outside the context of the cross. He says: 
All attempts to deal with the problem of evil, which 
are not grounded upon the power of the self-sacrifice 
of love, inevitably leave the evil unredeemed in the 
end. The Gospel of the cross enables us to see very 
dimly, as in a mirror, how all this mixed good and 
evil of our space and time may by its passing away 
be instrumental to fulfilling the goodness of an 
eternal world which is already in some partial sense 
expressed and embodied within it. 77 
Forsyth sees the divine destiny of the world as "not simply 
revealed in Christ, but secured in him". In the final analysis, he 
argues for a salvation where all souls might "come to the fulness and 
quality of the universal and eternal Christ". 
78 For Forsyth, the 
redemptive possibilities go beyond death until all are brought in - "the 
79 
worst and most intractable lost - since freedom may not be forcedt'. 
As Forsyth comments, "there is eternity to do it in". 
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Still, it is quite possible that the victim of suffering might 
wish to raise some objections concerning Forsythts point of view. The 
sufferer might ask why God did not create people without free will, or, 
perhaps as Mackie has suggested, as agents who always freely choose the 
good?. If God possesses the attributes of omnipotence, omnipotence and 
omnibenevolence, why should there be evil at all? Forsyth begins to 
respond by pointing out 
It is easy to set 
comply. It is so 
and pitch our demý 
do. It is not so 
penetrate it, and 
of doing it. 81 
up an expectation and call on God to 
easy to frame some high priori way, 
and accordingly, as to what God would 
easy to ask what God has done, 
accept His own account of His way 
Again Forsyth observes: 
We create difficulties for ourselves, I say, by our 
wrong start, by expectations formed at other sources 82 
than God's own account of His profound and supreme way. 
The victim of sUffering might still be tempted, like Dostoyseýski? s 
Ivan Karamazov, to "stumble at the cost" of the future order. But 
Forsyth was not unaware of this kind of criticism. Indeed, he raises the 
sufferer's complaint in a series of interrogatories: 
Why such a dreadful and ineffable suffering along the 
wholo course, suffering both of those taken and those 
left? Why does it cost so much at every stage ...? 
83 
To answer these questions, Forsyth once again brings us back to the 
cross of Christ. He contrasts the suffering of man with the deeper pain 
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provoked by God's conquest of evil in Christ. Forsyth seems to be 
replying on behalf Of the divine, but he insists that ultimately it is 
also the perspective of the sufferer which merits his attention: 
Do you stumble at the cost? It has cost me more than 
you - Me who sees and feels it all more than you who 
feel it but as atoms might. "Groanings and moanings, 
none of it I lose". Yea, it has cost me more than if 
the price paid were all mankind. For it cost me my 
only and beloved son to justify my name of 
righteousness, and to realize the destiny of my 
creatures in holy love. And all mankind is not so 
great and dear to me as he. Nor is its suffering 
the enormity in a moral world that his cross is. I am 
no spectator in the course of things, and no spectator 
on the result. I spared my own son. We carried the 
load that crushes you. It bowed him to the ground. On 
the third day he rose with a new creation in his hand, 
and a regenerate world, and all things working 
together for good to love and holy purpose in love. 
And what he did I did. 84 
But the skeptic might still ask about the specifics by which all 
of this will be accomplished. Forsyth has doubts that we can know what 
the exact contours of Godts plan for salvation might be: 
This you know not now ... Be still and know that I 
am God whose mercy is as his majesty, and his 
omnipotence is chiefly in forgiving and redeeming, 
and settling all souls in worship of the temple of 
a new heaven and earth full of holiness. In that 
day the anguish will be forgotten for joy that a new CD humanity in born into the world. 85 
It is important to notice that Forsyth insists that the suffering 
of this world will be "forgotten for joy", not repaired. I'lleaven does 
not laugh loud but it laughs last - when all the world will laugh in its 
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1186 light . Forsyth is also careful not to couch his point of view in 
the language of verification, eschatological or otherwise. He is content 
to make a suggestion: because of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ: 
The evil world will not win at last, it failed to 
win at the only time it ever could. It is a vanquished 
world where men play their devilries. Christ has 
overcome it. It can make tribulation, but desolation 
it can never make. 87 
All of the criticisms of Forsyth's kenotic theodicy we have 
mentioned in the last few pages has been voiced from the standpoint of the 
religious skeptic. But there had also arisen among his theological 
contemporaries a number of objections to his point of view which also 
deserve some discussion. 
Some of the clearest and what many suggest are the most significant 
criticisms of Forsyth come from William Temple in his Christus Veritas. 
88 
In that work, Temple, who for many years was the Bishop of Manchester, 
seems to stress at least two major objections to Forsythts kenotic 
position. The first of these can be seen in the following quotation: 
The difficulties are intolerable. What was happening 
to the rest of the universe during the period of our 
Lord's earthly life? To say that the infant Jesus 
was from his cradle exercizing providential government 
over it all is certainly monstrous; but to deny this, 
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and to say that the Creative Word was so self-emptied 
as to have no-being except in the Infant Jesus, is to 
assert that for a certain period the world was let 
loose from the control of the creative Word, and 
'apart from Him? very nearly everything happened that 
happened at all during those thirty odd years, both 
on this planet, and throughout the immensities of 
space. 89 
The second of his criticisms follows the passage cited above. 
Temple suggests that the idea of kenosis makes the period of Jesus' 
earthly life look like an episode in the life of the Word. But since 
the Word is 
-eternal there can be no episodes in his life. 
90 Because 
of these two major shortcomings, Temple suggests an alternative view 
of the incarnation: 
All these difficulties are avoided if we suppose that 
God the Son did most truly live the life recorded in 
the Gospel, but added to this the other work of God. 91 
There are indications that this is the Johannine viewe 
Earlier in chapter two we have suggested that God, in fact, is in 
time, but a time which stretches eternally in both directions. Thus, it 
makes perfectly good sense to speak of "episodes in the life of the word". 
Additionally, in the first of these criticisms Temple seems to ignore the 
possibility that the "providential government" of the universe during 
the time Jesus was on earth was being carried on quite adequately by the 
Father and the Spirit. In order to hold this view, of course, we would 
have to be able to show-that the c oncept of the trinity is such that 
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three distinct persons in one God is not a logically contradictory 
notion. Although I will not argue that position here, I will mention 
that W. L. Power in his article, "Symbolic Logic and the Doctrine of 
the Trinity", has, I think, demonstrated satisfactorily that the prima 
facie paradox of the trinity may be only apparent. 
92 
Templets second objection also would only seem to hold for a 
p. osition that sees God as "timeless" or "outside of time". Since I have 
argued earlier that the proper interpretation of God's eternity is 
"infinite duration in time" this criticism does not hold for my view. 
Forsyth's view of God's relation to time is not clearly spelled out, 
and consequently Temple may be entirely correct in his second criticism 
of Forsyth. But we need not hold ForsythIs view of God's relation to 
time and thus can escape Temple's second objection. 
It must also be added at this point that the alternative view of 
the incarnation suggested by Temple may preseýt us with its own set of 
difficulties. Quick has pointed out, for example, that the "addition" 
of human experiences to the life of the divine Word itself may imply 
the addition of its own peculiar set of limitations. 
93 Indeed, it might 
also be argued that Temple's view does succomb to one of CuPitt's 
criticisms - that it involves a doctrine of two consciousnesses. 
Ironically, this problem could be solved if the kenotic principle were 
92 
W. L. Power, "Symbolic Logic and the Doctrine of the Trinity", The Iliff 
Review vol. XXXII no. 1 (Winter, 1975). 
93 
Oliver Quick, Doctrines of the Greed, pp. 136-139. 
265. 
applied. 
One final kind of negative comment about the kenotic theodicy 
of Forsyth'might be voiced from those of the Mackie and Flew persuasion 
or indeed even from the believing theist. These critics might concede, 
after some argument, that the position we have been describing here is 
a logically possible state of affairs. But they might still ask why 
we should believe it. The answer to this important question is bound 
up, I think, with a host of other questions about the logical status 
of foundation principles, the rationality of religious beliefs, and 
more particularly about ýhe justification of religious assertions like 
those expressed by Forsyth about the problem of evil. In the remaining 
portion of this chapter we will attempt to answer these questions through 
the use of some insights once again provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein in 
his On Certainty, as well as some observations suggested by John Wisdom. 
V. 
0 
Since the time of Augustine, and probably much earlier, there has 
existed a certain ubiquitous view about the logical status of religi- 
propositions. It has been popular among believers and nonbelievers alike 
to view religious assertions as empirical hypotheses. Since the time 
of Hume and Kan-', -,, and their arguments against the philosophical proofs, 
it has been thought by most philosophers that it is wise to confine 
religious assertions to matters of belief, since we are not now in a 
position to know if they'are true. In this widely held view, religious 
assertions like those made by Forsyth regarding the proble. m of evil look 
like "hypotheses" - uncertain statements whose truth or falsity might be 
known in principle, if not in practice, by the gathering together of 
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some set of relevant facts. As this view goes, until the facts are in 
we cannot ascertain the truth of any given religious proposition, and so 
it must remain a hypothesis. 
In this view, the only real difference between religious propositions 
and other kinds of beliefs is that it seems so difficult to gather 
together the right set of facts so that our religious hypotehses might be"' 
upgraded to the level of truth. Treating religious propositions as 
hypotheses gives us the image of someone who waits by his mailbox for 
a report from the committee studying the Shroud of Turin, so that his 
religious hypotheses might finally be confirmed. Certainly, John Hick 
has committed himself to the "hypotheses view", albeit a sophisticated 
version, by suggesting his criterion of eschatological verification. 
There are, nevertheless, two major problems with the notion of 
religious propositions as hypotheses. First, many faithful practitioners 
of Christianity show little tentativeness in their adherence to religious 
teachings, despite how difficult it might be to justify these assertions 
on empiýical grounds. And second, the role religious assertions play in 
the thought and lives of believers, as well as the believers facility 
for connecting the facts, 'may be more germane to questions about their 
credibility than any other kind of criteria that could be applied. 
What I shall argue here, with the help of some insights from 
Wittgenstein, is that the major propositions on which Forsyth's theodicy. 
are built need not be construed as hypotheses at all. Indeed, it is 
probably much closer to their use to refer to them as"Itruths' to live 
by" or "foundational principles". These kinds of 'truths' tend to prove 
themselves in their use, not by being tested by some empirical method. 
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If this could be established then it would seem that the regulative 
function of religious assertions might be their most distinctive logical 
feature, though I will not suggest that religious assertions have no 
objective referents. However, it may well be that the power of a certain 
body'of beliefs to change a person's life may have more to do with the 
resolution of doubt than the proportioning of belief to the available 
evidence. 
The real trouble arises for a view like Forsyth's when we realise 
that in order to conform to a particular body of religious assertions 
we must first have a prior belief that the body of religious assertions 
is true. In a real way, the practical use these beliefs acquire as 
11ttruths' to live by "doesntt solve the problem of their truth status, 
it only confounds it. This sometimes makes the tendency to view religious 
assertions as hypotheses very captivating. Most people, including a 
good many philosophers and theologians, are attracted to the notion that 
religious assertions must first "prove" themselves as truth claims 
before they may properly be labelled as "truths to live by'T. They must 
have a logical status like every other truth claim, or so these people 
argue. And it is precisely at this point that we shall introduce 
Wittgenstein. 
In his book, On Certainty94, Wittgenstein suggests that some beliefs 
lie so deeply engrained in our thinking that it would make little sense 
to doubt them. They neither need nor allow the kind of justification we 
94 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977) 
a is indexed by Manorie Clay in Philosophicil Investigat On CertaLnt 
vol. 2 (1979) pp. 66-84. 
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ordinarily require of hypotheses which are offered as truth claims. 
Wittgenstein suggests that reasonable people, nevertheless, take these 
kinds of beliefs, which he calls 'leertainties"v for granted. They have 
this status, not because they have been empirically verified, but because 
with. these assertions believing and behaving come together. The 
reasonableness of certainties is not a function of evidence, rather it 
is because thinking and acting in the world entail conforming to these 
certainties. 
95 
Before discussing what relevance Wittgenstein's On Ccrtainýx may 
have for religious assertions like those of Forsyth's, we must make a 
distinction between different kinds of certainties -a distinction which 
Wittgenstein himself does not seem to make. We might label the first 
kind of certainty "paradigmatic" and the second "foundational"- Examples 
of paradigmatic certainties are II have two hands', or 'My name is 
Stephen Vicchiol. These propositions have the status of certainties by 
virtue of the role they play in a particular language game or set of 
language games to which we seem to adhere. This role can be understood as 
having two separate but related elements. First, Wittgenstein believed, 
if a paradigmatic certainty were to turn out to be false, it would have 
such repercussions throughout the language game or set of language games, 
that the survival of-that language game or set of language games would be 
95 
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put in question. 
96 And second, if the context in which that paradigmatic 
certainty is placed were to change, it could, with very little trouble to 
the language game as a whole, cease to be a certainty. 
Thus, if in ordinary circumstances G. E. Moore stands before an 
audience of philosophers and declares, while looking at his wiggling 
fingers, that he has two hands, it would most assuredly count as what we 
have called a paradigmatic certainty. The falsity of the proposition 
IG. E. Moore has two hands', given the context mentioned above, would prove 
to be problematical for a whole network of propositions related to it 
such that the whole langiýage_game in which it was placed might be called 
into question. 
But consider what happons if we change the context to the morning 
following a terrible automobile accident in which G. E. Moore has been 
involv&d. Now, when visiting Professor Moore in his hospital room we 
might very well look down at his bandaged limbs and say, "I wonder if 
G. E. Moore has two hands". Clearly the change of context also changes 
the proposition IG. E. Moore has two hands' from a paradigmatic certainty 
to an empirical proposition whose truth is now in doubt. 
The other kind of certainty, what I have labelled llfoýndationalll 
certainties, can be characterized by propositions like "There are 
. physical 
objects", and "the earth has existed in the past". This type 
differs from the paradigmatic certainties in that the first tyPO arc 
96 
This distinction, in slightly different form, has been raised by 
Professor C. Wright of the St Andrews' University Department of Logic 
and Metaphysics, in his spring, 1984 seminar on On Certainty. It can 
also be found in T. Morawetz's Wittgenstein and Knowled, 00: The Inportance 
of 'On Certainty' (Amherst: University of Mass. Press, 1978) pp. 12-13. 
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indubitable statements within the language game, whereas the second type 
specify the formal conditions of the language game being played at all. 
Foundational certainties, then, are distinct from paradigmatic certainties 
because the latter are context dependent and therefore contingently true, 
whil: e. the former are held to be the case regardless of any context within 
thdt particular language game in which they may be placed. 
One could perhaps argue that the denial of one or more of the 
paradigmatic-certainties would not throw the-language game "entirely off 
the rails" as Wittgenstein puts it. Language games and forms of life may 
be more flexible than Wittgenstein's account in On Certainty seems to 
suppose. But the denial of any of the foundational certainties must bring 
the language game to a halt. Since foundational certainties express the 
formal presuppositions of the language game, if any of them are denied, 
the underpinning of the language game itself comes apart. 
In the case of paradigmatic certainties, a change in context or 
the development of new empirical evidence might count against their 
believability, and thus their status as certainties. This can never 
occur, however, in regard to foundational-certainties, for first, they 
can never be construed as empirical hypotheses, no matter what the change 
of context might be, and second, they are the foundations on which any 
judgement with 
. in the language game is based. 
97 
97 
This distinction between paradigmatic and foundational certainties can 
perhaps best be seen in a somewhat cryptic remark in section 99 of 
On Certainty: ý'And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, 
subject to no alteration, or only to an inperceptible one, partly of 
sand, which is now in one place now in another gets washed away or 
deposited". 
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With all this said, we must add Wittgenstein was probably not 
thinking about religious propositions when he made his remarks about 
certainties. The kinds of beliefs he had in mind were things about 
which all but the dyed in the wool skeptic would agree. Yet, his 
observations about certainties may contribute more to the understanding 
of the problem of criteria for truth in religion than any of his other 
works, including his lectures on aesthetics and religious belief. 
98 The 
general problem of the rationality of religious belief, as well as the 
larger problem about foundational principles, and the more specific 
answer to the question concerning why we should hold Forsythts religious 
assertions as "'truths' to live by" become clearer when we apply a 
certain interpretation to On Certainty. 
" 
We must begin the explication of this interpretation by admitting 
that religious assertions are not paradigmatic nor foundational certainties, 
at least not the kind to which Wittgenstein refers. But religious 
assertions may, nevertheless, share a great deal with certainties. One 
of the chief similarities between a number of religious assertions and 
Wittgonsteinian foundational certainties is that they both may reasonably 
by held without being justified on prior empirical grounds. This 
interpretation of On Certainty opens up the possibility that reasonable 
98 
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This interpretation of On Certainty has many affinities with that found 
in John Whittaker's Matters_of Faith and Matters of Principle, (San 
Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1981) though Whittaker's view seems 
much closer to the noncognitive position of our former teacher Paul 
Holmer than doe s my own. 
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faith may have little or nothing to do with the defense of empirical 0 
hypotheses, for most important religious assertions, like Wittgenstein's 
foundational certainties, are not hypotheses to be tested. 
A second way that specific religious assertions may be analogous 
to foundational certainties is that in both we find the connection between 
believing and behaving to be so inextricably bound together that one's 
understanding of the way the world works depends on the prior acceptance 
of these beliefs. In both religious foundation principles and foundational 
certainties learning a certain form of life which is based on these 
principles or certaintieq is always logically and temporally prior to any 
claims of doubt. 
Throughout much of On Certainty, 
discuss philosophical skepticism. 
100 
Wittgenstein's purpose is to 
In brief, he thought any thorouEh- 
going version of skepticism was really a type of philosophical confusion* 
Instead-of answering the skeptics'arguments, he treated their doubts as 
spurious and unfounded because they raised questions about foundational 
certainties, or fundamental beliefs without which human beings could not 
function. He never claims in On Certainty, however, to be able to give 
a logical or empirical refutation of skepticism, nor that he could furnish 
proofs for all his fundamental beliefs. 
101 
Wittgenstein believed that the purely philosophical doubts, like 
those raised in Descartest Meditations, for example, are idle doubts, 
doubts which cannot and should not be taken seriously. of course, on 
first blush religious doubts appear to be appreciably different because 
100 
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they do not appear to be idle. 
102 Neverthelesso there is a third way 
in which many religious propositions are akin to Wittgensteinian 
foundational certainties. The religious believer is confronted by the 
doubts of the atheist or agnostic in the same way the ordinary believer 
is certainties is confronted with the doubts of the philosophical 
skeptic. Indeed, from a purely rational and empirical standpoint, the 
ordinary believer finds himself at a loss to provide logically compelling 
arguments against the philosophical skeptic. Similarly, the religious 
believer in a position such as Forsyth's may be hard pressed, in a post- 
Kantian age, to respond in a convincing way to the assaults of the 
nonbeliever. In both situations, the believer must readily admit that 
the skeptical position is a logically possible one. 
It is clear that Wittgenstein held that evidential groimds are not 
perpetually needed to justify all reasonable beliefs. The possibility of 
doubt, it must be admitted, will never go away, as long as empirical 
grounds are needed to justify foundational certainties. 
Wittgenstein hints that the proper way to respond to the philosophical 
skeptic is to show that doubts are sometimes completely out of place. In 
order to do that the believer in ordinary certainties must show that the 
demand for empirical proof cannot apply to all claims of fact, and that 
the room for reasonable doubt diminishes the closer we get to those 
certainties which are the foundations of our judgements. 
103 
102 
But when the religious person has doubts he does not disagree about 
the facts of the world, rather he doubts the metaphysical principles 
on which the Christian view of the world is built. The disagreement 
is about picturing the world as a whole, not about the individual parts 
of the world. 
103 
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Wittgenstein set out to show in On Certainty that all assertions 
about truth are not. hypotheses, and that certainties belong to a 
different logical category than hypotheses. He accomplishes this task 
by making a distinction between certainty and knowledge. 
104 Unlike 
knowledge, paradigmatic and foundational certainties are questionable in 
principle, though it would seem exceedingly odd to do so in practice. 
We can question certainties, but this is only because we can formulate 
the truth of their opposities without forming a logical contradiction. 
The mere fact we can formulate the denial of certainties without 
contradiction, howevor, does not provide reasons for doubting them. 
We can say, with Bishop Berkeley, 'I wonder if the physical world 
exists', but this is only because we can formulate the negation of the 
certainty 'the physical world existst without a logical contradiction. 
But the more fact that we can formulate the denial of this foundational 
certainty does not provide us with reasons forý doubting it. 
Wittgenstein's conclusion in on Certainty is that different truth 
claims sometimes have different logical statuses. Since the truth of 
foundational certainties is required as a condition for the possibility 
of judging other truth claims, they occupy. a kind of axiomatic status. 
The analogy we have been implicitly building should now be made 
more explicit. In the Christian form of life specific religious 
propositions serve as the "foundational principles" on which that 
particular form of life is built. That Jesus is fully human and fully 
divine, that the atonement was necessary for our salvation, that Jesus 
was a vehicle for that atonement, are all religious assertions which within 
104 
Did, 308f. 
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the Christian form of life have a status of "foundational principles". 
Without these prior beliefs, the Christian faith would make no sense. 
But we must be careful to notice that none of the religious assertions 
mentioned are empirical propositions, for their truths do not rest on some 
set of empirical facts to be discovered in the world. The Christian 
form of life provides the context in which these certainties are to be 
viewed. 
The importance all this has for our discussion of the problem of 
evil should now be clear. We have suggested that our teleological theodicy 
is somehow bound up with the incarnation and atonement of Jesus Christ. 
These are certainly not empirical propositions. 'But they are foundational 
principles on which the Christian faith is based. 
Since we have shown earlier that Forsyth's kenotic theodicy is one 
that is allowed by reason, and since it is within the Christian form of 
life that these assertions about the problem of evil are to be understood, 
the notion that all will be well because of the saving act of Jesus 
Christ takes on the status of a kind of foundational principle, one on 
which many other assertions about the Christian form of life are based. 
Moreover, these foundational principles go into the making of a form of 
life whose picturing of the world is one that is allowed by reason. 
Of course, it is true that our position is not exempt from doubt, 
but the assertions on which it is based nevertheless take on the status 
of foundational principles when viewed as part of the Christian form of 
life. In that set of language games, compelling evidence should no more 
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be expected than it should for foundational certainties. 
105- Like 
foundational certainties, foundational religious beliefs play a governing 
role in the thinking of the adherents to that particular form of life. 
Thinking and acting become intermingled. The difficult task of justifying 
religious beliefs on empirical grounds often seems destined to failure 
which puts the believer in. the position of'looking as though he or she 
has been defeated, when, in fact, the "defeat" may be a function of the 
difference in logical statuses between empirical propositions and 
foundational religious principles. 
To some it may begin to look like we have been arguing for a kind 
of relativism by taking this line of Wittgenstein's. Roger Trigg in his 
work, Reason and Commitment, for example, takes Wittgenstein and several 
of his followers to task for holding what he thinks is a relativistic 
view of truth: 
One popular form of relativism apparently manages to 
avoid the slide into total objectivism by making reasoning 
as well as truth relative to groups or societies. 
Proponents of this view are usually very reluctant to 
be called relativists. Nevertheless, once it is stressed 
that the different cultures have different concepts, and 
that their members see the world differently, it is no 
very groat step to saying that there is no right way of 
seeing the world and that it is pure arrogance to assume 
one's own society's understanding of things is the correct 
one. It thus becomes impossible to judge other cultures 
at all, since to do so we would have to rely on our Own 
societyto understanding of things being the correct one. 
It thus becomes impossible to judge other cultures at all, 
105 
Norman Malcolm relates an incident in Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoi-r 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958) which may illustrate that 
Wittgenstein could have believed the analogy between certainties and 
foundational religious principles. "When I once quoted him a remark 
of Kierkegaard's to this effect: 'How can it be that Christ does not 
exist, since I know he has saved me? ' Wittgonstein. exclaimed: 'You 
see, it isn't a question of proving anything! "I 
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since to do so we have to rely on our own conception of 
what really is the case, and this is to beg the question 
of what is really right. What we are left with are 
separate ways of thinking about the world, or a 
particular part of it. There can be no neutral way of 
describing the world, against which every conceptual 
scheme can be measured. It is obvious that we can only 
describe the world by means of some conceptual scheme, 
and so it is not logically possible to step outside of 
every conceptual system ... The result is that we are left apparently imprisoned within our own system, 
unable to pass judgements on other systems without 
using our own. This is fine if iý enables us to think 
of reality as it is, while other systems give a false 
picture. Since however, the adherents to oach system 
are liable to tLnk that theirýs sets the standard of 
truth, an obvious compromise is to say that there is no 
such thing as truth when conceptual systems are being 
compared. Each system sets its own standards of truth, 
but they are not the kinds of things which themselves 
can be true or false. Such a 
paradigm case of relativism . 
10gosition 
seems to be a 
Trigg continues by citing Peter Winch as one of the major perpetrators 
of this Wittgensteinian relativism: 
Winch fails to separate 'reality' from language, so that 
language actually seems to determine what is real. Even 
an objectivist, of course, would admit that there is a 
link between a language and what is regarded as real. A 
language expresses a community's beliefs about reality. 
The objectivist, however, would still wish to insist that 
'reality' exists apart from people's beliefs, and that 
their beliefs could be mistaken. An essential function 
of the language, he would maintain, is to concern 
itself with what actually is the case. Its business is 
to communicate truth. Winch will have none of this. Ile 
says 'reality is not what gives language sense. What is 
real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense that 
language has. Further, both the distinction between the 
real and the unreal and the concept of agreement with 
reality themselves belong to our languagef. It follows 
that different languages cannot be thought of as 
different attempts to describe the same reality. 'Reality 
lo6 
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is made relative to a lazDyuage and if different languages Cý portray 'the world' differently, then thore must be 
different worlds. If one accepts this conclusion, one 
is remorselessly driven to unpalatable consequences. The 
result of granting that 'the world' or 'reality? cannot 
be conceived as independent of all conceptual schemes is 
that there is no reason to suppose that what the peoples 
of very different communities see as the world is similar 
in any way. 107 
It must be kept in mind in analyzing'what Trigg has said that he 
begins by agreeing that it is impossible to argue outside of all conceptual 
frameworks in order to decide between or among them. There is no ideal 
observer status, at least not for human beings. Trigg is also in 0 
agreement that there is a close link between language and what is thought 
of as reality. 
But it also must be said that Trigg does not seem to fully 
understand Winch's position. Nowhere is his article about Evans-Pritchard's 
work oh the Azandes does Winch suggest either implicitly or explicitly 
that language describes reality. Rathor, the speakers. of a natural 
0 
language express their beliefs about reality in that language. It is the 
beliefs, not the languagep that can be true or false. 
For Winch, and for Wittgenstein as well, different cultures have 
different concepts, and there is no neutral way of comparing them. But 
nowhere do either Winch or Wittgenstein suggest that the people of these 
different cultures also have different worlds. Trigg seems to confuse 
these two points. In Wisdomts terms, we might suggest that different 
cultures have different connecting techniques for making sense of the 
107 
Ibid., p. 15. 
279. 
same world. Still, Trigg offers a rather detailed argument in support 
of the view that "different concepts mean different worlds": 
If the members of different societies live in different 
worlds and do not merely have varying and conflicting 
beliefs about the same reality, there will not 
necessarily be any point of contact between the 
concepts of one society and those of another. If 
different societies are dealing with the same world, 
it is possible in principle to examine how differently 
they describe the same things. All that is necessary 
is to see what members of the respective societies say 
when confronted with a specified situation, such as a 
cat or a mat. The words in one group can be regarded 
as a translations of the words of the other. If the 
assumption concerning the objectivity of what they 
describe is removed, there can be no justification 
for comparing what they say, because they may be 
talking about very different things. In these 
circumstances instead of their concepts determine 
the composition. Different concepts, therefore, mean 
a different world, so that what the world is like is 
relative to a conceptual scheme and the language of 
the system. 108 
In this passage Trigg uses the words "reality" and "world" as 
though they are interchangeable. Both are used in a very comprehensive U 
way. Ile does not refer to different aspects of the world or the different 
sorts of things and situations that go into the making of the world. 
Trigg's comment contains the naive assumption that all aspects of reality 
or parts of the world are made of the same stuff. But he fails'to see 
that there are criteria for distinguishing between different senses of 
what is "real". For example, one may walk by a department store window 
and say that the mannequin is 'not a real person. We can also point to 
an acquaintance and say, because of a lack of self knowledge on the part 
108 
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of that person, that lie or she is not a real person. Here we clearly 
have two different criteria for real and unreal because they are 
different aspects of the world or different kinds of situations that 
go into the making of the "world". 
Wittgenstein does use the term welibild, (usually translated as 
world picture), but he is not using it in the simplistic way Trigg uses 
'reality' or tworld'. For Wittgenstein, thin world picture is one that 
comes together through the conflation of a huge complex of different 
but overlapping beliefs systems. They overlap in the sense that a 
belief system about what. a person feels is different from but related 
to the belief system about how a person looks, for example. In these 
two systems of belief we use two different sets of concepts and these 
concepts are not subject to the same rules. Still, with all of -that 
said, it is clear that Wittgenstein believed that talking about 
different concepts is not tantamount to "different worlds". 
Trigg seems intent on concentrating on those examples in which it 
is supposed that different concepts are used to talk about the same 
thing, where "the same thing" does not mean different aspects of the 
same thing but the same aspect. It is in these cases where he speaks 
about the assumption of objectivity in relation to what is described. 
If this assumption is removed, Trigg argues, there can be no way of 
comparing what the two groups of people have to say. Although it could 
be pointed out that Trigg seems to have a rather peculiar notion of what 
counts as a thing, in that he seems not to realize that what counts as a 
thing is always decided in some quite specific context, in a way it could 
also be said that Trigg is correct. If the concepts of two cultures are 
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radically different, there may not be enough shared notions for 
communication between them to be easy. 
But the real violence Trigg seems to, do to the Wittgensteinian 0 
position is that the former implies that in the latter's position there 
is no way of showing that any beliefs are false. Certainly, Wittgenstein 
does not make this claim. Indeed, any belief that has the logical -status 
of an empirical hypothesis can, at least in principle, be shown to be 
false. Someone who thinks that the world is flat, to use one of Triggts 
favorite examples, can be shown to be incorrect very easily. There are 
all sorts of empirical pieces of evidence for suggesting this position 
is in error. 
But we must recall that the logical status of Forsyth's religious 
assertions about the problem of evil are closer in form to Wittgensteinian 
foundational certainties than they are to empirical hypotheses. 
Therefore, it is inappropriate to use empirical criteria to determine the 
truth or falsity of these claims. Indeed, it is impossible to ascertain 
their truth in this way, for, as Wisdom has-suggested, the supposed 
truth of these propositions goes beyond the 'facts' of the world. 
D. Z. Phillips attempts to make this same point when he suggests 
that a religious question like "What kind of reality is divine reality? " 
is not like the hypofthical question, IlIs this physical object real? " 
Rather, the religious question is more like the foundational certainty, 
"What kind of reality is the reality of physical objects? " 
I suggest that more can be gained if one compares the 
question, "What kind of reality is divine reality? " not 
with the question, "Is this physical object real or not? " 
but with the different question, "What kind of reality 
is the reality of physical objects? " To ask whether 
physical objects are real is not like asking whether this 
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appearance is real or not where often one can find out. 
I can find out whether unicorns are real or not, but how 
can I find out whether the physical world is real or not. 
The latter question is not about the possibility of 
carrying out an investigation. It is a question of whether 
it is possible to speak of truth and falsity in the 
physical world; a question prior to that of determining 
the truth or falsity of any particular matter of fact. 
Similarly, the question about the reality of the divine 
is a question about the possibility of sense and 
nonsense, truth and falsity in religion. When God's 
existence is constructed as a matter of fact, it is taken 
for granted that the concept God is at home within the 
conceptual framework of the reality of the physical world. 
It is as if we said 'We know where the assertions of God's 
existence belongs, we understand what kind of assertion 
it is; all we need to do now is determine its truth or 
falsity'. But to ask a question about the reality of God 
is to ask a question about a kind of reality, not about 
the reality of this or that, in much the same way as 
asking about the reality of physical objects is not to ask 
about the reality of this or that physical object. 109 
At this point in our discussion we must attempt to avoid a possible 
misunderstanding the use of this Phillips' quotation might engender. 
My position is closer-to John Wisdom's use of Wittgenstein thanlit is 
to the position of Phillips'. Wisdom wrote nothing about On Certainty. 
110 
Nevertheless, I think he would agree with Phillips claim that a religious 
question like "What kind of reality is divine reality? " is more like 
the question "What kind of reality ýs the reality of physical objects? " 
rather than "Is this particular thing real? " Wisdom would be in 
agreement with Phillips on, this point, I think, because he would also say 
log 
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It is clear that Phillips example comes directly from section 20 of 
On Certainty: "'Doubting the existence of the material world', does 
not mean for example doubting the existence of a planet which later 
observation proved to exist". 
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that religious propositions are not empirical propositions, not experimental. 
hypotheses to be proved. For Wisdom, in the case of experimental hypotheses 
further evidence should always be relevant and may make a difference to 
what can reasonably be believed. In the case of religious assertions, 
however, there is no further evidence to be collected. It is a matter 
rather of how most reasonably to construe or connect the evidence. 
Wisdom points out that religious apologists have nothing to tell us when 
it comes to what the facts are, except what is already known. 
At the same time, Wisdom would probably profoundly disagree with 
Phillips on a number of v. ery important points. He would not admit, for 
example, that religious propositions have their own Itsense", though he 
would say that often religious language is metaphorical or sometimes 
initially paradoxical. All religious propositions, Wisdom would suggestp 
from any form-of-life, must pass the initial test of logical consistency 
and intelligibility. It is true that one form-of-lifets religious 
propositions may be difficult to understand by those in another form of 
life, but this is no warrant for believing in round squares. 
In reading Death and Immortality 
ill 
one wonders whether Phillips 
case for religious language does not turn out to be a subtle denial of 
' 4, 
what it is usually thought, particularly by those who are religious, to 
6 
be about. In a real way Phillips seems to have, given up any attempt 
to defend theism except in terms of social function and meaning. Wisdoms 
unlike Phillips, would argue that although religious assertions are not 
ill 
D. Z. Phillips, Death and Immortality (London: Macmillan, 1970). 
284. 
empirical hypotheses, they may, nevertheless, refer to realities that 
exist independently of the language games in which these entities are 
mentioned. Phillips would deny that the concept tGodt refers to 
something Vnich is there independently of whether people believe in 
him or not. He also holds a similar position about the soul: 
To say of someone 'Hefd sell his sould for money' is 
a perfectly natural remark. It in no way entails any 
philosophical theory about the duality of human nature. 
The remark is a moral observation about a person, one 
that expresses the degraded state that person is in. 
A man's soul, in this context, refers to his integrity, 
to the complex of practices and beliefs which acting 
with integrity would cover for that person. Might not 
9112 talk about immortality of the soul play a similar role. 
Later, in the samemork, Phillips answers his rhetorical quostion: 
... questions about the immortality of the soul are seen to be not questions concerning the extent of a nants 
life, and in particular concerning whether that life can 
extend beyond the grave, but questions concerning the 
kind of life a man is living. I13 
Certainly, Phillips suggested use of the term 'soul' is a proper one 
given the context he has supplied, but that is not the only context in 
which the world soul is used. Indeed, when the devout believer says, 
"I believe in the life of the world to come", he is most frequently 
voicing a belief that he will survive death. 
In contrast to Phillips, Wisdom would hold that although religious 
propositions are not empii-ical hypotheses, they may, nevertheless, have 
cognitive significance. His Position, in a real way, closes the gap 
112 
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between the cognitive and noncognitive functions of religious language. 
Wisdom proposes that religious language may contribute to cognitive 
inquiry while at the same time not being subject to the rules of 
verification. In some ways, his position is not unlike some of the 
insights of Immanuel Kant. Kant grants that religious language, even 
within the domain of pure theoretical reason, has certain hueristic 
functions which are similar, I believe, to the function of Wisdom's 
connecting technique. Imagining God as a cosmic Designer can give shape 
and direction to the framing of our observations. Kant admitted that 
God concepts can never be cognitively justified, but he did believe, 
nevertheless, that the term 'God' and 'immortality' actually refer to 
something. 
114 
Nevertheless, even with these caveats, Phillips still has something 
important here to tell us. Because the question "What kind of reality 
is divine reality? " is much more like the foundational certainty, "Physical 
objects exist" than it is like the hypothesis flunicorns exist"t 
justification for holding that there is a divine reality should not be 
required in the same way it is for empirical hypotheses. The reality 
of physical objects is one of Wittgensteints certainties. It is a 
foundational principle on which other assertions about the world are 
based. In an analogous way, positing the existence of God is a 
foundational principle, a principle on which many of our other religious 
assertions'are based. One should not be required to justify this religious 
114 
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason Kant Selections edited 'F by T. M. Greene New York: Charles Scriberts Sons, 1929) pp. 242ff. 
and 260-262. 
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assertion on empirical grounds because it functions with a different 
logical status than do hypothetical assertions about which we usually 
have or ask for proof. 
The import this point has for our study should be apparent. When 
Forsyth makes religious assertions about the problem of evil he is 
making a set of claims which are based largely on a number of foundational 
principles on which the Christian form of life is based. He has taken 
as his starting point certain nonempirical propositions about the saving 
work of Jesus Christ and his central role in Christian theodicy. 
Having assumed this Christological. perspective, I have attempted 
in this chapter to show that P. T. Forsythts answer to the problem of 
evil is one that is allowed by reason, as well as one that is firmly 
rooted within the Christian form of life. It is true that critics might 
still ýespond by suggesting that I have reneged on my original promise 
to keep the victim of suffering central in my response to the problem of 
evil. Some might suggest that by resorting to Forsyth's teleological 
perspective I have ceased to give justice to the pain of the sufferer. 
It may be the case that outside the context of an existential 
relation with God it would only be rational and correct to claim that the 
experience of suffering is so real that it cannot be seen as an occasion 
for good, and that no amount of divine suffering can change the original 
terror of evil. But within the existential relation, the picturing of 
the world is quite different. Here the crushing reality of evil is not 
disputed, indeed it is confirmed. But at the same time, the attributes 
of God come to be realized within the. context of "seeing God". This 
process occurs in different ways, both in Job's encounter with Yahweh and 
237. 
with the Christian's encounter with Christ. When Job "sees God", as 
we have shown in chdpter four, the problem of evil radically changes in 
focus. He suddenly understands the foundational principles on which his 
faith is based. 
A similar alteration of the context for theodicy occurs in the 
case of the Christian's personal relation to God in Christ. For the 
Christian, it is in Jesus that one "sees God". In the context of this 
existential relation, the sufferer comes to see the son of God's victory 
over death as not diminishing the horror of evil, but rather 'confirming 
it in a most graphic way. 
That God had to die on the cross bocomes. for the Christian the 
problem of evil, and this realization totally recasts the way in which 
"the victim approaches theodicy. God's transformation of judgement into 
mercy in the cross of Christ allows the Christian sufferer to see evil 
as an occasion for good, but only on the basis of the work of Christ. 
God conquered evil in Christ, but this does not diminish its reality 
here and now. Rather, it gives the sufferer who is in Christ the power 
to transform his experience of evil into an occasion of good and to 
see in a future order the possibility of a respite from evil, not a 
repairing of it. 
115 
It might still be asked why God chooses to do things in this way? 
Why must we "accept the ticket? " The answer, very plainly, is that the 
experience of "seeinf; God leads the victim, not in the direction of a 
115 
k. - The well Icnown eschatological statement of Mother Julian's cap4-u--e:, 
this quiet'optimism: "But all shall be well, and all shall be well, 
and all manner of things shall be well". (Quoted in Hickts Evil and 
the God of Love, p. 264. ) 
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theoretical theodicy which answers all our questions about natural and 
moral evil, but rather sets the sufferer in a new life and provides the 
basis for a practical response to the problem of evil. As Forsyth puts 
it, the Christian theodicy lie is advocating is "not really an answer to 
a riddle but a victory in a battle". 
116 
This is where the Christian response to evil goes well beyond the 
Book of Job. Job could only go his way with the realization of the 
ontological gulf between himself and God and the trust in a teleological 
answer; the Christian receives the Good News that God has reconciled the 
two in Christ. In Christ, the sufferer finds a firm position from which 
to take a stand against evil. Participating in the suffering of Christ, 
the victim can partake in the victory of the ultimate victim over the 
powers of sin, evil and suffering. Rather than being paralyzed by the 
experience of evil, the victim, in Christ, is able to share in the practical 
struggle against it. As Oliver Quick puts it, "Our Lord's victorious 
self-sacrifice was not achieved in order to make our own unnecessary, but 
117 to make it possible. Indeed, if the Christian believes that God 
"empties himself" in Christ, he has the comforting assurance, as C. S. Lewis 
has expressed it, that "in self-giving, if anywhere, we touch a rhythm not 
only of all creation but of all being". 
118 
Austin Farrer gives a good description of how the victim of 
suffering who continues to abide in the Christian existential relation 
with God may respond to the problem of evil with the acceptance of his 
116 
P. T. Forsyth, The Justification of God, p. 211. 
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Oliver Quick, Doctrines of the Creed, p. 212. 
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practical calling in the world: 
An overmastering sense of human ills can be taken as the 
world's invitation to deny her Maker, or it may be taken 
as Godts invitation to succor His world. Which is it to 
be? Those who take the practical alternative become more 
closely acquainted with misery than the onlookers; but 
they feel the grain of existence, and the movement of the 
purposes of God. They do not argue, they love; and what 
is loved is always known as good. The more we love the 
more we feel the evils besetting or corrupting the 
objects of love. But the more we feel the force of the 
besetting harms, the more certain we feel of the value 
residing in what they attack; and in resisting them we 
are identified with the action of God, whose mercy is 
over our flesh. 119 
In the final analysis, more than any carefully reasoned theodicy, 
we must come to the realization that it is the figure of Christ, the God 
become man, who enables us to endure and indeed to transcend suffering. 
At the heart of the Christian message we must find a God who identifies 
himself so thoroughly with his creatures that he becomeo ono of them. 
It is true that-the particulars of Forsyth's thoodicy are not 
entirely clear. But we must trust that at bottom level the prima facie 
Christian paradox of evil is merely apparent. In the final analysis, we 
must trust as one of the Magi does in a Dorothy Sayers play: 
I do not mind being ignorant and unhappy-- 
All I ask is the assurance that I am not alone, 
Some courage, some comfort against the burden of fear and pain. 
If He is beside me, bearing the weight of His own creationy 
If I may hear his voice among the voices of the vanquished, 
If I may feel his hand touch mine in the darknessp 
If I may look upon the hidden face of God 
and read in the eyes of God 120 that He is acquainted with grief. 
119 
Austin Farrer, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited (New York: Doubleday, 
1961) pp. 164fC. 
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As quoted in John Kenner's Suffering and Death: Two . 
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Breaking Points (Now York: Macmillan, 1968) p. 315. 
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